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ABSTRACT
Thoughts Of Becoming: Negotiating Modernity And Identity In Bangladesh
By
Humayun Kabir
Advisor: Uday Mehta
This dissertation constructs a history and conducts an analysis of Bangladeshi political thought
with the aim to better understand the thought-world and political subjectivities in Bangladesh.
The dissertation argues that political thought in Bangladesh has been profoundly structured by
colonial and other encounters with modernity and by concerns about constructing a national
identity. Negotiations between the incomplete and continuous projects of modernization and
identity formation have produced certain anxieties about becoming that permeates political
consciousness and ideas in the country. Though such anxieties of becoming are also shared by
other postcolonial countries, the specific, though not necessarily exclusive, character of
Bangladeshi thought emerges out of the country’s particular political history and the double birth
of the nation – first as Pakistan, then as Bangladesh. The dissertation seeks to establish this
specific character of Bangladeshi political thought and political subjectivity through
investigations into the political and intellectual histories of erstwhile East Pakistan and present
day Bangladesh, engaging closely with the political lives and thoughts of four select thinkers and
political actors – Abul Mansur Ahmad, Abul Hashim, Maolana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani,
and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
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NOTES ON TRANSLATIONS, TRANSLITERATIONS, AND NAMES
● This dissertation draws heavily upon Bangla language primary texts. All the translations
from Bangla are mine unless otherwise stated.
● I use the spelling “Bangla” rather than Anglicized “Bengali” to name the language
because Bangladeshi scholars increasingly prefer to use the former spelling. However, I
retain the use of “Bengali” to refer to the ethno-linguistic group.
● What is Bangladesh today was legally called “East Pakistan” from 1956 to 1971 and was
named “East Bengal” until then. I alternate between these three names depending on the
historical period under discussion.
● Non-English terms are italicized and their meanings are explained either in context or in
parenthetical notes.
● I use phonetic transliterations of Bangla and other non-English terms, phrases, names.
However, certain non-English terms and names may appear in variant spellings in
quotations or titles of primary sources. For example, while I use the spelling “maolana,” a
word that means Muslim scholar, is variously spelled as “maulana” or “mawlana”.
● For the sake of continuity I have used “Calcutta” and “Dhaka” to spell the names of these
cities despite other spellings used historically or preferred by contemporary authorities.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

For days in February 2013, tens of thousands of mostly young people chanting fanshi
chai, “we want a hanging,” occupied Shahbag, a square at the heart of Bangladesh’s capital
Dhaka. This was not, however, a mob of Islamic fundamentalists demanding the death of an
atheist or apostate offenders of Islam. Rather, they were smart young urbanites occupying the
square strategically and articulating their demands creatively and colorfully. They were
protesting a lenient sentence and demanding capital punishment instead for alleged “warcriminals,”1 who had been accused of collaborating with the Pakistani Army in perpetrating mass
atrocities and genocide during Bangladesh’s “liberation war” 2 in 1971 and were being tried by a
special tribunal. The demonstration, lasting weeks, became known variously as ProjonomoChattar [generation square], Gonojagoron Mancha [people’s wakening platform/stage], and
simply and most popularly as Shahbag, named after the square occupied by the demonstrators.
The demonstration became a movement as it gripped consciousness of and spurred to action
millions of Bangladeshis in and outside of Bangladesh. The war-crime trials and the Shahbag
movement, however, also provoked a determined and widespread counter movement by Jamaat1

Though the accused were formally charged with “crimes against humanity” and not “warcrimes,” the media, commentators, and public commonly used the terms war crimes and war
criminals to refer to the trials and the accused. See Kjell Anderson, “Collective Crime,
Collective Memories, and Transitional Justice in Bangladesh,” in Understanding the Age of
Transitional Justice: Crimes, Courts, Commissions, and Chronicling, ed. Nanci Adler (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2018).
2
The nine months of war, from March 26th to December 16th of 1971, that preceded the
emergence of the Bangladeshi state have been dubbed in Bangladeshi historiography as
Shadhinotar Juddho [war of independence] and Mukti-Juddho [war of liberation]. Pakistani
historians and some international commentators have chosen to describe the war as a civil war or
war of secession. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the
Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
1

e-Islami and its allies, who had close ties with the accused war criminals. The counter movement
staged rallies, strikes, and sieges and was accused of rioting, vandalism, and attacks on lawenforcement personnel and minority communities. While the Bangladesh government tried to coopt the Shahbag movement, it responded to the counter movement with a curious mix of
appeasement and violent suppression. These two movements and the state’s reaction produced
massive political unrest and a cycle of violence that claimed dozens of lives. For weeks it
seemed that Bangladesh was at the edge of a precipice and radical change was in the cards.
Those anxieties and hopes, however, proved to be far-fetched and soon enough the Shahbag
movement and its counter movements subsided and political life in Bangladesh returned to
relative normalcy.
It would be reasonable to treat the political moment produced by the Shahbag movement
as just another forgettable episode of political unrest in a country where political unrest is all too
frequent. Yet there was and continues to be a feeling among close observers of Bangladesh that
Shahbag was somehow different and significant.3 Given my personal connection with and
scholarly interest in Bangladesh, I have followed the “Shahbag moment” closely and have
participated in discussions trying to make sense of it.4 I find the Shahbag moment significant,
and I invoke it here because the immediate concerns of the trial and punishments of past “war-

3

Shahbag provoked discussions and debates on various platforms and mediums – from social
media comments to op-eds in major newspapers to scholarly articles to academic symposiums.
See Ratan Kumar Roy, “Performing Shahbag: Debating Culture and Politics of Youth in
Contemporary Bangladesh,” in Culture and Politics in South Asia: Performative
Communication, ed. Dev Nath Pathak and Sasanka Perera (New Delhi: Routledge India, 2017),
271–86, and Leslie J. Reynard, “Activism in the Public Cyber-Sphere: Shahbag Square and Rana
Plaza in Bangladesh,” in From Tahrir Square to Ferguson: Social Networks as Facilitators of
Social Movements, ed. Juliet Dee (New York: Peter Lang, 2017).
4
Beyond informal discussions in person and online, I wrote an opinion piece for the online
magazine Alal-O-Dulal and organized and moderated a panel discussion with several
Bangladeshi scholars on the topic at the CUNY Graduate Center on May 2, 2013.
2

criminals' ' that Shahbag responded to evoked fundamental questions regarding the identity and
character of the contemporary Bangladeshi nation. A new generation of Bangladeshis born after
independence and thus without any direct experience of the struggle and trauma that
accompanied the nation’s birth nevertheless had invoked the “Spirit of Liberation War'' to put
forward a vision of what it means to be Bangladeshi. However, the vision that the Shahbag
movement had advanced was not shared by many others in Bangladesh, as became apparent with
the emergence of a counter movement by Jamaat and its allies. Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest and
most significant Islamist political party in Bangladesh, mobilized support from thousands of
madrasa (Islamic religious school) teachers and students united under the banner of Hefazot-eIslam [protection of Islam]. The central point of contention became not so much the appropriate
severity of punishment for the war criminals but the appropriate role and place of religion,
namely Islam, in Bangladeshi society and politics. The Shahbag movement posited the ethnolinguistic category of “Bengali'' to be the central marker of Bangladeshi identity and advanced
visions for a secular and liberal Bangladesh. The movement used the accused war criminals’
association with Jamaat and other Islamist parties to delegitimize Islamist politics. On the other
hand, the Islamists stressed the centrality of Islam in Bangladeshi society and argued that
Shahbag was a movement of a small group of secular/atheist middle-class urbanites not only
against Islam but also against the sentiments of the majority of Bangladeshis. The Islamists also
accused the war-crimes trials and Shahbag movement for being instruments in the global
oppression of Islam carried out by the United States and its allies under the guise of the global
war on terror. What ultimately was at stake in this struggle over the appropriate place of Islam in
Bangladeshi politics was the identity of Bangladesh and what it means to be Bangladeshi.

3

The Shahbag moment is expressive not only of a struggle over national identity but also
of a profound tension between identity and modernity that often characterizes political discourses
in a place like Bangladesh. For example, the urban middle-class youth who participated in the
Shahbag movement have grown up with the Internet, cell phones, and satellite television. Their
desires and subjectivities have been shaped by globalized consumer culture and cosmopolitan
identities. They want to enjoy the freedoms and luxuries enjoyed by their counterparts elsewhere
in the world, particularly in the so-called First World that is so clearly visible via all the modern
means of communication. Yet, these freedoms and luxuries are placed at an insurmountable
distance by the location of the urbane participants of the Shahbag movement in contemporary
Bangladesh and by all the material, social, and political conditions that produce the country’s
backwardness. The young participants of Shahbag must constantly negotiate a contradiction in
constructing their subjectivities and identities. They must negotiate their global desires and
cosmopolitan aspirations with their local position in Bangladesh and their Bangladeshi
identities.5 To negotiate they must enter cosmopolitan spaces as Bangladeshi subjects, which
means Bangladeshi subjectivity itself must be admissible to the cosmopolitan. Thus, their efforts
to construct personal subjectivities are inexorably linked to struggles over the construction of
Bangladeshi identity. Putting it simply, to claim to be modern and Bangladeshi at the same time
they must claim Bangladesh modern. Yet the desire to become modern also exposes them to
charges of betraying their autochthonous identity, as illustrated by Hefazot’s efforts to portray
Shahbag as an elitist movement out of touch with the sensibilities of the devoutly religious
5

I echo Anthony Giddens’ argument in Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late
Modern Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991) about increasing interconnection
between globalizing influences and construction of self-identity. A similar argument in the
Bangladeshi context has been advanced by Faheem Hasan Shahed, “Revisiting Bangladeshi
Nationhood: Walking along Global, Glocal and Local Pathway,” Journal of Asiatic Society of
Bangladesh, HUM 58, no. 2 (2013): 239–61.
4

majority. The large following and participation that Hefazot generated, particularly among the
rural masses and madrasa students, in its effort to valorize traditional authority and practices in
the name of a religious identity, demonstrate that large sections of the Bangladeshi population
still remain apprehensive about the social changes modernization demands.
This tension between identity and modernity highlighted by the Shahbag moment is not
an isolated phenomenon but symptomatic and expressive of deep-seated contradictions and
unresolved tensions that have long characterized Bangladesh’s society, politics, culture, and
thought-world. The project of constructing Bangladeshi identity remains unfinished and
contested even after forty-seven years of existence as an independent state. Not only are there
debates about the contents that would define Bangladeshi-ness but also the category of
“Bangladeshi” remains contested and unstable.6 On the other hand, as conventional descriptions
of Bangladesh as a “developing,” “democratizing,” and “modernizing” country suggest, the
program of becoming modern also remains unfinished and continuous. These transformative
processes and contestations over national identity have produced a sense in Bangladesh that
things are in constant flux, that identities are unsettled, that orders are not fully established, and
that a fully functional system is not yet in place. This state of flux produced by the dual
processes of becoming modern and a nation has shaped the character of Bangladesh, including
its political dynamics and discourses. Engaging the debates, struggles, anxieties, excitements,
and hopes that these two processes of becoming have generated enhance our understanding of
Bangladeshi politics. This dissertation project focuses on how Bangladeshis experience and
negotiate the tensions arising from the processes of becoming Bangladeshi and modern.

6

The question of whether the national identity of Bangladesh should be “Bengali” or
“Bangladeshi” is highly contentious, arising from partisan political affiliations and different
theoretical understanding of identity. I will discuss this debate more fully in the coming pages.
5

Though a project examining the tension between modernity and identity can be quite
enormous in scope and can pursue different questions employing various methodologies from a
range of disciplines, I seek to understand this tension through a political theory approach. The
decision arises partially from my academic location and training within the discipline of political
science and political theory. More importantly, however, the concerns about becoming a nation
and modern are political concerns about social order and transformations, which constitute some
of the core concerns of political theory. Decades earlier Isaiah Berlin argued that political
philosophy is possible only in a society where the ends of politics collide because there “is no
total acceptance of any single end.”7 Though Berlin was not talking about postcolonial
developing nations like Bangladesh, his idea of “collision of political ends” captures the
character of political dynamics and discourses in such places rather well. And, if political theory
is “a tradition of discourse concerned about the present being and well being of collectivities,”8
discourses about modernization and national identity formation fall within the purview of
political theory. This is not to say that in Bangladesh a significant body of literature can be
recognized as formal political theory or that this dissertation produces any such theory. Rather, I
approach the tension between modernity and identity through political theory because, as Wolin
has argued, one of the vocations of political theorists is to “sharpen our sense of the subtle,
complex interplay between political experience and thought.”9
Over the last half-century, political theorists have passionately debated about what it
means to do political theory. Despite the diverging definitions, a degree of consensus exists that
7

Isaiah Berlin in his 1961 essay “Does Political Theory Still Exist?” in Concepts and Categories
Philosophical Essays, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
8
Sheldon Wolin, The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).
9
Sheldon Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” The American Political Science Review 63,
no. 4 (December 1969): 1062–82. (p. 1077)
6

at least one vocation of political theory is to study history of political thought or to carry out, in
Michael Freeden’s words, “an analysis and interpretation of the rich and layered thought practice
referred to as political thinking.”10 Though political thought should ideally include both thinking
about politics and thinking politically, Freeden argues, conventional approaches in political
theory have predominantly focused on the former through their preference for “the thinking of
political and intellectual elites, such as politicians, scholars, and commentators.”11 Staying within
the convention, I analyze the negotiation of modernity and identity in Bangladeshi political
thought by focusing on a set of intellectuals and political actors. Admittedly, such a project will
give us direct access to the experiences and thought worlds of only a small, and perhaps elite,
section of the population. However, political and intellectual discourses exist in and respond to
concrete historical and political contexts and dynamics and reflect the aspirations and
experiences of not only the actors participating in these discourses but also of people in general.
Thus, an examination of the thinking of Bangladeshi politicians, scholars, and commentators
helps us understand how people in Bangladesh experience becoming modern and a nation.
The state of becoming, the feeling of flux, and the tension between modernity and
identity are not unique to Bangladesh but experienced by other countries, particularly those
situated outside of the West. These experiences are intrinsic to the “postcolonial condition,”
where uncertainties about national identities are compounded by the experience of backwardness
as a form of identity.12 Postcolonial nations, which emerge from and through the experiences of

10

Michael Freeden, The Political Theory of Political Thinking: The Anatomy of a Practice
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
11
Ibid, p. 19
12
This idea of the “postcolonial condition” is borrowed from Akhil Gupta, who proposes it based
on his readings of postcolonial critiques, most notably those advanced by Partha Chatterjee.
Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2003).
7

being colonized by modern European countries, face a double-edge challenge. They must on the
one hand articulate an autochthonous national identity and on the other hand overcome the
backwardness that the authenticity necessarily implies. The backwardness of the post-colonial
countries is produced materially through colonial exploitation and relations of dependent
capitalism and discursively through a Eurocentric understanding of history, progress, modernity,
and development.13 Thus, the tension between identity and modernity in Bangladesh must
necessarily be analyzed with reference to the general dynamics of the colonial and postcolonial
encounter with modernity and national identity formation. And, such an analysis must engage
with the vast and rich bodies of literature dealing with modernity, nationalism and the
postcolonial condition. However, if my dissertation is to be compelling it must go beyond the
literature reviews and even beyond analyzing Bangladesh as another case study of the
postcolonial condition. It must add to understanding the postcolonial condition by delineating
the specificities of the negotiation between modernity and identity in Bangladesh.
This dissertation demonstrates that Bangladesh’s thought world, intellectual tendencies,
and political discourses are conditioned by specific encounters with modernity and by the
specific history of nationalism in Bangladesh. Bangladeshi thought-world and politicalintellectual discourses, like those of other postcolonial countries, are engaged with modern
Western discourses but are neither reducible to nor wholly determined by them. In this space of
negotiation between modernity and Bangladeshi identity lays the possibility of recovering a
Bangladeshi subjectivity and a distinct body of political thought. The phrase “negotiation” is
employed here to capture a process that is different from a simple contestation between Western

13

Arturo Escobar, following Edward Said’s arguments about the discursive construction of the
Orient, in Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
8

modernity and an essential notion of Bangladeshi-ness. Rather, the negotiation between
modernity and Bangladeshi identity involves adoption, appropriation, and reinvention not only of
tradition and identity but also of modernity. This negotiation produces a modernity that is
stamped with a specific “Bangladeshi” national identity, itself a modern invention. This
argument undertakes an examination of how Bangladeshi national identity has been imagined
and constructed through the process of the double birth of the nation. Arguing against the
dominant nationalist narratives, I treat the emergence of the postcolonial state of Pakistan in
1947 as the moment of the first birth of the nation, which produce the possibilities and
necessities for the second birth of the nation as Bangladesh in 1971 and inexorably shape
discourses about identity and modernity in post-colonial Bangladesh.

I argue against the

nationalist interpretation that reads the birth of Bangladesh as the negation of the Muslim
nationalism of Pakistan. Though in many ways the birth of Bangladesh represents a historical
break and a negation of Pakistan, Bangladeshi nationalist discourses in 1971 and after have
shown remarkable continuity with the discourses of Pakistani nationalism of the 1940s and
afterwards, at least as it was understood by Bengali-Muslim actors. In both moments of the
double birth efforts to construct a regional or national identity were motivated by desires to
inhabit Bengali and Muslim identities while producing distinctions from other Bengalis and other
Muslims, as well as from other larger identity categories like Indian, Pakistani, humanity, etc. As
the Shahbag moment demonstrates, the tension arising from the uneasy cohabitation of Bengali
and Muslim identities still informs Bangladeshi political discourses.
Though the specific history of Bangladeshi nationalism is a central concern, I do not,
however, simply produce a history of nationalism or nationalist thought in Bangladesh. I analyze
not only how the identities of Bengali and Muslim have been constructed and mobilized to

9

imagine the nation but also the political ideals and ethical impulses contained within those
imaginations. Like political thinkers elsewhere, Bangladeshi thinkers also have been concerned
with questions regarding the nature of man, political authority, the place of religion in politics
and society, and such in their efforts to elaborate conceptions of freedom, equality, and justice.
Reflections on these perennial themes of political theory, however, occurred and continue to
occur in postcolonial contexts like Bangladesh within the discursive and political horizon set by
nationalism. As postcolonial political thought is almost always entangled with nationalist
concerns, I excavate the efforts to accommodate, appropriate, and negotiate with ostensibly
modern political ideals like freedom, equality, or progress by analyzing the political ideals
elaborated in imagining the nation.
Bangladesh has for decades been imagined as little more than a “basket case” ravaged by
natural calamities, overpopulation, war, and political strife. As it began to shed some of these
labels by making significant progress towards economic growth and Millennium Human
Development Goals, it has been rebranded, following the logics of the Global War on Terror, as
a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.14 Postcolonial Bangladesh exists in an
epistemic void except as an object of development, democratization, and more recently
securitization. Bangladeshi actors have rarely been treated seriously as subjects of
modernization, with their own thoughts and anxieties about modernization and nation building.
Consequently, the Bangladeshi thought-world has received scant attention in Western academia.
Even South Asia specialists rarely engage with the political and intellectual discourses of
Bangladesh. While the colonial Bengal of the 19th and early 20th centuries has been studied
extensively and while there exist numerous nuanced and sophisticated readings of many Bengali
14

Ali Riaz and C. Christine Fair, Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh (New York:
Routledge, 2011).
10

thinkers from this period, Bengali-Muslims who have constituted Bangladeshi identity over the
course of the 20th century are hardly ever read. I seek to fill the lacuna by producing a general
intellectual history and engaging the thought world of select 20th century Bengali-Muslim
intellectuals and public figures, focusing especially on the second half of the century. In doing so
I capture the complexities and distinctiveness of Bangladeshi nationalism and its negotiations
with modernity. Moreover, discussions of Bengali-Muslim construction and conceptualization of
Muslim identity will provide nuance in the global discourses on Islam, which still to a large
degree view Islam through the orientalist tropes as the quintessential other of Western modernity
and fail to appreciate the diversity of Muslims.

11

Theoretical concerns and location of the dissertation in various fields of studies
This dissertation is in dialogue with a body of literature that traverses multiple
disciplinary boundaries and fields of study including political theory, comparative politics, and
history. On the theoretical level the dissertation engages with literature on political theory,
postcolonial theories, non-Western political thought, modernity, modernization, and national
identity. It also engages with studies in South Asian intellectual history and analyses politics,
history, economy, culture, and the identity of Bangladesh and South Asia.
It is located within the vibrant discussions and debates about what is or should be
political theory or what it means to do political theory.15 While many political theorists have
chosen to study the history of political thought or intellectual history in general, they have
differed greatly about how to read texts, understand contexts, construct a history of ideas, or
analyze political discourses. The debates and tensions have opened up innovative ways of doing
political theory.16 Over the last few decades, Postcolonial critics have contributed to this
productive tension by critiquing the Eurocentrism of modern social and political theories and
highlighting how these theories have denied the agency of non-Westerners as thinking subjects
15

John Gunnell’s commentaries, especially Political Theory and Social Science: Cutting Against
the Grain (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), and the commentaries by political theorists
assembled in Noël O’Sullivan, ed., Political Theory in Transition (New York: Routledge, 2000)
and Stephen K. White and J. Donald Moon, eds., What Is Political Theory? (Thousand Oaks:
SAGE Publications Ltd, 2004) provide an excellent survey of the nature and state of political
theory.
16
Methodological discussions in political theory inevitably involve engagement with the
provocative and fruitful arguments advanced by Quentin Skinner over four decades and
assembled in Visions of Politics, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). In
addition, the following essays and books provide an excellent overview of methodological
debates: Leslie Butler, “From the History Of Ideas to Ideas In History,” Modern Intellectual
History 9, no. 01 (2012): 157–69, Patricia L. Dunmire, “Political Discourse Analysis: Exploring
the Language of Politics and the Politics of Language,” Language and Linguistics Compass 6,
no. 11 (2012): 735–751, Freeden, The Political Theory of Political Thinking (2013), and Daniel
Wickberg, “Intellectual History vs. the Social History of Intellectuals,” Rethinking History 5, no.
3 (November 2001): 383–95.
12

and have excluded non-Western thought from their canons.17 In efforts to recover the agency of
colonial and postcolonial subjects some scholars have sought to analyze how the politics,
subjectivity, and thought of both the colonized and the colonizer have been structured by
colonial encounters and the exigencies of imperialism.18 Other scholars, however, have
deemphasized the centrality of colonial encounters and have focused, instead, on travel,
friendship, and other encounters to explain global circulations of ideas and the emergence of
cosmopolitan thought zones and theories.19 The effects of both the Postcolonial critiques and the
efforts to theorize cosmopolitan thought have been positive for the study of non-Western thought
17

While the seminal texts of postcolonial theories such as Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White
Masks, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1994 [1952]) and The Wretched of
the Earth, trans. Richard Philcox, (New York: Grove Press, 2005 [1963]) and Edward W Said,
Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) have established a critique of the denial of the
agency of non-Western/colonized subjects, a foundational concern of postcolonialism, more
recent critics has focused on the exclusion of non-Western thought and knowledge. Especially
notable among the critiques that have informed my thinking on the subject are Dipesh
Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Partha Chatterjee, “The Poverty of Western
Political Theory: Concluding Remarks on Concepts Like ‘Community’ East and West,” in
Indian Political Thought: A Reader, ed. Aakash Singh and Silika Mohapatra (New York:
Routledge, 2010), Mohammad Salama, Islam, Orientalism and Intellectual History: Modernity
and the Politics of Exclusion Since Ibn Khaldun (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2011).
18
See Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: The Derivative
Discourse? (London: Zed Books, 1986), Sudipta Kaviraj, On the Construction of Colonial
Power: Structure, Discourse, Hegemony (New Delhi: Indian council of social science research,
1989), Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late
Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and
Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1999), C. A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and
Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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See Fred Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1996), Roxanne Euben, Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and
Western Travelers in Search of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006), Leela
Gandhi, Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and the Politics
of Friendship (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), Javed Majeed, Autobiography, Travel &
Postnational Identity: Gandhi, Nehru, and Iqbal (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),
Sugata Bose and Kris Manjapra, Cosmopolitan Thought Zones: South Asia and the Global
Circulation of Ideas (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), Farah Godrej, Cosmopolitan
Political Thought: Method, Practice, Discipline (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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and have inspired studies on Arab, Muslim, and Indian thought and intellectual history that break
with the orientalist practice of treating non-Western thought either as an exotic other or as a
vestige of a dying past.20 Scholars have also intervened in the field of political theory by asking
what it means to theorize from non-Western locations. Many of these scholars have noted that
non-Western, particularly post-colonial, settings produce different fields of politics and, thus, the
study of non-Western political thought and action generates different theoretical insights from
those coming out of a Western context.21
By inquiring about the construction of a Bangladeshi identity space, I explore the
literature of nations, nationalism, and identity formation. Though nations have been foundational
for modern politics, they have remained relatively understudied and theorized until recently. A
burst of scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s has produced provocative theories about the nature
and origins of nations.22 Again, postcolonial critiques have challenged the supposedly modular
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See Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (New York: I.B.Tauris, 1982), Muzaffar
Alam, The Languages of Political Islam: India 1200-1800, 1 edition (Chicago: University Of
Chicago Press, 2004), Anthony Parel, “From Political Thought in India to Indian Political
Thought,” in Western Political Thought in Dialogue with Asia, ed. Takashi Shogimen and Cary
J. Nederman (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 187–208, Shruti Kapila, An Intellectual History
for India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Sheldon Pollock, Forms of
Knowledge in Early Modern Asia: Explorations in the Intellectual History of India and Tibet,
1500–1800 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).
21
See Nalini Persram, ed., Postcolonialism and Political Theory (Lanham: Lexington Books,
2007), Ranabir Samaddar, Emergence of the Political Subject (New Delhi: SAGE Publications
India, 2009), Sudipta Kaviraj, The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2010), Margaret Kohn and Keally McBride, Political Theories of
Decolonization: Postcolonialism and the Problem of Foundations (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), Partha Chatterjee, Lineages of Political Society: Studies in Postcolonial
Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
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See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008),
Homi K. Bhabha, ed., Nation & Narration (New York: Routledge, 2013), Benedict Anderson,
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso,
2006), Anthony Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (New York: Routledge, 1998), Azar Gat,
Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism (Cambridge:
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and universal forms of the nation and the process of national identity formation by arguing that
post-colonial/non-Western nations are imagined and produced differently than their European
counterparts. These critiques, many advanced through studies of national identity and nationalist
thought, have produced fruitful theoretical and analytical approaches to nations and national
identity.23
By interrogating the possibilities of becoming modern, I engage with arguments about
modernity and modernization advanced by classic and contemporary texts. The works of
Baudelaire, Tocqueville, Marx, Tönnies, Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber provide categories for
distinguishing the “old” from the “new,” categories through which we continue to think about
and theorize the modern.24 Our conceptions of modernity are also indebted to mid-20th century
philosophers like Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and other critical theorists.25 This
dissertation, however, most directly involves discussions about modernity (and post-modernity)
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), Gopal Balakrishnan, ed., Mapping the Nation (New York: Verso,
2012).
23
See Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the
Imagination of Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), C. A. Bayly, Origins
of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India
(Oxford University Press, 2001), Ranabir Samaddar, A Biography of the Indian Nation, 19471997 (SAGE Publications, 2001) and Paradoxes of the Nationalist Time : Political Essays on
Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press, 2002), Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial
Economy to National Space (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2004), Manu Bhagavan,
Heterotopias: Nationalism and the Possibility of History in South Asia (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2010), Masood Ashraf Raja, Constructing Pakistan: Foundational Texts and
the Rise of Muslim National Identity, 1857- 1947 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010),
Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2013),
24
See Robert Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (New Brunswick: Routledge, 1993), Derek
Sayer, Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber (New York: Routledge,
1991), and David Frisby, Fragments of Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel,
Kracauer and Benjamin (New York: Routledge, 2013), Stuart Hall et al., eds., Modernity: An
Introduction to Modern Societies (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996).
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Theodor W. Adorno, History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965 (Malden: Polity, 2006) and
Andrew Benjamin, ed., Walter Benjamin and History (London: Continuum, 2005)
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carried out by philosophers, historians, sociologists, and cultural critics over the last three
decades.26 Here again, critiques of Eurocentric conceptions of modernity advanced by
Postcolonial theorists and other critics problematize a singular modernity and suggest that
alternative and multiple modernities capture and theorize the experiences of modernity outside
the West.27 Though modernity and modernization have occupied different discursive fields
within Western academia, in the postcolonial context these distinctions have been less clear,
where discussions of modernization and development are inseparable from discussions of
modernity.28 Thus, I engage theories of modernization and development, emphasizing postdevelopment theories that have challenged the hegemony of development discourses in the Third
World and have opened up new possibilities for appreciating the social forms and practices of
the so-called “underdeveloped.”29
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The field of intellectual history of South Asia has come a long way over the last three
decades, in part due to the spaces opened by postcolonial critiques. Works of intellectual history
have ranged from hermeneutic engagements with texts of prominent intellectuals and thinkers to
studies of the context, social history, and discourse that constitute and express general
intellectual tendencies and modes of thought. Many intellectual histories have analyzed and
theorized modernity and identity in the non-West, while some have catalogued and theorized
political thought. Within this growing body of literature this dissertation engages directly with
the studies of Muslim identity in South Asia, Pakistani nationalism, and Bengali culture.30 These
studies contextualize the dissertation’s focus on the history of the double birth and the formation
of modern Bangladeshi identity. However for the most part, East Bengal and its people figure
marginally in the narratives of Bengali culture or the Muslim nation. The few studies that
address intellectual histories of East Bengal or Bengali Muslims focus on the 19th and early 20th
century.31 Given the relative lack of focus on East Bengal and on the post-colonial, second half
of the 20th century, a formative period for the Bangladeshi thought world, Bangladeshi subjects
are conspicuously absent in the discussions of South Asian intellectual history.
30

See Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan. (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1967), David Kopf, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of
Indian Modernization, 1773-1835 (Oakland: University of California Press, 1969), Partha
Chatterjee, Texts of Power: Emerging Disciplines in Colonial Bengal (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1995), Andrew Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in
the Age of Capital (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2008) and Liberalism in Empire: An
Alternative History (Oakland: University of California Press, 2014).
31
See Soumitra Sinha, The Quest for Modernity and the Bengali Muslims: 1921 - 47 (Calcutta:
Minerva Associates, 1995), Ashoke Kumar Chakraborty, Bengali Muslim Literati and the
Development of Muslim Community in Bengal (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study,
2002), Shahadat H. Khan, The Freedom of Intellect Movement in Bengali Muslim Thought,
1926-1938 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007), Ananya Dasgupta, “Labors of
Representation: Cultivating Land, Self, and Community Among Muslims in Late Colonial
Bengal” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania, 2013), Neilesh Bose,
Recasting the Region: Language, Culture, and Islam in Colonial Bengal (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2014).
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There have been a few interesting and insightful studies of the thought-world and
subjectivities of post 1947 East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh, but they do not take up the
kind of analysis I propose. For example, Sartori and Dasgupta analyze thoughts of individual
authors/thinkers focusing limited texts and aspects of their thought.32 Raju, though has a larger
canvas and asks broader questions about modernity and identity, limits his analysis to cinematic
texts only.33 Murshid, Samaddar, and Uddin analyze a broad range of texts and discourses with a
focus on identity and politics.34 However, the scope of their analyses span colonial and postcolonial periods and much of their primary investigations remain focused on the late 19th and
early 20th century. Though Hasan’s study of intellectual practices in East Bengal during the
period from 1947 to 1970 is comprehensive and even encyclopedic, it does not extend to postindependent Bangladesh or specifically treat political thought as an object of analysis.35 These
studies remain limited for various reasons, most notably for their lack of systematic focus on
political thought and the second half of the 20th century.
And finally, a study of intellectual history and analysis of political thought must also be
informed by analyses of history and politics. As such, I have undertaken a close reading of a
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substantial literature on political and social history of Bangladesh and South Asia. Emphasis has
been placed on the literature that addresses the social history of Bengali Muslims, the formation
Bangladeshi identity, the Partition of British India in 1947, and the War of Independence in
1971. Furthermore, the dissertation has been informed by the literature that analyzes the
characters of states, societies, political cultures, and political movements in both Pakistani and
Bangladeshi contexts. These literatures, particularly those coming out of Bangladeshi academia,
contextualize the analysis and constitute the object of analysis, as expressions of Bangladeshi
political thought reflected in the academic discourses of Bangladesh.
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The “Postcolonial” Tension Between Modernity and Identity
“Modernity is easy to inhabit but difficult to define,” reads the opening sentence of
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s collection of essays on modernity.36 Whether modernity is a condition, an
epoch, a project, or even an ideology has produced hundreds of treatises over the last two
centuries. Though an attempt to define modernity can be endless, we need at least a provisional
definition. One way to define modernity would be to do so temporally, where the modern
signifies “that which is new.”37 In the temporal rendering, “the modern” becomes a diffuse, open,
and general concept that allows for the possibility that every epoch and society can produce and
experience that which is new, i.e., its “own modernities.”38 Yet, modernity also has an identity
tied to a time and a place. Over the last two centuries theorists have identified social, political,
and economic structures, and the co-responding subjectivities that are the essence of modernity.39
Despite the diverging conceptions of modernity, there is a consensus that “modernity” refers to
the “modes of life” or the social forms and organizations that emerged in Europe or the West
from about 16th or 17th century on.40 Even those who define modernity in temporal terms, and

36

Dipesh Chakrabarty, Habitations of Modernity (2002).
Derek Sayer, Capitalism and Modernity (1991).
38
S. N Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities (2002).
39
Many sociologists following Ferdinand Tonnies have maintained that society itself
(Gesellschaft) is a modern phenomenon. Others following Emile Durkheim have suggested that
modernity is marked by a new kind of relation (organic solidarity) that binds the members of a
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not in terms specific attributes of societies and individuals, identify it with Europe or the West.
As an example Marshal Berman, evoking Baudelaire and Marx, has argued most eloquently for
the possibility, or even the imperative, of producing constant change rather than being stuck or
comfortable in fixed and frozen traditions.41 However, It is precisely the presence of the
possibility and imperative to change that distinguishes Modern Europe from its historical and
civilizational others.42
Identification of a European experience with modernity rests on the argument that the
experience represented something genuinely new, something that can be qualitatively
distinguished from the old. These arguments for the novelty and the historical specificity of
modernity rest not only on empirical evidence, which certainly is plentiful, but also on discursive
constructions.43 Efforts to comprehend the profound social transformations that Europe had
begun to experience from about the 16th century produced, by the 18th and 19th centuries, new
directions in philosophical reflections grounded in new conceptions of history, the economy,
politics, and society. These concepts and the new academic disciplines they spawned, most
notably sociology, facilitated ways of distinguishing between and theorizing about “the old” and
“what was new.” The academic disciplines themselves were part of that what was new. Thus,

similar arguments, albeit with different normative and political implications. See for example
Samir Amin, Eurocentrism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989) and Chakrabarty,
Provincializing Europe (2009)
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modern social and philosophical theories were simultaneously produced by and constitutive of
modernity.44
The argument by modern social theories that modernity constitutes a qualitative and a
definite break from the past is predicated upon a “historicist” understanding of time and history.
The central idea in historicist thinking is that social and cultural phenomena are historically
determined; that is to say, social forms and individual experiences and subjectivities are products
of history. And, history itself is conceived as causally linked changes that have direction and
perhaps even purpose.45 The concepts of development and progress are used variously or
sometimes in conjunction to conceptualize the direction of history. While the idea of
development points towards an immanent process of coming into being or the actualization of a
potential, the idea of progress suggests a “movement of linear time towards an open and
infinitely perfectible future.”46 Despite the important differences between the concepts of
development and progress, they both function in the discourse of modernity to distinguish and
identify modernity as a historically significant epoch – either as the fulfillment of human
potential or as the “end of [the] history” of human perfectibility.47 The idea of perfectibility or
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maturation contained within conceptions of development and progress suggests the addition of
values, which is measured in terms of moral perfection, material well-being, or most importantly
rationality. History, according to dominant historicist thinking, is the result of the progressive
movement of reason.48 Applied to the modes of knowledge production, the argument about the
progressive movement of reason simultaneously identifies the emergence of the modern
sciences, including social sciences, as a marker of modernity and authorizes modern modes of
knowledge production as the only valid mode.49 More importantly, however, the idea of the
forward march of reason implies not only that our knowledge has become more grounded in
reason but also that social relations themselves have become more rational.50
Predicated upon a conception of a universal human history, modernist discourses have
conceived modernity not only to be the culmination of the particular history of social progress in
Europe but also as a universal category and the future of all non-modern societies.51

By

postulating the “modes of life” emerging in Europe to be historically necessary experiences for
all of humanity, modernist discourses betray their inherent Eurocentrism. In trying to define
Eurocentrism Samir Amin has argued that social theories produced by modern Europe
“conceived the history of Europe or the West to be exceptional, not in the sense that the modern
world was constituted there, which in itself is an undeniable fact, but because it could not have
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been born elsewhere.”52 This paradoxical proclamation – claiming modernity to be
simultaneously universal and Western – has profoundly shaped the experiences of modernity for
the places that are designated to be outside of the modern West. Modern social theories
incorporate the non-West in their universal developmental schemas by designating it premodern. Here, cultural and spatial differences get codified in terms of chronology; the non-West
is not simply a different place, but it also inhabits a different time. To borrow Chakrabarty’s
celebrated and provocative formulation, the non-West is placed in the “waiting room” of
history.53 Modernization has been a narrative of self-development for the West. For the nonWest, however, the process has not been a matter of simply producing social transformations or
experiencing something new but a matter of adopting already defined social forms, i.e., “the
superior prototype of social organization, a model that could be reproduced in other societies that
have not had the good fortune of having initiated this superior form on the condition that these
societies free themselves of the obstacles posed by their particular cultural traits, responsible for
their backwardness.”54
The non-West encounters modernity first through European colonialism. Modern social,
economic, and political structures get constructed in the process of colonizing and ruling nonmodern societies by modern or modernizing European powers. Modernity and colonialism were
not merely coincidental. Rather, Eurocentric constructions of modernity authorized colonialist
discourse and justified colonial enterprise. In other words, the project of modernization provided
one of the strongest ideological justifications for the establishment and maintenance of colonial
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rule.55 Modernizing projects of the colonial powers, however, had to be incomplete. If
colonialism were to produce complete modernization, it would have undercut the justifications
for its own exercise of power by abolishing the distinction between the West and the non-West.56
The non-Western subjects, on the other hand, experienced modernity in their colonial encounter
as an alien thing and as an imperative, something they had to adopt in order to operate within the
modern structures imposed by the colonizing powers and to challenge the ideological
justifications for colonization.57 Overcoming the limitations of colonial modernization provided
the impetus for most anticolonial movements, which, with some notable exceptions, did not so
much object to the goal of modernization as to its failure under colonial domination.
Consequently, in the postcolonial era modernization, reformulated through the discourse of
development, has been constructed as the raison d’état for postcolonial states.58
However, anti-colonial and postcolonial nationalisms have also often been constructed in
opposition to colonial modernity and perhaps modernity as such.59 While modernization is
pursued as a strategic choice to survive under colonial modernity, to legitimize claims of self55
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determination or to overcome “backwardness,” modernity itself is often seen to be external to the
“essential” self of the emerging nations.60 Paradoxically, however, to become a nation is to
inexorably become modern. The nation is a modern political concept that signifies a sovereign
and legitimacy producing political community with the right to its own state. Thus, the nation is
imagined not only by evoking an identity but also by elaborating political ideals as the
foundation of the sovereign national state. These political ideals, which are often formulated
through modernist discourses, construct the identities of the nations, despite the nations claiming
essential identities for themselves.

61

Thus, the challenge for anti-colonial and post-colonial

political thought is to articulate national identities and political ideals that are inexorably modern
yet sufficiently differentiated from the modernity of the colonizers.62
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The Negotiation of Modernity and Identity in Bangladesh
The question of the negotiation of modernity and identity drives this dissertation. This is
an old question to ask, however, and Bangladeshis, including myself, are late in asking it. The
question regarding the tension between modernity and identity acquires new urgency and
significance for Bengali-Muslim intellectuals and political actors in the mid-20th century for
myriad reasons, not least because of the imminent emergence of new nations and states at the
end of British colonial rule in India. However, by then much ink had already been spilled in
India and in Bengal particularly in thinking and theorizing about modernity and identity. Great
Bengali thinkers of the 19th and early 20th centuries such as Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay,
Bhudeb Mukhopadhyay, Bipin Chandra Pal, and Rabindranath Tagore have all dealt with this
question with intellectual acumen. What could have the belatedly arrived Bengali-Muslim
intellectuals offer beyond some regurgitation of the thoughts of the great thinkers of the 19th and
early 20th centuries?
The negotiation between modernity and identity has not reached a conclusion. As the
Shahbag moment suggests, negotiation still informs politics and political discourses in
Bangladesh even today, as it probably does elsewhere in the postcolonial world. Moreover, the
mid- and late 20th century negotiations in Bangladesh might contain and reveal something that
could not have been contained within the 19th or early 20th century negotiations, given the
changing political and discursive contexts at the local and the global levels over the last two
centuries. A distinction of course arises out of the qualitative differences between the colonial
and the post-colonial political and discursive dynamics. As David Scott has argued, a defining
feature of the “post-colonial present” is the collapse of the anticolonial imagining and making of
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national sovereignties, and consequently the loss of the hope or vision for an acceptable future.63
Anticolonial thought took “national self-determination” seriously and imagined that
decolonization would produce national sovereignties that would pursue alternatives to European
modernity and usher in a new humanity.64 Yet, postcolonial political realities have revealed the
tenuous nature of the sovereignties of postcolonial nations and their inability to pursue
alternatives to the social, political, and economic forms of European modernity. The negotiation
between modernity and identity in Bangladesh mostly unfolds within a global context
characterized by increasing disillusionment about national sovereignty and the increasing
hegemony of modernist discourses. What did it mean for Bengali-Muslims to imagine a nation,
when the idea of national sovereignty lacked the promise it once had? What possibilities did
Bengali-Muslims have to think about alternatives to modernity when modernization was seen as
an historical inevitability?
Bangladeshi nationalism is perhaps a new kind of nationalism in the Indian subcontinent.
Indian national identity was by and large founded upon a notion of a civilizational essence that
promised to transcend the divisions of language, religion, ethnicity, and caste. However, in most
renderings, Indian nationalism has taken on an upper caste Hindu character, excluding or
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marginalizing other social groups.65 In reaction to the latent Hindu character of Indian
nationalism, Pakistani nationalism mobilized the language of minority protection and conceived
Pakistan abstractly as a Muslim Zion or the “homeland of Indian Muslims” without any concrete
reference to ethnicity, language, territory, or even population.66 Bangladeshi nationalism, by
contrast, has emphasized an ethno-linguistic identity and its claims over a territory. As such
Bangladeshi nationalism is perhaps closer in form to classical European nationalism, based on
the arguments of “blood and soil,” than to its sub-continental cousins. Even more significantly,
the Bangladeshi nation went through a double birth – first as Pakistan, then as Bangladesh –
which distinguishes the history of Bangladeshi nationalism not only from other sub-continental
nationalisms but also from most other postcolonial nationalisms.
East Bengal became a part of Pakistan with Bengali-Muslim intellectuals and political
actors strongly supporting the idea of Pakistan and the claim of Muslim nationhood.67 Within a
generation, however, they were constructing a new national identity based on ethno-linguistic,
i.e., Bengali, claims to a nation.68 Though Bengali identity forms the core of Bangladeshi
nationalism, it has also been shaped by a desire to articulate a distinction based on religious and
regional differences from the dominant Bengali identity of West Bengal.69 Moreover, the
rejection of Pakistan and its Muslim nationalism has not eliminated “Muslim” as an important
marker of identity. The Muslim claim to the nation did not disappear but continues to exacerbate
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the problems of articulating the new nation and the political priorities of the new state.70 So, if
for Indian nationalists the project was to create a modern nation that was not Western, for
Bangladeshi nationalists the project has been to create a modern nation that is not Western, not
Indian, not Pakistani, and not just Bengali or Muslim. Negotiations over national identity have
become much more complex and multifaceted. Moreover, since this double birth of the nation
occurred within twenty-four years, the tasks of elaborating two national identities and political
logics were carried out by individuals of the same or successive generations and, at times, by the
same individuals. Consequently, there has been a remarkable profusion of new ideas alongside
tremendous confusions and contradictions.
Another interesting feature of Bangladeshi nationalism is the cohabitation of feelings of
inferiority with an irrepressible sense of optimism. East Bengal and its people have often been
described as “backward” compared to the English educated Bengalis of Calcutta and the
classically trained aristocratic Muslims of North India. The common view had been that BengaliMuslims were basically illiterate peasants possessing little, if any, culture and that they were
both “poor Muslims” and “poor Bengalis.”71 Backwardness thus constitutes an inherent feature
of Bangladeshi identity not only as a representation of the postcolonial condition but also in
terms of specific comparisons to more locally dominant social groups.72 Nationalist discourses
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in Bangladesh reflect this position of backwardness and the consequent marginality. The
protagonists of Bangladeshi nationalism, in contrast to Indian or Pakistan nationalism, have not
been members of the aristocracy serving the British bureaucracy or the sons of rich merchants
and zamindars or even the elite of the newly emerging professional classes. Rather, the
protagonists of this nationalism have been the sons of peasants competing to become a clerk or a
reporter or a schoolteacher.73 Their nationalism has no glorious past from which to draw
inspiration or legitimacy. Instead, they have a history of exploitation, marginalization, and
oppression. Their nationalism has been oriented not towards an imagined past but towards a
hopeful future in which the establishment of national sovereignty promises the end of inferiority,
backwardness, and injustice. Consequently, some nationalist thinkers in Bangladesh viewed
independence not as a nation claiming sovereignty but as the production of possibilities for the
people to become a nation.74
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The tension between Bengali and Muslim identities flagged by the Shahbag moment has
a history that is almost two centuries old, dating back to the emergence of modern Bengali
cultural identity in the 19th century among the Hindu bhadralok of Calcutta, a class produced as a
result of British colonial rule.75 The discourses of Bengali cultural identity displayed a decidedly
upper-caste Hindu orientation and were saturated by orientalist prejudices against Islam. They
constructed Bengali-Muslims as both backward and outsiders.76 Bengali-Muslim discourses of
self-identity since their emergence in the late 19th century have been fundamentally conditioned
by and carried out in response to these constructions of inferiority and outsider status. The
response by Bengali-Muslims has varied. For the purposes of our discussion here, however, I
will highlight tendencies in broad strokes. One current of thought, which has enjoyed varying
degrees of hegemony over the decades, has in some ways been a motivating ideology behind the
Shahbag movement. It internalizes orientalist views and conceives Muslimness as the reason for
the backwardness of the Bengali-Muslims but understands “Bengalines” as a secular and thus a
progressive category. The implicit and often explicit conclusion of this line of thinking has been
that Bengali-Muslims must overcome their Muslimness or at least subordinate their religious
identity to Bengali national identity to become both genuinely Bengali and modern. On the
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opposite end of spectrum is an emphasis on Muslim identity at the expense of Bengaliness the
latter equated with Hinduness. In embracing Muslim identity these discourses either reject
modernity altogether or advance some notion of what Faisal Devji has called “apologetic
modernity.” It argues that Muslims have no need to embrace European modernity because they
already have their own modernity.77 This line of thought dominated the late 19th century reaction
against Bengali culturalism, was then embraced by the ideologues of the Pakistani state, and, as
demonstrated by the rhetoric of the Hefazot movement, continues to enjoy support even today.
In between the two extremes are the discourses that emphasize the composite category of
Bengali-Muslim. They argue the impossibility of separating Bengaliness and Muslimness in the
social history of Bengal, particularly in its eastern parts. These discourses neither reject nor
discard the composite identity for being responsible for the backwardness of the BengaliMuslims. Rather, these discourses counter the inferiority constructed through colonial discourses
by endowing each of the categories with positive ethical and political values and by endorsing
projects of both modernizing and re-vitalizing these categories. The discourses of BengaliMuslim identity challenge and decenter not only the bhadralok constructions of Bengali identity
but also the orientalist essentialization of Muslimness. I focus on these Bengali-Muslim efforts to
reconcile and inhabit Bengali and Muslim identities because an understanding of these efforts
will help us understand the complex dynamics of identity formation in post-colonial Bangladesh.
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Reading Bangladeshi Political Thought: Practical and Methodological Challenges
This dissertation seeks to examine the experiences of becoming modern and a nation in
Bangladesh as reflected in Bangladeshi political thought.

The two main methodological

challenges I have faced in carrying out this project had to do on the one hand with questions of
how to read political thought generally and on the other hand with the difficulties of defining
“Bangladeshi political thought.” As thoughts cannot be accessed directly but can only be inferred
from texts and acts, conventional analyses of political thought often take the form of intellectual
histories based on textual exegesis of intellectual figures. The emphasis in these approaches is on
a hermeneutic or interpretive analysis that, on the one hand, seeks to investigate the logical
integrity, coherence, and clarity of the texts and, on the other hand, seeks to locate the text and
the author in local and global traditions of thinking.78 Such intimate engagements with thinkers
and their texts enable one to make claims about particular thinkers. But how does one make
claims about a general category like “Bangladeshi political thought”?

In the process of

producing an intellectual history of Victorian England, Lytton Strachey argued that producing an
exhaustive and comprehensive study of all the intellectuals and texts of any given place or era to
make general claims may be as impossible as rowing across a great ocean and measuring it.79
Instead, Strachey suggested a better approach was to “drop a bucket” here and there and collect a
“characteristic specimen” with the aim of studying it with “careful curiosity.” Following
Strachey’s suggestion, one may, for example, engage with thinkers like Gandhi, Ambedkar,
Rabindranath, or Jayaprakash Narayan as examples of characteristic specimens or as exceptions
or simply as interesting and eccentric characters of Indian political thought. However, there is
no recognized body of Bangladeshi political thought, as there is, for example, French, German,
78
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British, American, or even Indian political thought. Since there is no constituted category of
“Bangladeshi Political Thought,” it is difficult to talk about this Ahmad or that Hashim as a
characteristic specimen. Moreover, I did not begin the dissertation project with certain thinkers
or texts in mind. Instead, I proceeded from the assumption that I would find such thinkers and
texts in the archive or the “shelf” of Bangladeshi political thought. The problem, however, is that
such a “shelf” of Bangladeshi political thought does not yet exist. Thus, the first task of the
dissertation then became the conceptualization of Bangladeshi political thought and the
construction of that “shelf” from where I may select my interlocutors. I have felt compelled to
engage with a great ocean of materials to ascertain the general character of Bangladeshi political
thought before embarking upon close examinations of “characteristic specimens.”
Ascertaining the general character of Bangladeshi political thought has also been
suggested by many recent arguments within political theory that have made a case for analyzing
political thought with reference to specific political lives and social, historical, and discursive
contexts. 80 Quentin Skinner and the Cambridge School, for example, have advocated reading
thinkers in their discursive contexts, i.e., reading them as making arguments and interventions in
the specific debates and discussions prevalent in a place and a time.81 On the other hand, Marxist
and neo-Marxist approaches note that thinkers and intellectuals respond not only to ideas and
debates but also to the socio-economic and political structures and necessities of their time.82
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Alongside discursive and historical contexts, Christopher Bayly has championed Anthony
Giddens’ formulation of an upward hermeneutic that personal experiences and specific economic
and political conflicts must also be considered as factors informing and shaping ideas and
arguments.83 Bayly has suggested that micro experiences of everyday life – affected by factors
like levels of technology, communication networks, availability of certain commodities for
consumption, and the experience of social inclusion or marginalization – affect how thinkers
receive, make meaning of, and participate in intellectual and political arguments and debates. I
engage with broader political history and social histories of intellectuals as a step for not only
contextualizing thought but also for accessing it in the first place.
Constructing the “shelf” of Bangladeshi political thought and ascertaining its general
character has involved first and foremost extensive reading of the intellectual, social, and
political histories of Bangladesh and going through the works and biographies of dozens of
intellectuals and political actors. The insights from these readings have been articulated in
chapter 2, where I provide an outline of Bangladesh’s social, political and intellectual histories.
However, perhaps the more important but less easily quantifiable or describable insights came
from an immersion in the political and intellectual cultures of Bangladesh during my six months
of field research.84 My personal connection and my proficiency in Bengali was a motivating
factor behind studying Bangladeshi political thought. However, I had become a stranger to
Bangladeshi politics and culture in the decades that I had spent outside of Bangladesh. My
prolonged stay in Bangladesh during the field research gave me the opportunity to reacquaint
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myself with the country’s culture and political sensibilities. Ostensibly, the objective of my field
research in Bangladesh was to find and gather textual materials by going through the dusty
catalogues and shelves of the libraries and archives, by visiting bookstores and publishing
houses, browsing personal libraries of some of my friends and contacts, and by regularly
attending a month long book-fair. During my stay in Bangladesh I had the opportunity to read
the local newspapers regularly, socialize or participate in addas85 with intellectuals and political
activists, and attend lectures, seminars, plays, concerts, and other cultural programs. These
general experiences, along with two specific events have been instructive.
Shortly after my arrival in Bangladesh, the country was gripped by one of its regularly
occurring violent political crises arising out of partisan struggles over control of government.
Massive rallies, violent clashes with the police, strikes, and even terrorist attacks on civilians
were regular occurrences for about three months before the crisis abated and order was restored.
Living in Dhaka in those months provided me with visceral connections with the insecurities,
fears, frustrations, and anxieties that people in Bangladesh experience with unfortunate
regularity. That episode, however, also provided me with a glimpse of the resilience, courage,
and optimism of the Bangladeshi people, which have enabled them not only to survive but also
to strive forward. During my stay I also gained an understanding of Bangladesh’s imperfect
experiment with electoral democracy through my close association with one of the campaigns in
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Dhaka's mayoral election. Each experience allowed me to immerse myself in and gain a deeper
understanding of Bangladesh’s political and intellectual culture.
My immersive experiences provided me not only with a cultural context but also a
“discursive context” in the sense suggested by Quentin Skinner. Ascertaining the discursive
contexts for Bangladeshi political thought is challenging given that intellectual practices in
Bangladesh are seldom contained within formal institutionalized spaces of academic research,
journals, seminars, conferences, etc. Rather, informal settings like addas and readings circles act
as sites of intellectual practice and vehicles for carrying forward intellectual traditions. Personal
connections and interactions, particularly between teachers/mentors [guru] and disciples,
produce powerful moments of knowledge production and transmission.86 Consequently,
intellectual traditions are often oriented around charismatic personalities, and the continuation of
these traditions takes the form of hagiographic accounts rather than critical engagements.
However, contestations and competitions among gurus, their disciples, and breakaway factions
produce possibilities for critical evaluations of persons, ideas, and arguments. My participation
in various addas during my stay in Bangladesh provided me with valuable insights about the
social and discursive contexts of Bangladeshi intellectual practices and the “every-day
experiences” of my protagonists. In short, the immersive experience brought me into contact
with persons, discourses, and practices that substantially informed and redefined my project. My
immersive experiences and my substantial engagement with the intellectual and political
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histories of Bangladesh enabled me to define the general character of Bangladeshi political
thought, define the boundaries of my project, and select interlocutors for the project.
Discussing Indian political thought, Anthony Parel has proposed a distinction between
political thought in India and of India.87 While the former connotes political thinking within the
geographical and political boundaries of India and is carried out by Indian thinkers, the latter
makes a stronger claim for the specific character of an Indian way of thinking or an Indian
canon. I make claims about the possibilities of political thought of Bangladesh, starting with the
more empirically definable category of political thought in Bangladesh.
The seemingly uncomplicated category of political thought in Bangladesh, however, is
not obvious and requires reflections on and decisions regarding its temporal and spatial
boundaries. Though Bangladesh as an independent state with territorial boundaries emerged only
in 1971, we can identify a “Bangladeshi” intellectual tradition that precedes the emergence of the
state. Arguably, we may start from the second half of the 19th century, when the Bengali cultural
identity emerges and Muslims in Bengal begin to think of themselves as Bengali-Muslims.
Alternatively, we may start from 1905, when, in the context of the first partition of Bengal, we
can discern a distinct and organized political interest of the people of East Bengal. Or, we may
also start from the 1920s, when literary and cultural movements inaugurated a distinct BengaliMuslim modernity. Finally, we may start from the early 1940s, when, in the context of the
imminent dissolution of the British Empire, Bengali-Muslim identity was politically mobilized in
support of Pakistan. It is this last period that I start my inquiries for two reasons. First, a
relatively rich and nuanced body of 19th and the early 20th century Bengali intellectual history
exists. The dissertation benefits from this existing scholarship without reproducing the primary
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research. Instead, I focus on a period that has received relatively little academic attention, i.e.,
the second half of the 20th century. Second and more important, the partition of British India and
emergence of independent Pakistan produces the territorial unit and political discourses that
eventually produce the possibilities for an independent Bangladesh. Since the creation of
Pakistan involved partition of Bengal and loss of Calcutta, the hitherto undisputed cultural and
intellectual capital of Bengal, East Bengalis had to inaugurate new intellectual and cultural
tradition that we now call Bangladeshi.
While the starting point of this study is based on historical consideration, the end point is
more arbitrary. Though my question about the tension between modernity and identity arise from
observations of the political and social dynamics of contemporary Bangladesh, I have not
extended my analysis to the present. Rather, I have decided to end my analysis in the mid-1970s
for primarily practical reasons. Originally, I envisioned a more comprehensive study covering
more than 70 years and ending in the mid-2010s. However, as I began to research and write I
realized that the project was enormous. I concluded that a study of political thought in
contemporary Bangladesh would require different analytical and methodological approaches and,
perhaps, another dissertation altogether. Reluctantly, I have limited my inquiries to the mid1970s. Though my focus on the 1940s to the 1970s is certainly insufficient for a comprehensive
account of Bangladeshi political thought, I can capture political thinking across two key
generations that have shaped Bangladesh’s political and intellectual discourses. The first
generation includes those who were intellectually and politically active before the creation of
Pakistan and continued to be so in post-colonial Pakistan or even in independent Bangladesh.
The second generation includes those who became intellectually and politically mature and
active during the Pakistan period and continued in post-independence Bangladesh. Together, the
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two generations represent the coming into being of a modern Bengali/Bangladeshi nation – from
mobilizing Bengali-Muslims in support of Pakistan, to encountering all the contradictions of
post-colonial Pakistan to articulating a Bengali national identity and leading a war of national
liberation to setting up political institutions in post-independence Bangladesh to elaborating and
also challenging the ruling ideologies of the new state.
Selection of Interlocutors
One of the challenges in studying political thought of colonized and post-colonial spaces
is that political thought is produced not so much as a self-contained object of analysis by
specialized academics or philosophers but more as practical and normative ideas of political
activists, leaders, statesmen, creative writers, public intellectuals, and such.88 As Aditya Nigam
has argued, post-colonial societies are over-burdened with political concerns and, consequently,
every poet, novelist, playwright, or filmmaker worth the name may also be considered a political
thinker.89 We are faced with a double-edged problem – the scarcity of texts that are ostensibly
theoretical and the potentially limitless archive of texts inscribed with political thought. One
way to disaggregate this massive archive is to think of different “registers” through which
political thoughts are articulated and elaborated.90 There can be many registers: academic
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writing, political speeches, works of literature, media discourses, etc. Though boundaries of
these registers may not always be well defined, disaggregating the archive into registers narrows
my focus. My task should not be and is not to produce a comprehensive or encyclopedic account
of Bangladeshi political thought. Limiting the focus of the study on a limited number of
registers and interlocutors requires making choices based not only on extensive readings of the
social, political, and intellectual histories of Bangladesh but also immersion in contemporary
political and intellectual discourses. After countless dead ends and discarded notes I made three
key decisions that made progress on the dissertation possible. At the end, my choices turned out
to be obvious and straightforward. However, the journey to those choices was anything but. If I
had been able to make these choices earlier in the dissertation process, it would have been a
much shorter and less onerous process. However, what I have learned in the process of selecting
my interlocutors has provided me with a deep understanding of Bangladesh’s political and
intellectual landscape, something that I believe has made my dissertation richer.
In narrowing my focus and selecting my interlocutors the first choice I have made is to
limit the investigation of Bangladeshi political thought to the urban middle-class intelligentsia
that emerged in Bengal in the 19th and 20th centuries. It may suffice here to say that the choice
makes obvious sense given that conventional approaches to political thought have predominantly
focused on urban intelligentsia. A focus on urban intelligentsia is, however, fraught with danger
because such an approach not only ignores subaltern political discourses but also fails to
recognize alternative intellectual discourses carried out by the “traditional intellectuals,” who are
trained not in the modern or westernized educational institutions but in the traditional or religious
system of education. As many Bangladeshi scholars have argued, the traditional intellectuals or
more specifically the Ulema have significant influence among the largely rural and illiterate
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population of Bangladesh and, thus, have played decisive roles in Bangladeshi politics on many
occasions, including producing popular support for the Pakistan project.91 Though I recognize
that not engaging with the traditional intellectuals risks producing a lopsided account of
Bangladeshi political thought, I have decided to do so partly because of the conceptual and
methodological challenges associated with carrying out such an engagement. But more
importantly perhaps, I focus on the urban intelligentsia and the hegemonic political discourses
because even these discourses have not been studied adequately. A lopsided account of
Bangladeshi political thought is probably better than no account at all. And I hope that future
projects on Bangladeshi political thought will complicate and correct this lopsided account.
Second, I have sought to narrow my focus by considering only two of the many different
possible registers of political thought. The first register focuses on public intellectuals who were
directly or indirectly involved in politics and, more importantly, have produced texts containing
their thinking about politics. Here the investigations focus on published and unpublished works
of select interlocutors, their lived experiences, as well as on their biographies. The second
register focuses on political actors who have shaped the political questions and concerns and
have influenced the thought world in Bangladesh not so much through their textual outputs but
through their leadership and political activities. In engaging with the political thought of these
figures, the dissertation not only examines their published texts, public and legislative speeches,
personal diaries, autobiographies and memoirs but also analyzes the party manifestos, political
programs, and national constitutions that these figures have been instrumental in producing.
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See, for example, Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, Pakistan As a Peasant Utopia: The Communalization
of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920-1947, First edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). Ali
Riaz, God Willing : The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
2004). Murshid, The Sacred and the Secular.
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Last, I have decided on four individual figures representing the two registers discussed
above to be the primary interlocutors of the dissertation. Though it is hard to avoid an element of
arbitrariness in choosing registers and selecting primary interlocutors, the process has not been
random or whimsical. Of course, the generative questions regarding modernity and identity
helped me narrow my focus by selecting thinkers who have something meaningful to say about
the topics. Moreover, I identified and selected figures, who not only represent moments, shifts,
and moods in Bangladeshi history but also continue to be relevant in contemporary Bangladeshi
political and intellectual discourses. During my stay in Bangladesh, I received invaluable
feedback and guidance through formal and informal conversations I had with Bangladeshi
intellectuals and academics, which have been helpful for identifying “significant” and
“influential” political and intellectual discourses, personalities, and texts. I have decided to
engage with the lives and works of Abul Mansur Ahmad, Abul Hashim, Abdul Hamid Khan
Bhashani, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. I have organized my discussion of these four figures by
dividing them into two pairs, each serving to illuminate one of the births of the double-birth of
the nation in Bangladesh.
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Preview of the Chapters
Chapter 2, “Contextualizing Bangladeshi Political Thought: An Outline of Social,
Political, and Intellectual Histories of Bangladesh,” serves as a prelude to the main discussion
and provides a general overview of the social, political, and discursive terrain within which my
interlocutors operate. The chapter opens with a historical analysis of the colonial encounter with
modernity in the Indian subcontinent. The discussions highlight how the social, political,
economic, and epistemological transformations produced by British colonial rule and
governmentality in turn produce new political subjectivities and possibilities for new kinds of
political thinking. The chapter then pursues a historical and sociological analysis of the
formation of “Bengali-Muslim” identity and the emergence of the Bengali-Muslim urban
middle-class intelligentsia as new political subjects. The chapter then briefly discusses the
political history of Bangladesh highlighting a few select events and episodes, particularly those
relating to the emergence of the states of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Against the backdrops of
social and political history, the chapter then pursues a discussion of the Bengali-Muslim mind or
thought-world by analyzing general atmosphere, trends, sensibilities, and ideological orientations
of intellectual practices in Bangladesh.
Chapter 3, “The First Birth of the Nation: Bengali-Muslim Identity and the Ideas of an
Islamic State in Producing the ‘Pakistan Moment’,” analyzes the political and intellectual
responses of Bengali-Muslims to Pakistan both before and after the creation of the country in
1947. It anchors the discussions around two prominent Bengali-Muslim political figures of the
mid-20th century, Abul Mansur Ahmad and Abul Hashim. Though Ahmad and Hashim were not
first-tier leaders of the era – that distinction belonging to figures like A.K. Fazlul Huq and
Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy – they were more systematic thinkers and certainly more prolific
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writers than the others. Though Ahmad and Hashim both played crucial roles in the creation of
Pakistan through their intellectual support and political leadership, their understandings of
Pakistan and their logics for supporting it were substantially different, as were their responses to
and critiques of the state of Pakistan. Ahmad’s politics was consistently oriented by his
commitment to Bengali-Muslim identity. His initial support for Pakistan, as well as his
subsequent critique of the policies and practices of the Pakistani state, were motivated by his
concerns for the autonomy, wellbeing, and modernization of the hitherto marginalized and
exploited nation. Hashim’s politics were motivated not by identity but by his commitment to
Islam as a political ideology. Though Hashim supported the idea of Pakistan, he was highly
critical of leaders like Jinnah, who stressed Muslim identity while seeking to establish a
Westernized secular state. For Hashim, the creation of Pakistan represented not merely the
possibility that a particular nation would become free of colonial domination but more
importantly that it would be able to articulate and establish a new political-economic system
based on a different philosophical understanding of the world. By engaging with the lives and
works of these two political thinkers this chapter seeks to capture the hopes, anxieties, and
contradictions produced by the first of the double-births of the nation.
Chapter 4, “The Second Birth of the Nation: Aspirations for Democracy, Equality,
Freedom, and Social Uplift in Producing the Bangladesh Moment,” discusses the second moment
of the double-birth of the nation, when Bangladesh emerged as an independent state after the
breakdown of the awkward political entity called Pakistan. The chapter’s central figures are
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (popularly known as Mujib) and Abdul Hamid Khan (popularly known
as Maolana Bhashani), who came to the foreground of Bengali-Muslim politics in the 1950s and
1960s. Though neither Bhashani nor Mujib were particularly systematic thinkers or prolific

46

writers, they continue to cast their immense shadows on Bengali-Muslim politics and thought
worlds long after their deaths in the 1970s. Mujib, of course, came to be known as the jatir pita,
the father of the nation, by virtue of the leadership he and his political party, the Awami League,
provided in the struggle for Bangladesh’s independence. After the independence, Mujib, with the
help of party intellectuals, articulated a new ideology, known as Mujib-bad [Mujib-ism], which
reflected the ideological radicalization produced in the struggle for independence and served as
the foundation for the constitution and the early economic and social policies of the newly
independent state. This hastily constructed amalgamation, which combined the principles of
Bengali nationalism, democracy, secularism, and socialism in pursuit of economic development,
was idealistic and progressive. Though actual commitment to this ideology remains debatable, it
has become, by virtue of Mujib’s and subsequent Awami League government proclaimed
adherence, something like the ruling ideology of Bangladesh. Bhashani, on the other hand, has
come to embody the symbol of popular opposition to state injustices. In his long career as a
peasant leader, Bhashani not only fought against the British, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi states
but also was highly critical of the urban middle-class politics represented by Mujib and the
Awami League. Bhashani, who was deeply influenced by Maoism and ideas of Islamic
socialism, produced a synthesis of the languages of political Islam and Marxism that attracted
and inspired legions of followers not only among the rural masses but also among radicalized
urban intellectuals. For much of the 1950s and 1960s he was the most influential and powerful
political figure in East Pakistan and even achieved international recognition. Though he became
sidelined during the crucial moments of Bangladesh’s struggle for independence and was forced
to continue his role as a critique of the regime rather than being one of architects of the new
state, his politics and ideas remain a source of inspiration for many in Bangladesh. By engaging
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with the thoughts and politics of Mujib and Bhashani this chapter examines the ideas and
aspirations that produced and were produced by the independence of Bangladesh.
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by highlighting some of its key arguments and their
implications for contemporary political discourses in Bangladesh. The conclusion reflects upon
the ways the dissertation has been successful in accomplishing its objectives, as well as on some
of the limitations it failed to address or overcome. Finally, the conclusion reflects upon the
dissertation’s connection to and relevance for political theory.
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CHAPTER TWO
Contextualizing Bangladeshi Political Thought: An Outline of social, political, and
intellectual Histories of Bangladesh
Political theory is more comfortable with and interested in intimate, nuanced, and
sophisticated engagements with thinkers, texts, and concepts than with broad categories like
“Bangladeshi political thought.” As a student of political theory, I also share the desire for close
readings and deep engagements with thinkers and texts. And, I do not want to produce an
encyclopedic and, thus, superficial catalog of Bangladeshi history and personalities in lieu of a
critical account of Bangladeshi political thought. Yet, I find it necessary to start with a landscape
shot, if I may be permitted to use a cinematic analogy, before moving towards close-ups of
individual thinkers and their ideas. Thus, in this chapter I discuss the broad outlines of the social,
political, and intellectual histories of Bangladesh, which will provide the necessary historical and
discursive context for the more detailed and focused discussions that take place in the following
chapters. Admittedly, discussions of this chapter remain limited to painting the contours of
Bangladeshi history with broad strokes and rely heavily on other scholarly accounts. Much of the
discussions in this chapter may be familiar to Bangladesh or even South Asia specialists. I have
nevertheless decided to move forward with these discussions partly because I believe that they
will provide the basic background information for those readers who may not be familiar with
Bangladesh. More importantly however, in these discussions I will present my own reading and
understanding of Bangladesh’s political and intellectual history. These historical sketches will
produce an understanding of how the categories of “political” and “thinking” have been
constituted and reconstituted over the recent centuries and decades in Bangladesh. And, I hope
that my readings of Bangladeshi social, political and intellectual histories will be helpful in
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analyzing Bangladeshi political thought, i.e., how Bangladeshi subjects have thought about,
understood, and responded to politics in its recent history. Thus, in this chapter I produce these
historical sketches with trepidation but also with the optimism that my retelling of familiar
stories may still be insightful and interesting.
In keeping with the boundary of the dissertation project, the chapter focuses primarily on
the period between 1940s and 1970s. However, I begin with a brief analysis of the ways British
colonial rule produced a profound break in the history of Bengal and India generally, producing
the possibilities for new kinds of politics, thought, and identities. By starting with the colonial
period, I do not, however, wish to argue that the history of the colonized societies begins with
colonialism or that the history of the pre-colonial period ceases to inform or be relevant for the
developments of the post-colonial future. In fact, I agree fully with the arguments advanced by
scholars such as Sheldon Pollock and others regarding the importance of studying pre-colonial
history not only of the socio-economic and political conditions but also of ideas and thought
world for understanding postcolonial places like South Asia.1 The colonial experience should not
be viewed as the beginning but as one of many episodes in histories, intellectual and otherwise,
of postcolonial countries. Despite recognizing the importance of pre-colonial intellectual and
political histories, I begin my analysis from the experience of colonial encounter partly because
of the need to contain the discussion within a manageable perimeter and partly because the
colonial encounter is a more proximate vector shaping postcolonial politics and intellectual
landscapes. After analyzing the impact of the colonial encounter in Bangladeshi thought and
1

Sheldon Pollock, “Is There an Indian Intellectual History? Introduction to ‘Theory and Method
in Indian Intellectual History,’” Journal of Indian Philosophy 36, no. 5–6 (October 1, 2008):
533–42. Also See Sudipta Kaviraj, “The Sudden Death of Sanskrit Knowledge,” Journal of
Indian Philosophy 33, no. 1 (2005) and “An Outline of a Revisionist Theory of Modernity,”
European Journal of Sociology 46, no. 03 (2005): 497–526.
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politics, I move on to a reading of the social history of the emergence of the “Bengali-Muslim”
middle-class intelligentsia and the emergence of the identity category of “Bengali-Muslim.”
Though this history focuses primarily on the late 19th and early 20th century social
transformations engendered by the colonial encounter, it stretches back to the 13th century, to the
moment of arrival of Islam in Bengal. In the third section the chapter presents a reading of the
political history of Pakistan and Bangladesh, covering a period from the 1920s to the
contemporary moment. The fourth and last section of the chapter presents an intellectual history
of the “Bengali-Muslim” intelligentsia, focusing particularly in the second part of the 20th
century, in an effort to identify the general characteristics of Bengali-Muslim manos or thought
world. My hope is that the broad-stroke historical narratives presented in this chapter will define
and present the political and intellectual landscape in which my interlocutors are situated and
will help us understand the political and intellectual concerns of my interlocutors.
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Colonial Encounters in Shaping Politics, Society and Thought in India and Bengal
Despite the British East India Company’s claim to be mere traders and not conquerors or
governors and despite the intention of Warren Hastings, the first governor general of India, to
rule India according to its own laws and customs to suit the “exigencies of the country,”2 British
rule in India would produce profound changes in nearly all aspects of Indian life. I want to draw
attention to a few transformations that are particularly relevant to our discussion. The first of
these concerns the construction of a new kind of political authority in the form of the modern
state, distinguished not only through its claim of sovereignty3 but also through its practice of
governmentality.4 The modern state was not simply imported to India from Britain; neither was
its emergence in India an isolated event. The emergence of the modern state in India was a part
of a global shift in political arrangements, produced in part by experiences and political ideals of
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Hastings had declared 1792 that the objective of company rule should be to “adapt our
regulations to the manners and understandings of the people, and the exigencies of the country,
adhering as closely as we are able to their ancient uses and institutions.” Barbara D. Metcalf and
Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), pp. 57.
3
Though philosophical discussions on sovereignty have been vigorous and numerous since the
time of Bodin and Hobbes, sovereignty has also become a standard concept in modern political
discourse. It is defined not simply by the empirical phenomenon of the absolutist states
characterized by centralization of bureaucracy and the monopoly of means of violence but also
by the political logic that claims the state as the only legitimate political authority, i.e., having
the authority to make and enforce law. Daniel Philpott, “Sovereignty,” in Oxford Handbook of
the History of Political Philosophy, ed. George Klosko (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011)
4
As advanced by Michel Foucault, governmentality describes that mode of modern
power/regime that functions not only through law, the sword, or power to say no but also through
producing, facilitating, and structuring possibilities of life and fields of action. Foucault’s
formulations have radically altered contemporary scholarly discourses about how power
functions and have provided the theoretical framework for many contemporary studies of
colonial and post-colonial politics. See for example David Scott, “Colonial Governmentality,”
Social Text, no. 43 (1995): 191–220, Nicholas B. Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the
Making of Modern India (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002), Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of
the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2013).
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European and American revolutions in which the state became the primary and most dominant
actor.5 Also, in this global shift towards the state-form and the discourse of governmentality,
movements of political ideas and practices did not flow only from colonial powers to the
colonized spaces. Rather, political ideas, practices, and institutions in the metropolitan centers
were also informed by their colonial experiences. Despite these caveats, it will be reasonable to
argue that the modern state in the Indian subcontinent arises directly out of the colonial
encounter and produces political and social structures that are qualitatively different from their
pre-colonial predecessors.
As Sudipta Kaviraj has argued, political authorities of pre-colonial India did not claim
sovereignty over all domains of life but rather accepted authority of various other discourses and
practices. In contrast, the colonial state, particularly after being formally incorporated in the
British Empire in 1858, not only claimed supremacy over all other authorities but also
increasingly claimed the right to intervene in every aspect of social life.6 The colonial power
restructured the colonial economy by introducing new regimes of property relations and revenue
collection, by centralizing and standardizing finance and state budget, by rearranging agricultural
and industrial production, and by creating new infrastructures and communication networks.7
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Jean-François Bayart, for example, argues in Global Subjects: A Political Critique of
Globalization (Malden: Polity, 2007) that globalization of the “state” constitutes a major, if not
the most significant, element of modern world/global history. Also C. A. Bayly in Recovering
Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011) presents a perceptive analysis of the influence of European and
American revolutions on political ideas and practices in colonial India.
6
Sudipta Kaviraj in The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2010) uses a metaphor of circle of circles, in which the state is one of many
circles that exercise authority and determine membership in a community.
7
See Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago:
University Of Chicago Press, 2004) for a compelling and provocative account of the production
of the colonial economy through the practices of the colonial state, which in turn made possible
the production of national space and a national economy of India.
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The colonial state also quickly abandoned its principle of non-interference in favor of policies of
social reform aimed at liberating Indian people from the shackles of “despotism,” “priestcraft,”
and “superstition.”8 To this end colonial rulers sought to use the sovereign power of the state,
i.e., the law, to proscribe and prescribe social practices, customs, and behaviors.9 Censuses,
surveys, catalogues, anthropological studies, and other practices of what Nickolas Dirks has
called, the “ethnographic state” produced profound transformations in the conceptions of
identities and communities.10 In the colonial state Indian subjects thus encountered a new kind of
political authority that was not only alien but also transformed social imaginaries or the “ways
people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on
between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative
notions and images that underlie these expectations.”11
Colonialism colonized not only space or political structures but also the minds of the
colonized, producing “an epistemic rupture on the vastest possible scale”12 and establishing the
dominance of Eurocentric knowledge and epistemology. Stephen Marglin, for example, has
characterized this “epistemic rapture” as one in which oral and other non-textual knowledge is
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The colonial power was not monolithic by any means, and there existed considerable debates
among British thinkers and policymakers regarding the aim of colonial rule. However, as
perceptively argued by Uday Singh Mehta in Liberalism and Empire: A Study in NineteenthCentury British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) and by others,
liberals ranging from Adam Smith to Jeremy Bentham to James and John Stuart Mill saw
advancement of liberal values as the justification of colonial rule.
9
Prohibition of the practices of Sati under Lord Bentinck in 1829 is one of the earliest and most
celebrated examples of such injunctions. However, the colonial state carried out many more
major and minor interventions in the society in the next hundred plus years of its rule. Metcalf
and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India (2012).
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Dirks, Castes of Mind (2002). See also Kaviraj, The Imaginary Institution of India (2010) for a
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Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 23.
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devalued in favor of gridded, rational, and textual knowledge. The epistemology accompanying
the colonial power relied upon literacy and formal institutions of education for the purpose of
production and transfer of knowledge, whereas the pre-colonial production and transfer of
knowledge had more of the qualities of “techne,” a kind of knowledge that may be impossible to
articulate as abstract reproducible knowledge but is transferred through direct learning, imitation,
observation, etc.13 Institutions of knowledge production set up by colonial power were motivated
by the practical necessities of gathering more knowledge of the society and the people it was
ruling and of producing a class of functionaries for colonial administration. These practices of
knowledge production, however, also provided legitimation for colonial power and established
the supremacy of Western knowledge over indigenous knowledge.14 Observing the simultaneity
of the formation of the Western scientific disciplines and modern imperialism Gyan Prakash
argues that “the authority and application of science as universal reason” buttressed new
structures of rule and knowledge produced by colonial power.15
The superiority of Western knowledge and discourses was, of course, unquestioned in the
minds of the British colonial rulers. The challenge, however, was to produce the recognition of
Western knowledge’s authority among the colonized population, which the colonial power
concluded could only be achieved by enlightening and transforming Indian subjects through a
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Marglin, “Towards the Decolonization of the Mind” (1990).
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program of Western education.16 The early efforts in learning Indian languages, literature,
history, and law by Western scholars displayed a sort of orientalist reverence for the once great
Indian civilization. Such sentiments were soon discarded in favor of a growing assertion of the
supremacy of European knowledge. By 1835 Thomas Macaulay, the Whig politician who served
in the Council of India from 1834 to 1838, would conclude in his controversial “Minute on
Indian Education” that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native
literature of India and Arabia.” The inhabitants of India would be better served, Macaulay
argued, not by efforts to “revive native literature” or knowledge but by the “introduction and
promotion of the knowledge of the sciences” and education in British and European literature,
law, and morals. Macaulay urged the colonial government to adopt an education program that
would follow a Western curriculum and have English as the language of instruction. However,
since educating an entire body of population was beyond the means of the colonial government,
Macaulay contended, the goal of English education would be:
To form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a
class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals,
and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the
country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western
nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the
great mass of the population.17
The above passage is remarkable in how well it reflects the attitudes of the colonizer and in how
well it anticipates the role played by Western-educated Indian elites in establishing the authority
of modern science and the ideologies of reform and progress that underwrote both modernity and
colonial rule in India.
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By the early 19th century a growing number of Indians, of whom Raja Rammohan Roy
was the most prominent, had been expressing enthusiasm and appreciation for Western
knowledge and education. The Hindu College, India’s first English-language institution of higher
learning, was set up in Calcutta in 1817. By the 1830s, already several thousand students
attended Calcutta’s English-language schools.18 The 1835 English Education Act, embodying
much of Macaulay’s arguments, and then the 1854 Education Dispatch, a set of specific policy
reforms proposed by Sir Charles Wood, greatly accelerated the growth of literacy and Western
style secular education by allocating funds for the establishment of and grant-in-aid for schools
throughout India. Despite its popularity and rapid growth, English-education in India remained
for the most part an elite phenomenon, restricted to the upper class and upper-caste male
population.19 English-educated Indians formed an elite stratum in colonial India not only because
they came from already privileged sections of the society but also because English education
itself produced higher social, economic, and political status. On a practical level, education
generally, and English education particularly, became marketable commodities and produced
economic and social opportunities by providing access to new careers and business ventures.
More importantly, however, English education provided access to the discourses of the colonial
masters and, thus, to colonial power itself. English education, by providing access to power and
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Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India (2012)
For example, in 1911, in Bengal, the most literate/educated part of India at that time, the
literacy rate among upper-caste Hindu men was 64%, while for women of the same caste group
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wealth, became a major constitutive element in the formation of new elite and middle classes in
colonial India, which in the context of Bengal came to be known as the bhadralok.20
Expansions in literacy and English education played instrumental roles in social and
political transformations in India not only by producing new class dynamics but also by
generating possibilities for the emergence of a print culture, new forms of sociality, and
ultimately new political and intellectual discourses. Printing presses had arrived in India in the
early 16th century via Portuguese missionaries and had a visible presence in various parts of India
throughout the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. However, it was only in the late 18th and early 19th
century that there emerged a print culture in India.21 By the 1780s and 1790s, British journalists
were setting up English-language newspapers and journals in colonial cities such as Calcutta,
Madras, and Bombay. Vernacular newspapers and journals began to emerge in the early decades
of the 19th century due to efforts by both European and Indian pioneers. The early 19th century
also witnessed the growth of books and pamphlets published in local languages. Many of these
texts were produced by institutions like the Fort William College, which patronized translations
of English and other European language texts into Bengali and other local languages and
supported production of original scholarships in local languages.22 The efflorescence of print
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Bhadralok literally means gentlemen or respectable folks, a much used yet loosely defined
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culture went hand in hand with the growth of voluntary associations of various orientations and
goals throughout India and particularly in cities like Calcutta. Circulations of and discussions
about printed texts were important propellers of the emergence of new forms of sociality –
informal gatherings or addas, formal voluntary organizations, and public meetings – that served
as sites of discussions, debates, and commentaries about various socio-political issues of the day.
The circulation of texts and many of the new associations also served as vehicles for establishing
the authority of the modern, i.e., Western sciences and rationalist discourses and were
instrumental in producing movements for religious and social reforms.23 Though these sociocultural and epistemological transformations occurred throughout colonial India, they were most
profound in Bengal and over the course of the 19th century culminated in a phenomenon that has
come to be known as the Bengal Renaissance.24 The nature and significance of the so-called
renaissance have been assessed and reassessed over the years. Whatever else its impact might
have been, at the least it announced the emergence of the modern intelligentsia among the
bhadralok class and signaled a discursive shift in the Bengali and Indian thought world.
Much has been written about the role played by the English-educated elite, such as the
bhadralok intelligentsia, in colonization and decolonization of India. They have been described
Print : Popular Publishing and the Politics of Language and Culture in a Colonial Society,
1778-1905 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) and Francesca Orsini, Print and
Pleasure: Popular Literature and Entertaining Fictions in Colonial North India (New Delhi:
Permanent Black, 2009).
23
Prakash, Another Reason (1999), p. 52 to 57 makes this argument persuasively by discussing
examples such as the Society for the Acquisition of General Knowledge (1838), the Bethune
Society, the BurraBazar Family Literary Club (1857), and the Mahomedan Literary Club (1863).
24
For a critical evaluation of the renaissance and its relationship to Bengali Muslims, see David
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as clients or agents of colonial power and its fiercest critics and most formidable opponents; they
have been criticized as self-serving traitors and hailed as nationalist heroes and producers of
national consciousness; they have been diagnosed as examples of ‘colonized mind’ and revered
as champions of liberty and enlightenment.25 All these contradictory yet arguably accurate
descriptions point toward the liminal position occupied by this new class between the borders of
colonial power and colonized population. As Indian subjects sought to comprehend and contend
with an alien power that was transforming their ways of being, their conceptions of “the
political” and their relationships to political authority were also being radically transformed.
Given that the colonial state was no longer just another authority among many other authorities
but claimed supreme authority over all, it became less and less possible to challenge colonial
power by invoking some other authority. Colonized subjects had to negotiate the power of the
colonial state by using its own logic and speaking in the language produced by it. The bhadralok
class, and particularly the intelligentsia, emerged as most poised to traverse the new discourse of
power that was fast displacing pre-colonial political ideas and practices.
Discourses of modernity, nation, progress, and liberalism entered and increasingly
dominated the Indian and Bengali thought world as the bhadralok intelligentsia “consciously set
out to emulate the historical experiences” of European modernity and began to think, speak, and
write within its discursive limits.26 The print culture and civil society organizations produced in
India a “public sphere” that was populated mostly by members from the upper classes.27 This
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public sphere was in part defined by the possibilities and imperatives of making political
arguments as appeals to an abstract public. Political arguments sought to either express or shift
“public opinion” in efforts to secure and establish the “public good.” This form of political
argument was qualitatively different from its pre-colonial modes, which, as exemplified in the
Akhlaq treaties of the Mughal period, primarily took the form of petitions to rulers and appealed
to their generosity and magnificence.28 The public sphere transformed the idea of politics from
something that pertains only to decisions and policies of kings, i.e., rajniti,29 to something that
involves ever-larger sets of actors and actions. In this transformed field of politics, the
intelligentsia emerged as one of the most influential protagonists by virtue of their proficiency in
the colonial discourses of power and politics.
However, the colonial power did not manage, especially in its early career, to exercise
total control over the colonized territories or populations. Vast majorities of Indians remained on
the margins of and lacked access to discourses of colonial power, particularly given their
illiteracy. There existed various other alternative discourses of power and authority that operated
in that marginal space. For instance, many of India’s 19th and 20th century movements and
uprisings of marginalized peoples invoked religious or millenarian discourses, which could be
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viewed as autonomous discourses of the subaltern.30 Yet, these possibilities do not negate the
argument that colonial rule altered the political terrain in India by instituting new and modern
discourses of power, in which the bhadralok intelligentsia served to translate and enforce
colonial power over the masses but also produced possibilities for negotiating and resisting that
power. Initially, the English-educated intelligentsia, “trapped in the discourse of [the colonizer’s]
Enlightenment rationalism,”31 had no connection to or motivation for communicating with the
subaltern, whose subalternity was constituted by his inability to access or speak in the modern
discourses of power. By the late 19th century, however, a nationalist consciousness began to
emerge among the intelligentsia as it increasingly recognized colonial modernity as a “travesty”
of the original European modernity. Likewise, it recognized the impossibility and undesirability
of reenacting the modernity of the colonizer.32 This recognition, in turn, stimulated the colonized
intelligentsia to discover and return to an autochthonous Indian identity, for which it looked not
only to the “inner domain” of spirituality or to the supposed glories of classical Indian science
and philosophy but also to the cultures and traditions of agrarian masses.33 Efforts to locate the
“true India” among the rural subaltern found expressions in the writings of Indian thinkers
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already in the late 19th century and by early 20th century they constituted a coherent political
project in the Swadeshi movement.34
Though the intelligentsia’s efforts during the Swadeshi movement to “return” to the
village and connect to peasant farmers were unsuccessful, they nevertheless signaled the
necessity for a nationalist discourse to overcome the bifurcation between elite and subaltern
discourses.35 It was Mahatma (M.K.) Gandhi who finally produced a truly nationalist politics not
so much by erasing the distinctions between the two but by bridging their bifurcated discourses
through his ability to speak in the dual registers of the subaltern and the English-educated
elites.36 Gandhi, though certainly the most prominent, was not the only one who was speaking in
these dual registers. Many Muslim League leaders, particularly East Bengal leaders such as
Fazlul Huq, Maolana Bhashani, and Abul Hashim made successful cases for Pakistani
nationalism precisely because they could speak to urban middle class aspirations and to the
desires for a “peasant utopia.”37 These leaders connected to and commanded the rural subaltern
not only because of their skills and charisma but also because of the larger structural shifts that
undermined the autonomy of the agrarian economy and society.38 Thus, by the mid-20th century
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nationalist discourses successfully incorporated and subsumed subaltern discourses that hitherto
operated on the margins of civil society. The displacement of a peasant worldview by a modern
nationalist political consciousness meant that the authority to elaborate political ideals and lead
political movements increasingly shifted away from religious and other traditional leaders to the
urban intelligentsia.
The profound transformations in socio-political structures and educational systems
produced by British colonial rule in India facilitated the emergence of the intelligentsia as the
primary protagonist of colonial politics. In the early 19th century the intelligentsia was an elite
phenomenon, confined mostly to upper-caste Hindus in large colonial cities like Calcutta. By the
end of the century, however, the intelligentsia was acquiring a middle-class character as English
education spread to mofussil [small/provincial] towns and rural areas and was embraced by an
increasing number of the upper peasantry. The emergence of a Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries certainly fits within this broader pattern of historical
development. However, to appreciate the distinct character of the Bengali Muslim intelligentsia
and their particular intellectual and political concerns we need to understand the specific social
and political histories that had structured the conditions of the emergence of the Bengali-Muslim
intelligentsia and gave it its identity.
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The Bengali-Muslims and Their Middle-class Intelligentsia: A Social History
Islam arrived in Bengal in the 13th century via Muslim proselytizers, traders, and military
conquerors of mostly Perso-Turkic cultural background. By the 18th century the meeting of
Islamic and indigenous cultures in the eastern part of Bengal made possible the emergence of an
ethnic group that we now identify as the “Bengali-Muslims.”39 However, the use of the category
“Bengali-Muslim” to designate a particular social group before the 1920s would be somewhat
anachronistic given that such an identity was not proclaimed by any group, nor any group was
identified as such by outsiders. As many scholars of South Asian history have commented, precolonial communal identities were “fuzzy” in different ways. 40 First, the markers and boundaries
communities were seldom precisely or concretely defined, leaving the questions of who
belonged inside and outside the group open. Second, there was no necessity for or possibility of
knowing exactly how large or small the community was. And lastly, a person could claim
membership in different communities simultaneously based on religion, caste, language,
occupation, and place of birth or residence. These “fuzzy communities” increasingly gave way to
“enumerated communities” with precisely defined markers, borders, and exclusive membership
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries for a number of reasons, most significant being the
interventions of colonial governmentality.41 In particular the censuses, first conducted in India in
1872 and carried out decennially from 1881, produced increasingly definite communal identities
based on religious and caste affiliations. These censuses of the late 19th century revealed,
contrary to the commonly held assumptions of the period, that the majority of the population of
39
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Bengal proper were Muslims and in the eastern regions of the province Muslims were more
numerous.42 The censuses produced definitions and measurements of a social group that in the
19th century was known as Bengal Muslims or Muslims of Bengal.
The Bengal Muslims were not, however, a monolithic entity. They were divided among
numerous sects based not only on the well-known divisions between Shia and Sunni but also on
innumerable other differences arising out of adherence and allegiances to various imams, pirs
(Sufi saints), and diverging theological and juridical traditions. These sectarian differences were
often so pronounced that forms of social integration, for example intermarriage, among the sects
were as restricted among them as they were between Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Moreover,
the social and ritual lives of Bengal Muslims were highly syncretic, often blurring the
distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim and making the category of Muslim highly elastic
and porous.43 The more significant divisions among Bengal Muslims, however, arose not from
sectarian differences but from differences in social statuses arising from the composite factors of
class, caste, place of ancestral origin, and claims of spiritual purity. Ashraf, meaning high born or
noble, referred to the members of Muslim upper classes in urban centers and to the rural landed
elites that had emerged during the five centuries of Muslim rule in Bengal prior to the
ascendency of the British. While ashraf Muslims generally claimed foreign, that is to say Arab
and Perso-Turkic, ancestry, converts from upper-caste Hindus may have also been included in
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this category.44 The category of ajlaf or the atraf, connoting lowborn, referred to certain
occupational groups and the peasantry without land-holdings, the vast majority of Muslims in
Bengal. A third category named arzul mirrored the caste concept of untouchable and referred to
groups such as butchers and scavengers. The boundaries of these social divisions among Bengal
Muslims were, however, not well defined. Lack of any scriptural or juridical basis in Islam for
these status differences also allowed for relatively easier upward social mobility for the Bengal
Muslims. In fact, late 19th century theories about the low caste origins of Bengal Muslims and
the census’s need to fix and claim one’s social status as a matter of government record drove
many Muslims in Bengal to claim ashraf status simply by making a show of wealth and adopting
Arabic, Persian, or Turkic names.45 The porousness of the category of ashraf and many
“fraudulent” claims to that status, however, do not negate the concrete and substantial social
difference between ashraf Muslims and the great mass of Bengal Muslims.
While the Muslim population constituted a majority in Bengal, the sectarian and social
differences among Muslim groups meant that there was no “Muslim community” in any selfconscious way. In fact, ashraf Muslims shared a greater sense of community with Muslim elites
across India and beyond than with their co-religionists among the rural peasants. The upper strata
of ashraf Muslims belonged to a pan-Islamic cosmopolitan elite through shared Perso-Turkic
culture, Urdu and Farsi language and literature, and family ties. These elites demonstrated
cultivated disinterest, if not disdain, for Bangla, the language of the vast majority of Bengal’s
Muslim peasants. Even in the 20th century many Bengali Muslim political leaders, most notably
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Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, did not even speak adequate Bangla.46 Muslim peasants, on the
other hand, were thoroughly integrated in the social lives of rural Bengal and enjoyed
community or even class solidarities with peasants of different sectarian denominations.47 The
peasants of Bengal not only shared Bangla as their mother tongue but also rituals, social
customs, festivals, fairs, art forms, music, and everyday cultural practices. It would be, however,
too simplistic to argue that Muslim peasants had adopted Bengali language and culture or that
the Bengali peasants had converted to Islam. Rather, a complex mix of “foreign” and indigenous
cultural, linguistic, and religious elements produced a cultural form that was simultaneously
Bengali and Muslim. 48
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Between the cosmopolitan elite ashraf and the Bengali speaking peasant there existed a
middle class composed mostly of clerics and religious scholars, office holders in civil and
judicial bureaucracy, and sections of the peasantry with small land holdings or tax collection
rights. The Muslim middle class was relatively small and weak even in the pre-British Muslimruled Bengal as many middle-class positions in trade, banking and even government
administration were occupied by non-Muslim groups, particularly by upper-caste Hindus.49 The
British takeover made the position of the Muslim middle class in Bengal even more precarious
during the early decades of the 19th century.50 Fundamental changes in land tenure and
administrative and judicial structures instituted by the British eroded the economic and political
bases of the traditional middle class and precipitated the rise of a new middle class, which, as
discussed above, was dominated by upper-caste Hindus. The Bengal Muslims were unable and,
to a degree, unwilling to find a place within this new middle class, which required different
qualifications and social capital, i.e., secular English education.
Culturally, the Muslim middle class of Bengal occupied an ambivalent position. Though
the necessities of their practical lives and occupations demanded extensive interaction with and
immersion among Bengali-speaking peasants, their social aspirations, particularly for the status
of ashraf, often led them to disavow Bengali identity in favor of a claim of foreign ancestry.
Though they were often Bangla speaking, they were invested in learning Urdu and Farsi, which
boosted not only their claims of ashraf status but also their economic opportunities, at least until
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the mid-19th century. The desire to distinguish one’s social status through language was so strong
that many Muslims of Bengal expressed preferences for Dobhasi, a creolized language with
origins in Bangla and other foreign languages, over Bangla, when their proficiency in Urdu,
Farsi, or Arabic was less than perfect.51 The disdain for Bangla among the Muslim middle class
was an old phenomenon and one that was often criticized by many writers of medieval Bengal,
most famously and scathingly by the 17th century poet Abdul Hakim.52 The disdain towards
Bangla intensified over the course of the 19th century, perhaps as a reaction to the profound
changes in Bangla language and literature produced by British rule. Despite being the spoken
language of the vast majority and being patronized by the rulers, Bangla was not the medium of
official or business communications during Muslim rule and consequently remained relatively
unstandardized and heteronomous. The British preferred to use Bangla, instead of Farsi, as one
of the official languages in addition to English, and they initiated a process of modernization and
standardization in which the Hindu bhadralok of Calcutta emerged as the standard bearers of
Bangla. The language became increasingly aligned with Sanskrit and Brahminical culture. 53 As
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a result, the negative attitudes of the Muslim middle class towards the language intensified
during the 19th century. Shorn of intellectual, social, and political statuses, the Muslim middle
class of Bengal sought refuge in the cultural identity of the upper ashraf and became politically
and intellectually ineffectual for the greater part of the 19th century.
In the second half of the 19th century, especially after the spectacular failure of the 1857
Sepoy Rebellion, Muslims in India generally reconciled with British rule and gradually became
more amenable to English education. During this period Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) and
the “Aligarh School” famously led the charge for expansion of education and reform of Indian
Muslims. In Bengal such efforts were led by the likes of Nawab Abdul Latif (1823-1893) and
Syed Ameer Ali (1849-1928) of the so-called “Calcutta School.” Though these men differed
greatly in their opinions and politics, their efforts at educational reforms shared the goal of
overcoming the “prejudice and exclusiveness of the Mohammedan community” by imbuing it
with a desire for “Western learning and Progress” and by giving its members “an opportunity for
the cultivation of social and intellectual intercourse with the best representatives of English and
Hindu society.”54 By “Mohammedan community” they meant not any local community but a
pan-Indian community of Muslims elites, who were finding themselves at politically and
economically disadvantageous positions because of their lack of English education. Despite
professing to strive for the “well-being” and “recognition of just and reasonable claims” of
“Indian Mohammedans,” these reformers were generally uninterested in the fortunes or the
“moral revival” of the mass of the Muslim population and restricted their education promotion
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programs among the upper classes.55 These early reformers also stressed the need for the
continuation of traditional Madrasa education by arguing that though English education was
necessary for practical purposes, religious indoctrination and training in Arabic and Farsi
language and literature were essential for preserving the identity and moral character of the
community. While these reformers are primarily celebrated as the modernizers of Indian
Muslims, they should also be recognized as key figures in producing and mobilizing Muslim
communal identity in India. And, while their reform initiatives produced considerable expansion
of English and Madrasa education among the Muslim elites and middle classes of India and
Bengal, they did little to promote either mass education or vernacular language and literature.
The emergence of the modern intelligentsia among Bengal Muslims at the turn of the 19th
century had less to do with elite reform movements and more to do with the formation of a new
middle class among Muslim peasants. The Bengal Permanent Settlement of 1793 instituted by
the British created a class of landowners with full proprietary rights over large estates. However,
in practice a complex system of revenue collection with multiple layers of intermediaries situated
between the zamindar (the landowner) and the ryot (the man with the plough or the tiller of the
land) developed. These intermediaries, generally referred to as the jotedars, directed agricultural
activities in the villages and wielded considerable social and economic power.56 In addition, East
Bengal’s deltaic geography and shifting rivers meant that the rural landscape was being
constantly restructured through erosion of riverbanks and the generation of new landmasses, or
chars, elsewhere. Formal proprietary rights in these chars were almost impossible to establish as
they often lay outside of the state’s control or reach. These vast swaths of land, occupied and
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settled by fierce individuals and kinship groups, supported a class of independent cultivators
outside of the Permanent Settlement regime.57 In East Bengal the jotedars and independent
cultivators were mostly Muslims and over the course of the 19th century constituted a rural
Muslim middle class. By the turn of the 19th century this class had become relatively prosperous
due to increases in the commodity value of their crops, particularly jute, and began to invest
surplus income in higher education for their children and in various business ventures.58 Thus, by
the early decades of the 20th century, a new urban Muslim middle class – which, unlike the
traditional Muslim middle class, was deeply rooted in the agrarian economy and the peasant
culture of eastern Bengal – emerged in mofussil towns, as well as in Calcutta.59
The new urban middle class that emerged from the peasantry undertook a journey in the
early decades of the 20th century from being Muslims of Bengal to becoming “BengaliMuslims.” This transformation in identity is critically important to understand because the new
identity of Bengali-Muslims would eventually serve as the foundation for Bangladeshi
nationalist identity and politics. Initially, however, the new urban middle class prioritized its
Muslim identity and aligned itself with ashraf Muslims based on their shared religious identity.
Such an alignment was produced partly because the emerging Muslim middle class of Bengal
found itself competing with the already established Hindu urban middle class or the bhadralok
for jobs and business opportunities. Economic competition exacerbated inter-communal
differences, while fostering intra-communal solidarities. Moreover, by the end of the 19th century
Calcutta’s bhadralok intelligentsia was articulating an idea of a “Bengali Culture” that was
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simultaneously modern yet deeply Hinduized, that is to say Brahminical and Sanskritized.60 This
Hinduized conception of Bengali cultural identity, in which Muslims of Bengal were constructed
as foreigners, caused the new Muslim middle class to retract further into its Muslim communal
identity.61 However, the new Muslim middle class could not be as hostile to Bangla as its 19th
century predecessor, partly because Bangla was most obviously its mother tongue and partly
because literacy in Bangla was now helpful in securing employment and conducting business. By
the late 19th century and early 20th centuries, Muslims in Bengal were becoming literate not only
in Arabic, Farsi, or English but also in Bangla! The increase in Bangla literacy facilitated a
Bangla print culture among Bengal Muslims, which by the 1920s made way for the emergence of
a distinct “Bengali-Muslim” literature and cultural identity.
During the late 19th century, in the context of an emerging print culture and print
capitalism in colonial India, Muslim writers and publishers embraced Bangla as the preferred
language, which propelled publication of several influential journals and newspapers along with
the outpouring of punthi literature.62 Printed in Calcutta’s Bat-tala presses and in small presses in
mofussil towns, these publications constituted a separate and subaltern print culture, which was
oriented towards Muslim peasants as its primary audience. These publications focused on
facilitating wider and more effective dissemination of the message of Islam. Some of the writers
and publications, most notably those associated with the Shudhakar Movement of 1889/90, were
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quite successful in their endeavors and were even politically influential. Their influence
remained, however, confined mostly among the peasantry and failed to make any significant
impression among the urban middle class.63 At the beginning, Muslim Bengali print culture
embraced Bangla mostly as a medium of communication to spread Islamic reform and revivalist
ideologies and campaigns among Bengali speaking Muslims, without necessarily embracing or
promoting a Bengali cultural identity. However, even this limited acceptance of Bangla required
reconstruction of Muslim identity to be based on adherences to and practices of theological,
juridical, and ethical discourses and not on Perso-Turkic or Arabic cultural identities. Though
this decoupling of Muslim identity from linguistic or cultural elements allowed for the
possibilities for being Muslim and Bengali simultaneously, Bengali Muslim print culture
continued to work within and reproduce the category of “Muslims of Bengal” well into the 20th
century.
One of the few Muslim writers who managed to challenge the subaltern and somewhat
ghettoized status of Muslim Bengali literature in the 19th century was Mir Mosharraf Hossain
(1847-1912), famous for his epic novel Bishad Shindu (1885-1891). Though Hossain’s works
addressed themes common to other contemporary Muslim of Bengal writers and were greatly
influenced by punthi literature, he broke into the mainstream literary scene of the bhadralok by
adopting the modern genres of the novel and the play and by associating himself with
mainstream publications.64 Following Hossain, a number of Muslim writers began to write in
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Bangla and ventured into modern literary genres aimed at urban middle-class audiences during
the first two decades of the 20th century. During this period several journals and magazines were
also established, most notably by Mohammad Akram Khan (1868-1968), in efforts to provide
outlets for the burgeoning literary activities.65 Furthermore, the Bangiya Musalman Shahitya
Shomiti was founded in 1911 in an effort to promote Bangla literacy and literature among the
Muslims of Bengal. Despite these efforts, Muslim Bangla literature remained limited and weak
until the end of the WWI as a majority of the Muslim middle and upper classes continued to
view Bangla literature as being less prestigious and less worthy of engagement compared to Farsi
or Urdu literature.
In the years following World War I and throughout the 1920s, however, perhaps the most
significant, shift occurred in the political and intellectual history of Muslim Bengal. Muslim
writers and intellectuals of this period enthusiastically embraced not only Bangla language but
also Bengali literary and cultural identity. This shift in attitude can be discerned from the
activities and gestures of new periodicals like the Saogat, a literary magazine launched in 1918,
and literary and cultural organizations like the Muslim Shahitya Somaj, founded in 1926. These
periodicals and organizations provided intellectual and literary spaces for a new generation of
progressive and modernist Muslim writers and intellectuals and reflected the attitudes and
aspirations of an upwardly mobile and newly urbanized Muslim middle class.66 The literary and
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intellectual spaces, though intended to promote Muslim writers and oriented towards Muslim
readers, were also self-consciously secular or non-communal and were committed to promote
tolerance and cultural exchanges among Hindus and Muslims.67 The vast majority of the literary
activities of the period were concerned with elevating the literature of Muslim Bengal from its
ghettoized status through processes of refinement, which translated into adopting the tropes and
conventions of the bhadralok literature. However, some writers, most notably Kazi Nazrul Islam,
succeeded in infiltrating the standard Sanskritized and Hinduized Bengali language and literature
into linguistic and cultural elements of the Bengal Muslims. In doing so they also succeeded in
secularizing Islamic imageries and expressions. Overall, the1920s produced a literary and
cultural space that was identifiably Muslim yet secular and increasingly part of mainstream
Bengali culture.
Several global and local factors may have facilitated this shift towards secularism and
embracing Bengali identity among Muslim writers in Bengal. First, due to increased support by
the colonial government, the urban middle class and the intelligentsia among the Bengal
Muslims grew significantly during this period. Following the overturning of the first partition of
Bengal in 1911, the British adopted a policy of courting Muslim support by increasing
educational and employment opportunities in Muslim dominated Eastern Bengal. Particularly
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important in this context was the founding of the University of Dhaka in 1921, which played a
significant role not only in promoting secular higher education among Bengal Muslims but also
in transforming Dhaka, which up until then had been little more than a provincial and dispirited
mofussil town, into an vibrant intellectual and political center.68 Second, World War I and the
Russian Revolution precipitated radical ideological changes throughout the world by spreading
nationalism and communism. Bengali-Muslims, particularly those who participated in the war,
were also deeply affected by these world-changing events and became interested in nationalist
and egalitarian ideologies.69 Furthermore, the alliances constructed between Hindus and Muslims
in the context of Gandhi’s Non-cooperation movement and the Khilafat movement also
facilitated a departure from the communitarian politics of the previous decades. And finally and
more proximately, the growing prestige of Bengali literature generally and the awarding of the
Nobel Prize to Rabindranath Tagore particularly played significant roles in attracting a growing
number of Muslim writers to the folds of Bengali literature.70
A confluence of factors produced a critical juncture in the intellectual and political
history of Muslim Bengal in the 1920s, when the Bengali-Muslim middle-class intelligentsia
could finally break free of the cultural holds of the ashraf Muslims and the consequent
veneration of Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu literature and culture and to proclaim Bengali to be their
68
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autochthonous cultural identity. The 1920s marked an inauguration of the Bengali-Muslim
identity. Due to the expansion and reconfiguration of the middle class and the expansion of
literacy and institutions of higher education, sociologically speaking, the modern intelligentsia
emerges among Bengal Muslims only in the 20th century. More importantly, only during this
period did the Muslim intelligentsia begin to grapple with the question of cultural identity, which
had become available globally as a conceptual category only in the preceding decades.71 In
efforts to conceptualize their cultural identity the Muslim intelligentsia of Bengal began to
construct the category of Bengali-Muslim, which on the one hand recognized the primacy of
Bengali linguistic and cultural identity but on the other sought to produce distinctions from the
Bengali identity of the Calcutta bhadralok by emphasizing both religious and regional
differences. The Bengali-Muslim identity inaugurated in the 1920s by young Muslim
intellectuals continued to develop in the subsequent decades in complex and interesting ways as
it interacted with the identities and politics of Bengali, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi nationalism.
This complex unfolding of the Bengali-Muslim identity constitutes a major theme of discussions
presented in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. There I will revisit the lives and careers
of some of the important actors who produced this formative moment in Bangladesh’s history.
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An Outline of a Political History of Pakistan and Bangladesh
The interwar period (1919-1939) was tumultuous globally and for colonial India. Among
the myriad historic developments, perhaps the most significant was the beginning of colonial
India’s mass politics. Politics in colonial India had hitherto consisted of either lobbying and
petitioning by the elites hoping to secure economic benefits and political concessions from the
colonial government or of acts of violence carried out by small groups with the intention of
terrorizing the colonizing power.72 Anti-colonial and nationalist politics in India went through a
qualitative shift after WWI with the emergence of mass movements of resistance and rebellions,
exemplified by Gandhi’s Non-cooperation movement.73 These mass movements were
accompanied by gradual expansion of representative government and the franchise, instituted by
the colonial government either as political concessions or as strategic maneuverings. The
introduction of electoral politics and the institution of separate electorates for Hindus and
Muslims transformed the nature of politics in colonial India by making numbers the most
important political factor and by solidifying political identities along markers of religion and
caste. The political dynamics of the interwar period determined the postcolonial future of British
India, which as we know would eventually be partitioned into the states of Pakistan and India.
The political history of Bengali-Muslims is located within and shaped by these macro processes.
We need to, however, also pay attention to the particularities of Bengal politics during this
period and treat them not just as regional or local manifestations of all-India politics. Focusing
on the particularities of Bengal politics is especially warranted if we are to appreciate the
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historical contingencies that led to the second partition of Bengal and East Bengal’s inclusion in
Pakistan.
Though “Muslim separatism” is often offered as one of the main causes of the partition of
India and Bengal, this narrative needs to be contested. In the all-India context, apprehensions
about the status of “minority” motivated much of the Muslim support for Pakistan. In Muslim
majority provinces of Bengal and Punjab, however, the political dynamics were much different.74
With the introduction of electoral politics in the 1930s, Bengali-Muslims, who constituted the
majority of Bengal, became a powerful political bloc despite their relative economic and
educational “backwardness” compared to Bengali-Hindus. This new political advantage along
with the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia’s embrace of Bengali identity from the 1920s meant that
Bengali-Muslims were conflicted and ambivalent about a partition of Bengal and separation from
Bengali-Hindus. Bengali-Muslim’s support for Pakistan, though proved to be decisive in the end,
was neither inevitable nor unequivocal; nor was there a consensus about the idea of Pakistan.75
Bengali-Muslim politics in the 1930s and early 1940s, as exemplified by A.K. Fazlul
Huq’s Praja Party, was motivated more by peasant class concerns than by communal interests.
Though the Praja Party, because the vast majority of Bengal peasants were Muslims, was a de-
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facto Muslim majority organization, it was explicitly secular or non-communal and drew support
and membership from many non-Muslim groups, particularly from lower-caste Hindus. In the
election for the first Bengal Legislative Assembly in 1937 the reconstituted Krishak-Praja Party
(KPP) won 35 seats and the Bengal Muslim League won 40, while independent candidates won
42 other “Muslim seats”. As the numbers suggest the political parties were relatively equal in
strength and no party exerted hegemonic control. The postelection intrigues, however, produced
a coalition between the KPP and the Muslim League not so much as a result of communal
solidarity but as a result of pragmatic political calculations. The coalition was invited to form a
government and the Congress became the opposition party despite winning more seats (54) than
other party. Fazlul Huq became the head of the government and the first prime minister of
Bengal despite his party winning fewer seats than either the Congress or the Muslim League.
This points not only to Huq’s own stature as a leader but also to the importance and vibrancy of
peasant politics in Bengal.76
The second and last election of the Bengal Legislative Assembly was held in 1946. This
time the Muslim league won 110 seats out of 117 Muslim reserved seats and the KPP won only
four, of which two belonged to Huq himself as he contested successfully from two
constituencies. The League received 95% of the total Muslim urban vote and 84.6% of the
Muslim rural vote. The demise of the KPP and Huq and the ascendency of the Muslim League to
become the sole representative of Muslims of Bengal ultimately paved the way for the creation
of Pakistan and the partition of Bengal.77 If the KPP and its brand of politics had not collapsed so
spectacularly, the history of Bengal and perhaps the entire Indian subcontinent would have
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unfolded much differently. Thus, the question of what caused the fall of KPP and the rise of the
Muslim League in Bengal remains a central question in the Bangladeshi and South Asian
historiography. Bangladeshi historian Taz Hashmi has argued that the collapse of the KPP and
rise of the Muslim League in the 1940s resulted from the increasing “communalization of class
struggle” and construction of Pakistan as a “peasant utopia.”78 Communalization of class politics
was certainly a factor in enlisting peasant support for the Pakistan movement and might have
motivated a section of the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia, particularly those with strong peasant
roots and left-leaning politics. Multiple other factors also contributed to the fall of the KPP and
the rise of the Bengal Muslim League. The weak organizational base of the KPP, factional
competition and maneuvering among Bengali-Muslim leaders, the failure of Fazlul Huq’s
leadership, and interference by the colonial government explained the changing fortunes of the
two political organizations.79
The dominance of the Muslim League in Bengal politics did not, however, automatically
translate into support for Pakistan, not at least for the kind of Pakistan that Muhammad Ali
Jinnah, the Quaid-E-Azam, and others were envisioning elsewhere in British India. The rise of
the Bengal Muslim League and its overwhelming victory in the 1946 election owed a great deal
to the leadership, political acumen, and organizational skills of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy and
Abul Hashim, both of whom were deeply skeptical of Jinnah and the central leadership of the All
India Muslim League and their idea of Pakistan. Suhrawardy, Hashim, and other BengaliMuslim political leaders, however, supported the demand for Pakistan because they understood
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Pakistan to represent possibilities for creating multiple states, possibly federated, out of the
dissolution of British India. One of the sovereign post-colonial states would have been a unified
Bengal, possibly including Assam and other parts of Eastern India, which would represent
Bengali cultural/national identity while allowing for substantial political power for the BengaliMuslim majority. United Bengal remained a realistic possibility even as late as May of 1947, a
mere three months before its eventual failure and consequent partition of Bengal. 80
Arguably, the most significant factor behind the failure of the United Bengal movement
had to do with the insufficient development of an idea of a Bengali nation, which could have
provided the ideological foundation of the new state. Lacking any ideological foundation for
unity, Hindus and Muslims of Bengal had become increasingly hostile to each other based on
their real and perceived differences of interests. The underdevelopment of Bengali nationalism
and the lack of unity among Bengali Muslims and Hindus contributed to the subordination of
local Bengal politics to the demands of the political contests between the Muslim League and the
Indian National Congress (INC) for control of the post-colonial future. The imperial ambitions of
the central leadership of these organizations and their failure to successfully negotiate or share
power with each other produced the political crises of the 1940s, which increasingly produced an
inevitable partition of British India.81 Given the choices that Bengal would either become a
unified independent state or become divided into two parts with one side joining India and the
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other Pakistan, the majority of Congress leaders chose the latter option. In their efforts to
establish a United Bengal, Bengali-Muslim leaders were joined by some progressive BengaliHindu politicians like Sarat Bose, brother of Subhash Bose. A majority of Bengali-Hindu leaders
from the Congress party, however, strongly opposed the idea of an independent unified Bengal,
fearing that Bengali-Hindus would be dominated by the Muslim majority in the new state.
Consequently, Bengali-Hindu leaders pushed for a partition of Bengal that they so vehemently
fought a few decades ago.82 The ashraf elements of the Muslim leadership, particularly those
associated with Dhaka’s Nawab family, prioritized a unified Muslim state of Pakistan at the
expense of a unified Bengal. And, in the end, leaders like Suhrawardy and Hashim capitulated
not only to the ashraf leaders of Bengal but ultimately to the personality and will of the Quaid
and to the idea of responsibility towards the “Muslim Community.” In the absence of any
coherent Bengali nationalist ideology, communal identities prevailed on both sides.
The creation of the new states of India and Pakistan produced profoundly contradictory
effects. On the one hand the partition caused massive violence, loss of lives, and displacements,
deeply traumatic events for millions across South Asia.83 On the other hand it also produced a
sense of optimism and euphoria that touched even the peasants living in the far-flung corners. In
Eastern Bengal, the sense of jubilation was particularly high among the rural masses, who
viewed the establishment of Pakistan not only as the birth of an independent state but also as a
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promise of freedom from economic exploitation by their Hindu landlords.84 The Bengali-Muslim
middle class was also generally enthusiastic about Pakistan for its creation represented increased
opportunities for professional advancement and other economic gains. Yet, in Bengal, perhaps
more than in other places of South Asia, the partition tore apart the whole social fabric as friends,
families, and neighbors suddenly found themselves on different sides of the new political border.
For the Bengali-Muslim middle class the loss of Calcutta, the center of its intellectual and
political activities, was particularly destabilizing. Many Bengali-Muslim intellectuals and
politicians simply stayed back in Calcutta instead of migrating to the state they played major
parts in making, while some others made the move reluctantly and belatedly.85 Such a partition
was so unfathomable that even years after its occurrence, many continued to insist that it would
not be sustainable or permanent.86 Historian Ayesha Jalal has argued that perhaps no one, not
even ardent supporters, really wanted the Pakistan that actually emerged in that confusing and
bloody summer of 1947.87 Yet, after the creation of the new state, there was no alternative left
but to work through the many contradictions and crises that plagued the new state from the
moment of its inception.
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The partition of British India into two states involved demarcating territories and
distributing people, institutions, infrastructure, and other resources. After the dust of partition
had settled, it became apparent that while Pakistan gained a strong military, it acquired a
relatively weak civil bureaucracy and severely malnourished industrial economy.88 Building up
the state and its economy thus became the immediate and paramount task facing leaders of the
new country. This task was made exceedingly difficult by the challenge of accommodating five
to seven million Muslim refugees coming in from various places in India and the severe shortage
of administrative personnel and human capital caused by the departure of up to ten million
Hindus from Pakistan. The war with India over control of Kashmir in 1947-48, the subsequent
political and military conflicts and the effects of Cold War politics only compounded the
challenge of governance in the new state. But perhaps, the most difficult and important challenge
was adopting a constitution that would produce national cohesion and a governing structure for a
country that did not even have territorial contiguity; its western and eastern wings were separated
by more than a thousand miles of Indian territory and profound ethno-linguistic differences. All
these challenges became much harder to tackle because of the loss of authoritative leadership,
first by the death of Jinnah in 1948 and then by the assassination of his deputy and Pakistan’s
first prime minister Liquat Ali Khan in 1951. Their deaths produced a crisis of leadership and the
intensification and public displays of factional and regional conflicts among the political stratum
of Pakistan. 89
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For the most part Pakistani political events can be analyzed as the unfolding of tensions
between the two most prominent factions within the ruling strata. On the one hand there were the
politicians, fragmented into the ranks of landlords, urban professionals, and capitalists and on the
other hand were the state functionaries, divided between the civil-bureaucracy and the military.90
The complex negotiations of interests among these factions were compounded by the distance
and differences between the western and the eastern wing of the country. West Pakistani leaders,
in particular Punjabi politicians, were fearful that in a parliamentary system, politicians from
East Bengal, which contained 54 percent of Pakistan’s population, would dominate national
politics. The apprehension about representative government was also shared by the ashraf
segments of the East Bengal leadership, who feared that in a democratic system they might lose
ground to their middle-class counterparts. These apprehensions about democracy and fear of
regional dominance made consensus for a constitution difficult to achieve. A constitution was
finally adopted in 1956, after nine years of negotiations and foot-dragging. However, the failure
of leadership and the crisis of governance during Pakistan’s early years produced an opening for
the emergence in 1958 of Ayub Khan as the military strongman bringing order and stability to
the country.91
A major source of political tension in Pakistan was the profound ambivalence regarding
the concept of the nation. The nation that Jinnah and other makers of Pakistan had advanced was
constructed upon an abstract notion of being Muslim in India, instead of more concrete ties of
blood and soil. In fact, the founders of Pakistan viewed existing ethno-linguistic identities as
90
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sources of division within, instead of the foundations of, the nation.92 The challenge for the
founders of Pakistan was to produce national unity among ethnically and linguistically diverse
groups.93 Many proponents of Pakistan, most notably Abul A’la Mawdudi of Jamaat-e-Islam,
argued that national unity could only be achieved by constructing Pakistan as an ideological
state, with Islam the foundational state ideology.94 The more secular-minded leaders of the
Muslim League, however, resisted making Pakistan an Islamic state. Yet they failed to propose
an alternative ideological foundation. In this ideological void, the founders of Pakistan sought to
produce national cohesion by imposing artificial linguistic uniformity, making Urdu the only
official language. The founders reasoned that since Urdu was not the mother tongue of any of the
major ethno-linguistic groups, making it the official language would require Pakistanis overcome
their particular ethno-linguistic identities and become national subjects. 95 This move, however,
failed to produce its desired effects and instead inflamed the politics of regionalism not only in
East Bengal but also in regions of West Pakistan.
In East Bengal, political forces had joined together under the banner of the Muslim
League for the common goal of Pakistan, giving the party near absolute hold over the region’s
politics by 1946. However, once the new state came into place such political alliances were
unnecessary and untenable, opening rifts within and ultimately causing the demise of the party.
The party’s leadership positions had been captured by the ashraf politicians during the
tumultuous period of the Partition, with Khawja Nazimuddin of Dhaka’s Nawab family in the
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lead. As the Muslim league became the ruling party after independence, these leaders became the
new rulers of East Bengal and part of the ruling circle of Pakistan.96 Despite formally
representing East Bengal, however, these leaders socially and culturally belonged more to the
pan-India Muslim elite. The political loyalties and interests of the ashraf leaders aligned more
perfectly with the central power of Pakistan rather than with the regional interests of East
Bengal. Muslim League leaders’ hostile response to the movement demanding to make Bangla a
Pakistani state language was one of the early and clear indicators of the new rulers’ antipathy
towards a population they supposedly represented. In the process of consolidating their power,
the ashraf elites marginalized the Muslim League leaders with progressive political agendas and
with more regional appeal and popularity among the middle class in East Bengal.97
Having been pushed to the sidelines, some veteran leaders and most younger political
activists in East Bengal became disillusioned with the Muslim League within a short period. By
1949 many broke with the Muslim League and formed a new party, the Awami Muslim League,
which was renamed the Awami League (AL) in 1953, under the leadership of Maolana Bhashani,
Shamsul Huq, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman among others. Suhrawardy and Hashim, who had
both stayed back in West Bengal after the partition, moved to Dhaka in 1950. While Suhrawardy
joined and took up the leadership of the newly formed Awami Muslim League, Hashim floated a
new political organization by the name of Khilafat-e-Rabbani Party. In 1953 some of the more
leftwing and communist-leaning members of the Muslim League broke with the party and
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formed yet another new political party, the Ganatantri Dal, under the leadership of legendary
peasant organizer Haji Muhammad Danesh. Meanwhile, A.K. Fazlul Huq, who had been
relegated to playing a second-tier role after the collapse of the KPP in 1946, sought to re-enter
the political limelight in 1953 by reviving his old party under a new name, the Krishak Sramik
Party (KSP). By the time the first election for the provincial legislative council of East Bengal in
the post-independence era was held in 1954, most Bengali-Muslim leaders had virtually
abandoned the Muslim League, causing the party to suffer a total defeat in the election. While
the Muslim League managed to win only 10 of 309 seats, the coalition of parties assembled
under the banner of the United Front won 233 seats.98
The proliferation of new political parties in East Bengal in the early 1950s indicated the
widespread disillusionment with the Muslim League and highlighted the differences in political
programs and personalities contained within the old Muslim League. These disparate political
factions, however, soon realized that their forces had to be aligned if they were to overcome the
hegemonic hold of the Muslim League. Thus came the United Front, which included the Awami
League, the Krishak Sramik Party, and the Ganatantri Dal, as well as the Nizam-e-Islam. The
United Front was, however, another example of an uneasy and unsustainable coalition. It was
united by the minimum program of defeating the Muslim League but did not manage to work
through policy and ideological differences to produce real unity. Even its famous 21-Point
Program was not fully agreed upon by all factions. And there had been many secret negotiations
and agreements among the various leaders of the United Front, which fundamentally undermined
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many of the objectives of its publicized platform.99 Despite its massive electoral victory the
United Front government barely survived two months because of the political differences and the
conflicting personal ambitions of its leaders and factions. Though many United Front leaders
would later occupy ministerial posts in the provincial and central governments and build upon
their electoral mandate, the United Front government and parliamentary democracy in general
came to an end with the dissolution of Chief Minister Huq’s cabinet and the imposition of
governor’s rule on May 29, 1954.100
Though the United Front proved to be a failure in government, its massive electoral
victory – particularly of the Awami League, the largest partner in the coalition with 143 seats –
reflected the rising regional consciousness and arguably a nascent Bengali nationalism among
the electorate. The first of the Front’s 21-Point Program was a demand to recognize Bangla as
one of the state languages of Pakistan, a demand that had galvanized the populace of East
Bengal, particularly its student body, from the early days of Pakistan’s inception. After the
violent response of the government in February of 1952, this demand took on a central place in
East Bengal’s politics and served as a unifying force behind the United Front.101 Though the
1956 Constitution of Pakistan and other government edicts recognized Bangla as a state language
and fulfilled few other demands of the 21-point Program, the aspirations for East Bengal regional
autonomy and for economic and political parity between the eastern and the western wings of
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Pakistan were reflected in support for the United Front. Those aspirations would remain
unrealized until the very end.102
Ayub Khan’s coup d’état in 1958 suspended the constitution only after two years of its
existence, and his military-bureaucratic regime governed Pakistan with an unequivocal
authoritarian grip, promising political order, national unity, and economic development. While
GDP growth and other macroeconomic indicators point to a period of relative economic
prosperity, his regime nullified much of the previous decade’s gains in democratic politics, as
modest as they may had been. Under Ayub’s rule, political power and economic wealth in
Pakistan became ever more concentrated, with his cronies and the military establishment
becoming the chief beneficiaries. Job opportunities and other benefits of an expanding economy
were distributed, by and large, as patronages for securing support for the regime. In order to put
democratic veneer on his authoritarian rule, Ayub introduced the system of “Basic Democracy,”
which did away with universal suffrage and established a mechanism for indirect elections for
national offices.103 The electorate in this Basic democracy scheme was composed of a limited
number of local level political figures, who were suspected of being manipulated through
patronage and favors and consequently provided the strongest support base for the regime. The
regime also courted support from members of the middle-class intelligentsia by bestowing upon
them awards and titles and by installing them in prestigious positions in newly created academic
and cultural institutions.104 And finally, despite Ayub modeling himself as a Kemalist
modernizer, his regime sought to produce legitimacy for itself and for the Pakistani state by
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politicizing Islam.105 This is not to suggest that Pakistan became an Islamic state in the sense that
it adopted sharia as the law of the land or came to be ruled by the ulema. Rather Islam was used
to serve the interest of a state that never disavowed its inherent secularism, i.e., its claim to
sovereignty. The Ayub regime sought to produce an Islamic cultural identity as the national
culture of Pakistan, one that sought to subordinate, if not erase, regional cultural identities. In
practice this meant justifying authoritarian state practices of social engineering and control in the
name of Pakistani national unity, which in turn was legitimized as the bulwark protecting not
only Muslims of South Asia but also Islam itself. Perhaps, Ayub was just less ambivalent and
more efficient in his “opportunistic Islamization” than his predecessors at the helm of
Pakistan.106
One of the significant effects of Ayub’s cronyism was that it compounded the political
tension between East and West Pakistan through policies that systematically discriminated
against East Pakistan and disproportionately favored West Pakistani, particularly Punjabi,
economy and population. As a consequence, notwithstanding the support he enjoyed from his
client classes and some popular support produced by his personality cult, Ayub faced opposition
in East Pakistan, where his regime was viewed not only as authoritarian rule but also as an
instrument of West Pakistani domination.107 By the second half of the 1960s the opposition to
Ayub’s regime began to find expressions in concrete political movements and campaigns in East
Pakistan. Discourses of Bengali literature and culture (shahitya and sonskriti), which articulated
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and emphasized the cultural distinctiveness of East Pakistan, became increasingly politicized
during this period and frequently clashed with Ayub’s project of producing hegemonic national
culture.108 By 1966 the Awami League, now led by young and charismatic Sheik Mujibur
Rahman, launched the historic Six-Point campaign demanding complete political, economic, and
cultural autonomy of East Pakistan, leaving only matters of military defense and international
relations in the hands of the federal government of Pakistan. Also by the late 1960s, perhaps in
keeping with the spirit of the time, a significant part of the student population of East Pakistan,
as well as in West Pakistan, embraced left-wing revolutionary politics. Ayub Regime’s heavyhanded response to the political movements against him, in particular the persecution of Mujib
and other AL leaders on conspiracy charges, not only served to galvanize popular opposition to
his regime but also established Mujib, now dubbed Bangabondhu or the Friend of Bengal, as the
most authoritative leader of East Pakistan.109 In 1969 a people’s uprising, involving not only
urban middle class but also peasants, industrial workers, and state functionaries, both in the
Eastern and the Western wings of Pakistan forced the “benevolent dictator” to abdicate power.
His successor, Yahia Khan, was mandated with restoring parliamentary democracy.110
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In the run up to the first election for the national assembly of independent Pakistan, 23
years after the birth of the country, there was much excitement and optimism. However, there
were also anxieties and apprehensions among West Pakistani political leaders about sharing
national power with or worse yet being dominated by politicians from more populous East
Pakistan. They were particularly worried that while multiple political parties vied for power in
West Pakistan, the Awami League had established a near monopolistic hold in political
representation of East Pakistan.111 In any case, the elections were held in December 1970. The
Awami League enjoyed a landslide victory, securing 288 out of 300 seats in East Pakistan’s
Provincial Assembly and 167 out of 169 seats in the National Assembly allotted for East
Pakistan. The Pakistan People’s Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as the winner in West
Pakistan securing 83 seats of the national assembly and winning an overwhelming majority in
provincial assemblies of Punjab and Sindh. The National Awami Party led by Wali Khan
performed well in the former North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, winning a majority
in the provincial assemblies of both states. The once hegemonic Muslim League was now
divided in many factions, and most religious outfits, except Jamiat Ulema Islam, suffered heavy
electoral defeats.112 The election results laid bare the regional schisms in Pakistani politics with
each party dominating their own region but unable to make any inroads beyond. The Awami
League, despite securing an absolute majority in the National assembly, failed to win a single
seat in West Pakistan. Failure of any one party to claim a national mandate and the failure of the
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parties to reach a consensus about sharing power and forming the next national government
triggered a political crisis that would escalate over the next three months, culminating in the
nine-month-long liberation war of Bangladesh.
The liberation war was fought between the Pakistani Army and the Mukti Bahini
[Liberation Force], a guerilla force composed of Bengali personnel from the Pakistani Army, the
Police, and the Border Guard, as well as a large number of civilian volunteers, particularly young
university students. The Mukti Bahini was under the formal command of the temporary
government of Bangladesh, formed on April 17, 1971 by the Awami League leaders, who had
managed to survive the initial offensive by the Pakistani Army on March 26th and escape to
India. The Mukti Bahini were trained, armed, and supported by the Indian Army, which
eventually joined the war directly on December 6th, to force the defeat of the Pakistani Army on
December 16th, 1971. The war was one of the more devastating conflicts of the 20th century.
Despite the difficulties in ascertaining actual numbers and despite the hyperbolic arguments and
counter arguments by those with vested interests, it is reasonable to argue that genocidal violence
and extreme atrocities were committed by the Pakistani Army.113 The discussion of why such a
bloody war took place and who should bear the responsibility for the atrocities and devastation
has produced a cottage industry of historical analysis, with many commentators – including
academics from both inside and outside of Bangladesh – still trapped in wartime partisan
narratives. A critical evaluation of this literature and a meaningful analysis of the complex
113
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history of the war are beyond the scope of the current discussion. However, I want to offer a
caution against the kind of teleological reading of the war advanced by Bangladeshi nationalists
and others who construct the war as the inevitable outcome of the conflict between Bengali
nationalism and Pakistani neo-colonial domination.114 The war was a much more historically
contingent event determined as much by geopolitical calculations of global and regional powers
in the context of the Cold War as by actions and initiatives of local actors.115
After independence Mujib, who was in a Pakistani prison for the entirety of the Liberal
War, was hailed as Father of the Nation and became the first president of Bangladesh. The
Awami League became the official ruling party. Representatives elected in the 1970 election
assumed the mandate to serve as the constituent assembly and produced a relatively progressive
constitution for Bangladesh within a year.116 Though the constitution articulated most democratic
and egalitarian ideals as the founding principles of the new state, the re-construction of state
apparatuses and mechanisms of governance remained far from complete. Recovering from the
tremendous loss of lives and the devastation caused by the war posed the greatest of challenges.
Poverty and unemployment were deep and widespread and exacerbated by natural disasters and
rampant corruption. Bangladesh’s difficulties culminated in a devastating famine in 1974. The
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question of how to address the “collaborators” who had opposed the Liberation War or actively
supported the Pakistani Army proved to be a complex and contentious issue, particularly because
many of them were to be absorbed into the military and the civil bureaucracy of the new state.
Moreover, many former members of the guerilla force, now greeted as freedom fighters, had not
laid down their arms at the conclusion of the war and sought to use their arms as well as their
status as freedom fighters to secure political and personal gains. The radical left factions, many
of whom participated in the war outside of the command of the Awami League-controlled Mukti
Bahini, posed a particularly difficult challenge as they sought to push the struggle for national
liberation to the next stage and produce radical revolutionary transformations of society.117
In the face of these challenges, Mujib and the Awami League struggled to assert effective
control over the country, relying mostly on the charismatic authority of Mujib and politics of
patronage. Mujib became increasingly authoritarian in his bid to maintain control of the country.
The Jatiya Rakshi Bahini, formed in February 1972 as a paramilitary force personally loyal to
Mujib, was draconian in its efforts to produce political order, violently responding not only to
armed insurgencies but also to political opposition to the regime. Mujib and the ruling Awami
League’s lack of tolerance for political opposition became apparent during the first general
117
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election of Bangladesh in 1973, when the ruling party abused state power and employed dubious
means to capture 292 seats in the 300-seat parliament. This massive electoral victory, however,
did not prove to be helpful in either producing legitimacy for the regime or in coping with the
socio-economic crises facing the country. As discontent and opposition to his regime increased,
Mujib responded first by declaring a state of emergency, then by discarding parliamentary
democracy in favor of presidential rule, and finally by instituting a single party regime and
banning all other political parties. 118 These moves did not succeed in placating the opposition,
which now denied opportunities for legitimate expression turned more to violent insurgencies
and conspiracies.119
On August 15, 1975 the Mujib regime was overthrown by a coup d’état organized by
factions of the military and disgruntled members of the Awami League, including members of
Mujib’s own cabinet.120 Mujib, along with most members of his family and personal staff, were
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brutally murdered that day. Some of his key allies and deputies were imprisoned and later
assassinated in jail. The coup produced a period of extreme political instability and violence, in
which several coups and counter coups followed each other as different factions vied to control
the country. At the end a sepoy-jonota biplob [uprising of soldiers and the people] on November
7, 1975 helped Major-General Ziaur Rahman to emerge as the de-facto ruler, who then formally
assumed power first as the chief martial law administrator on November 30, 1976 and then as the
president on April 21, 1977.121 In a bid to secure his rule Zia relied heavily upon the civilmilitary bureaucratic elite, who were installed in key positions at the national and local level. In
doing so Zia essentially reproduced an authoritarian administrative state similar to the one that
Ayub Khan had presided over.122 And like Ayub, Zia also sought to produce democratic
legitimacy for his rule by holding referendums and elections, whose openness and credibility
remain questionable.123 He also launched a political party of his own, The Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) in 1979, which came to be composed of diverse and conflicting factions
– disaffected members of the Awami League, members of left wing political parties that were
incompetence of those involved in the coup. Many have also argued and alleged, however, that
larger forces – not only the military high command but also the US Central Intelligence Agency
– were complicit, if not culpable for the coup and the murders. See S. A. Karim, Sheikh Mujib:
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sidelined during the Awami League’s ascendency in the 1960s, and members of conservative
Islamist parties that were outlawed after independence for their opposition to the Liberation War
and collaboration with the Pakistani Army. Though Zia’s regime produced mixed results in terms
of bringing political order and economic development, he personally remained popular because
of his perceived honesty and hard work. Yet, his personal appeal was not, as it was not for
Mujib, enough to contain the contradictions and conflicts among different political factions.
Even the military, his strongest base, lacked any genuine cohesiveness; there were 19 abortive
coups between 1977 and 1981.124 The last of these abortive coups, on May 30, 1981, claimed the
life of President Zia.
After Zia’s sudden death, vice-president Abdus Sattar became president and continued
with support from Zia loyalists among the civil-military bureaucracy. Old and frail, he failed to
assert leadership over the country and was removed from office within a year through a bloodless coup by the then army chief of staff Hussain Muhammad Ershad. The new military dictator
followed the pattern of military rule that by then had become well established and predictable –
mixing up oppressive measures with democratic overtures, setting up a political party to produce
an organizational base and to dress the government in civilian clothes, and politicizing religion to
mask the lack of an ideological foundation. However, Ershad was more successful than his
predecessor Zia in consolidating power, particularly within the army, which in turn provided
some measure of political order and a platform for economic development. The relative stability
and prosperity of the Ershad regime was, however, severely undercut by rampant corruption and
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clientelism, which produced widespread dissatisfaction and resentment. Political mobilization
against the regime started as soon as Ershad lifted martial law and allowed political activities.
The Awami League, now headed by Sheik Hasina, one of two surviving daughters of Mujib, and
the BNP, headed by Khaleda Zia, the widow of General Zia, emerged as the most formidable
challengers to Ershad’s newly constituted Jatiya party. Though the Ershad regime claimed
landslide victories in presidential and parliamentary elections by blatantly rigging the system, it
faced increasing popular resistances and agitations. The situation became particularly volatile in
1987, but he managed to survive by employing strong-arm tactics. However, he failed to survive
the next wave of popular agitation in 1990 because by then he had lost support of not only the
civil-military bureaucracy but also crucially of Western powers like the United States, which
found little use for military strongmen in third world countries at the end of the Cold War.125
General Ershad stepped down on December 6, 1990 handing over power to an interim
“caretaker” government headed by the Chief Justice Sahabuddin Ahmed. It was a momentous
occasion in Bangladeshi political history because it marked the beginning of the new democratic
era and a transfer of power without a coup where the deposed leader was allowed to live. By
most accounts the caretaker government functioned admirably by fulfilling its mandate to hold a
free and fair election, in which the BNP emerged as the surprise winner. Since then Bangladesh
has been more or less ruled by democratically elected governments and there have been several
transfers of power based on elections that were generally free, fair, and with a high degree of
participation. There is a sense among ordinary people that voting and other forms of political
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participation matter. Despite widely shared views about the corruption and hypocrisy of the
political leaders, people continue to express active support for the mainstream political parties.
Democracy in Bangladesh, however, remains highly precarious. The ruling parties have
invariably used their political power to enrich their members and in the process made corruption
a systemic feature of the political economy of Bangladesh. And since party affiliation matters for
everything from university admissions to job placement to government contracts, all major
institutions in Bangladesh, including the military and the judiciary, have become increasingly
divided along party lines.126 And since being in government is not simply about political power
but very blatantly about economic opportunities and livelihoods, ruling parties have been
reluctant about transferring power and opposition parties have often resorted to the most extreme
means to force the hand of the ruling party. The situation was so bad in 2007 that the military
forced the then ruling party BNP to relinquish power by declaring a state of emergency. The
military refrained from assuming power itself, however, choosing instead to install a consensus
civilian government. The military backed emergency government ruled for two years to “restore
order” before handing over power to democratically elected representatives. The current ruling
party, the Awami League, is showing no sign of departing from the established pattern. Through
a combination of legal and extra-legal maneuvering the AL government has virtually neutralized
the opposition parties and continues to rule the country based on the mandate of the last two
general elections, which have been criticized by local and international observers for being
rigged and pre-determined.127 In the face of criticisms of its undemocratic practices, corruption,
abuse of power, and human rights violations, the AL government has responded by restricting
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freedom of press and speech. The country seems to be heading towards a single-party
authoritarian rule. Yet, the regime has not faced mass movements or other major challenges to its
rule perhaps because, despite all, the economy is growing at a mind-boggling pace of 7.2% per
year.
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The Bengali-Muslim Thought-World: Trends, Tensions, and Negotiations
The question of how to characterize the general intellectual tendencies of Bengali
Muslims has animated scholars and commentators from East and West Bengal for more than half
a century. Arguably, the 1947 partition of Bengal inspired and motivated many of the studies that
have inquired about the mon [mind], manos [mentality/psyche], chinta-chorcha [thoughtpractices], and buddhi-britti [intellectual practices] of Bengali Muslims. For many scholars and
commentators from Western Bengal, understanding the Bengali-Muslim mind was motivated by
a desire to understand Bengali-Muslims as the existential other of Bengali-Hindus and to make
sense of the communal politics of the 20th century that had led to the partition of Bengal.128
Intellectuals and scholars from East Bengal were also motivated by the partition but not so much
as an event that needed explanation but as an event that produced the possibilities for inquiring
about a cultural identity that is distinct from the larger Bengali identity and cultural construct.
Questions about the Bengali-Muslim mind [mon] or psyche [manos] reflect a desire to locate a
cultural identity in history, or as Bangladeshi literary historian Anisuzzaman has put it, a journey
“in search of one’s own self [swaruper shondhane].”129 Of course, the centrality of nationalist
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politics in post-independent Bangladesh means that many of these “journeys,” taken both inside
and outside of academia in Bangladesh, were motivated by and designed to fit into nationalist
narratives. In the recent decades, however, there have been academically rigorous and
specialized intellectual histories of the Bengali Muslims carried out in the universities of India
and Bangladesh, which have been relatively free of the influence of the political projects of the
respective countries.130 Beyond these intellectual histories produced by Bangladeshi and WestBengali commentators, there exist relatively few studies of the Bengali-Muslim thought world.
Though many Western academics have written intellectual histories of colonial Bengal and of
Bengali-Hindus, only a few have been interested in Bengali-Muslims.131 This gap has been only
partially filled, however, by a handful of intellectual histories produced in recent decades by
Bengali academics based in Western academia.132
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Reading through Bengali-Muslim intellectual history and discussions of the BengaliMuslim psyche narrative patterns become discernable. The most common narrative constructs
Bengali-Muslim intellectual history in terms of a tension, if not a conflict, between modern,
secular, liberal, and progressive elements on the one hand and traditional, religious, and
reactionary elements on the other hand. This reading of history is of course structured by metanarratives of modernity and modernization and is subscribed to by commentators with different
identities and ideological orientations. For example, many commentators from West Bengal
identify the socio-economic backwardness and the consequent conservatism of the “Bengali
Muslim mentality” as the root cause of “Muslim separatism” and, thus, of the communal politics
of the early 20th century and subsequent partition of Bengal.133 These commentators note that the
encounter with modernity via colonialism in 19th century Bengal challenged the moral and
intellectual foundations of society and produced the need for reform. While Bengali-Hindus by
and large opted for progressive reforms, Bengali-Muslim reform movements sought to reestablish and reaffirm the authority of religious orthodoxy, as evidenced by the Islamic revivalist
movements of the 19th and early 20th centuries. This reaction stemmed on the one hand from the
resurgence of fundamentalist tendencies within and cultural stagnation of the Islamic world
generally and on the other hand from the resentment of the Indian Muslim elites and middle
classes towards British rule.134 In these readings the reaction against colonial modernity,
religiosity, conservatism, and the communalism of the Bengali-Muslims become synonymous
with each other and indicate some inherent Bengali-Muslim backwardness, which stands in
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contrast to the supposed secularism and progressiveness of Bengali nationalism. These readings
concede that despite their backwardness, Bengali-Muslims, inspired and influenced by the
modernizing and progressive Bengali-Hindus, eventually produce a renaissance or wakening in
the 1920s and 1930s. The Buddhir Mukti [Emancipation of Intellect] movement is often
mentioned as the most prominent example of this belated awakening to modernity.135 However,
the awakening was short-lived; by the mid-1940s fundamentalist and orthodox elements reasserted their dominance, producing the political and ideological victory of the Muslim League
and Pakistani nationalism. In the post-colonial era the dominance of conservative forces
continued unabated under state patronage, despite occasional resistance offered by sections of
the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia.136
Conflict between progressive and reactionary forces in shaping the Bengali-Muslim
thought-world is also the master narrative of many intellectual histories produced by Bangladeshi
scholars and commentators, particularly those who are ideologically and politically aligned with
“Bengali nationalism.” However, most Bangladeshi commentators reject the argument of the
inherent conservatism of the Bengali-Muslim society or the intelligentsia, pointing towards the
syncretic and heterodox characters of Bengali Islam and the existence of a rational and secular
intellectual tradition that stretches back to the 19th century and further.137 The Buddhir Mukti or
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the shamyabadi [egalitarian] movements of 1920s and 30s are seen not as momentary departures
from a conservative tradition but as the best examples of an essentially liberal and secular
tradition.138 In this reading of Bengali-Muslim intellectual history, the ascendency of the Muslim
League and the success of the Pakistan movement represents a moment of victory for the
conservative forces, which was produced on the one hand by political dominance of the ashraf
Muslims in Bengal politics and on the other hand by the capitulation of the middle class
intelligentsia in the face of the Muslim nationalist fervor.139 For many Bangladeshi
commentators this capitulation to Pakistani nationalism by the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia and
their inability to defend against the communal, reactionary politics and ideology of the elite
classes point to their political weakness and their weak commitments to modernity.140 Other
commentators, however, have argued that the appropriation of discourses of modernity by Indian
nationalism that was thoroughly Hindu in character and the disdain displayed by the modernizing
Bengali-Hindu middle class towards its Muslim counterpart in the early 20th century produced an
understandable, if not justifiable, sense of indignation and resentment among Bengali-Muslims
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and caused them to turn inwards and accentuate their differences, which eventually translated
into support for Pakistan.141
Despite differences in the assessments of the intellectual history of the Bengali-Muslims
leading up to the Pakistan Moment, there is broad agreement that during the Pakistan period,
between 1947 and 1971, conservative and Islamic orthodox forces were generally dominant over
the progressive, modern, and secular forces. The former were mobilized and utilized by the
rulers of the new state for the purpose of producing the ideological foundations for Pakistani
nationalism and their own rule. The rulers used a carrot and stick approach to either buy off EastPakistani intellectuals with lucrative jobs and awards or stifle dissent through aggressive use of
censorship and imprisonment. Despite these efforts, progressive forces persisted and arguably
even became stronger as evidenced in the cultural movements of the 1960s.142 Some
commentators have argued that in their struggles against the reactionary ideologies of the regime,
progressive Bengali intellectuals from East Pakistan not only became disillusioned with
Pakistani nationalism but also began to articulate a Bengali nationalism. Thus, by the late 1960s,
the conflict between conservative and progressive elements among Bengali-Muslim intellectuals
becomes a conflict between Islamism and Pakistani nationalism on one hand and secularism and
Bengali nationalism on the other hand. In these readings Bangladesh’s liberation war appears
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both as a nationalist struggle and a struggle between forces of progress and reaction/regress.143
The argument is then extended to post-independent Bangladesh to read its political and
intellectual history in terms of an unfinished project of realizing mukti-juddher chetona – the
ideal or spirit of the liberation war, which is understood to be modern, secular, and progressive.
The project remains unfinished because of the violent end to Mujib’s regime and the subsequent
military rule, which allowed or even relied upon the return and resurgence of the political and
ideological opponents of the liberation war, i.e., the Islamists and conservatives.144 The transition
to democracy in 1990 has not restored the spirit of the liberation war as the ruling ideology of the
country but has merely produced the possibility for doing so, which the Awami League,
presently the party in government, proclaims to be its mission.
This widely subscribed to and circulated reading of Bangladesh’s intellectual landscape
in terms of a binary opposition between progressive Bengali nationalism and a regressive
Islamist agenda needs to be problematized. Tazeen Murshid’s path-breaking intellectual history,
The Sacred and the Secular: Bengal Muslim Intellectual Discourses, 1871-1977, produces
possibilities for a more nuanced understanding. Murshid argues against the orientalist perception
of an insurmountable opposition between secularism and Islam, proposing instead the possibility
of recognizing a tension between accommodation and confrontation of secular and spiritual
concerns within the great tradition of Islam.145 In the case of Bengali-Muslims this tension
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becomes further complicated by the persistence of folk beliefs and local customs, by the class
differences among Bengali-Muslims, by the dynamics of the relationship between BengaliHindus and Bengali-Muslims, and ultimately by colonial modernity. Though Murshid recognizes
a tension between revivalist and reformist tendencies among Bengali-Muslims, she cautions
against the conflation of communalism with religiosity or religiosity with anti-secularism.
Finally, she argues that the secular-sacred tension was not unique to Bengali-Muslim discourses
but was also present in discourses of the Bengali-Hindus and of colonial India generally, thus
rejecting the claim of inherent “backwardness” or conservatism of the Bengali-Muslim
discourses.
The oppositional binary between modernity and tradition or between progress and
reaction has also been challenged by Morshed Safiul Hasan’s encyclopedic study of intellectual
practices in East-Bengal during the Pakistan period.146 One of the central and most provocative
claims of Hasan is that an explicit Bengali nationalism is not discernable among the intellectuals
of the Pakistan period. Perhaps they were simply not thinking in terms of Bengali nationalism, or
they chose not to express their nationalist ideas fearing retribution from the authoritarian regime
of Pakistan. Regardless, Bengali nationalism as a theme or concern is notable in its absence
among the published works of the intellectuals of East Bengal. Hasan finds instead a vibrant
debate about how to conceptualize the East-Bengali or Bengali-Muslim identity. On the one side
of the debate were the shatontro-badis [autonomists], who sought to articulate a distinct and
autonomous cultural identity for the Bengali-Muslims, distinguished from the cultural identity of
the Bengali-Hindus in terms of both religious and regional differences. Though a BengaliMuslim emphasis on the cultural autonomy produced initial support for the Pakistan movement,
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it did not translate into continuous support for the Pakistani state or for its effort to erase the
cultural distinctions of various regions of Pakistan.
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As an illustration we may point to the

example of the Tamuddin Majlish, an organization that was set up Bengali-Muslim intellectuals
in post independent Pakistan for the expressed purpose of elaborating a new cultural expression
of the new nation. It was also one of the first and most significant actors in the movement to
recognize Bangla as one of the state languages of Pakistan.148 And, as Hasan demonstrates, a
Bengali-Muslim politics of cultural autonomy was not inherently reactionary or even communal
and was subscribed to and appropriated by intellectuals and political actors of various ideological
hews. The shatontro-badis, however, were more common among older generations, whose
political and intellectual outlooks were shaped by their experiences of and struggles against
discrimination by the Hindu middle class. On the other side of the debate Hasan identifies the
shomonnoy-badis [synthesits], who locate Bengali-Muslim identity within a larger and
composite Bengali identity and claim inheritance of a Bengali literary tradition going back
fourteen hundred years. Though one may find shomonnoy-badis among the older generations of
Bengali-Muslim intellectuals going back to the 1920s and 1930s, most shomonnoy-badis tended
to be from younger generations, whose political and intellectual outlooks were shaped by efforts
to assert Bengali cultural identity against the authoritarian imposition of a Pakistani identity and
by concerns about protecting and producing an inclusive space for the Bengali-Hindus, who had
become a vulnerable minority in Pakistan. Shomonnoy-badis were expressly anti-communal,
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emphasizing the commonality and unity of Hindus and Muslims of Bengal and were generally
more secular and liberal. However, the anti-communal stance of the shomonnoy-badis
intellectuals did not necessarily translate into a denial of their Muslim identity or religiosity or
even of their support for Pakistan.149
Though Hasan does not extend his analysis beyond 1971, I believe that his categories
may prove helpful in thinking about the intellectual landscape of independent Bangladesh. In
many ways this older debate between the shomonnoy-badis and the shatontro-badis gets
expressed through the battle between the “Bengali” and the “Bangladeshi” conceptions of the
national identity. While, the “Bengali nationalism” emerged in the context of the liberation war
and has been championed by the Awami League and its intellectual allies, “Bangladeshi
nationalism,” emerged in the 1970s among certain sections of the political-military establishment
and provided the ideological foundation for Ziaur Rahman’s regime and for his Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP). While the “Bengali” conception captures the ethno-linguistic identity
inclusive of all religious groups in Bangladesh, it fails to appreciate the political and intellectual
journey of Bengali-Muslims becoming a “people.”150 Though the Bangladeshi conception
gestures towards that journey by highlighting the geographical, linguistic, and religious
distinctiveness of Bangladesh, it does not explicitly make Bengali-Muslim the foundation of
Bangladeshi identity. The standard explanation from the advocates of Bangladeshi nationalism
for this equivocation is that Bangladeshi is an inclusive identity that accommodates all, including
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those who are neither Bengali nor Muslim.151 However, the sincerity of this claim of
inclusiveness has been challenged by the policies and practices of the BNP, the official standard
bearer of “Bangladeshi” nationalism, both in and outside of government. The BNP not only
accommodated radical Islamist groups and conservative forces but also was complicit in fueling
discrimination against and persecution of Hindus and other minority groups. Thus, many critics
have argued that “Bangladeshi” nationalism is a rebranded form of the conservative Islamist
ideology of Pakistan period Muslim nationalism.152 The debate is highly partisan and remains
inconclusive. At some level it may be possible to dismiss the “Bengali” vs. “Bangladeshi” debate
as the mere ideological posturing of the Awami League and the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party,
vying for power and legitimacy. The debate, however, has dominated the political and
intellectual discourse in Bangladesh over the last four decades, and it points towards the
existence of a deep ambivalence regarding the construction of national identity in Bangladesh. 153
Also, the debate produces a messy Intellectual landscape in which various ideas of the nation get
tangled up with claims of progress, freedom, equality, and other political ideals in complicated
ways.
The narrative of conflict or tension between progressive and reactionary forces has been
problematized differently by leftist commentators, who have challenged equating progress with
secular nationalist discourses. Their critiques have generally involved reassessment of the
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political character of the urban middle-class intelligentsia generally and of “modernizers”
particularly.154 Leftist critics have argued that the Bengali-Muslim middle-class intelligentsia by
and large, with notable exceptions, was primarily focused on serving its own economic and
political interests instead of larger concerns of social transformation. In doing so it aligned itself
with the ruling classes – first with the feudal aristocracy and then increasingly with the nascent
bourgeoisie – and against the peasantry and the working classes. Consequently, it failed to
advance any substantial critique of either capitalism or imperialism. Its modernizing and
reformist gestures were at best weak or bad imitations of European modernity or at worst, born
out of an inferiority complex, expressions of disdain for peasant culture. The modernizing efforts
in either case did not aim at transforming society but sought only to produce changes in the
attitudes and outlooks of members of its own class. Even the celebrated Buddhir Mukti
movement fell into this trap by constructing religious orthodoxy and intolerance as the principal
object of its critique.155 In contrast, the leftist critics have argued that the political language of
Islam and Muslim identity have often enabled and organized the rural peasantry in class struggle
against both feudal exploitation and colonialism. Thus, arguably, Islamic movements have often
been closer to the “true spirit” of modernity and progress, i.e., producing social transformation
and social justice. The leftist critique also argues that the nationalist culture and national identity
elaborated by the middle-class intelligentsia, both in the cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh, to be
elitist and disconnected from the cultural lives of the masses. According to leftist critiques the
real tension in the Bengali-Muslim intellectual landscape is located not in the conflict between
154
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modernity and tradition or between the past and the future but in the conflict between liberalnationalist and egalitarian-communist conceptions of modernity and the future.156
The oppositional binaries discussed in preceding pages offer ideas about the intellectual
landscape of the Bangladesh/East Bengal of the last century. However, these binaries often carry
the ideas of conflicts and contradictions, while the idea of negotiation and navigation may be
more accurately descriptive of ways intellectuals formulate and express their worldviews and
political positions. The Bangladeshi thought world is characterized on the one hand by the
politics of becoming, i.e., the articulation of a self-identity or swaruper shondhan, and on the
other hand the often contradictory but at times complementary pulls of three ideological
traditions – Islam, liberalism, and socialism – that offer different visions of social justice.
The centrality of Islam in Bengali-Muslim identity should be evident from the
discussions above. The language of political Islam, to borrow an expression from Muzaffar
Alam,157 is much older than the 20th century incarnation of political Islam that is so often
associated with terrorism and other atrocities. In the context of pre-modern or Muslim-ruled
Bengal the language of political Islam refers to the discourses produced by Muslim rulers and
their ideological champions to establish political authority and legitimacy, which required
elaborating conceptions of justice and welfare and mechanisms for petition and even
representation, albeit in limited ways.158 This language of political Islam was informed not by
any monolithic Islam but by a cosmopolitan tradition already accommodating and negotiating
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multiple ethnic, linguistic, regional, and civilizational diversities of the Islamic world, which in
turn had to adjust to the socio-political realities of Bengal.159 The language of political Islam
survived India’s encounter with British colonialism partly because of the policies adopted by
Warren Hasting, the first governor general of India, who sought to rule India through “Hindu”
and “Muslim Laws.” More importantly, the language of political Islam survived because it was
mobilized in the discourses of anti-colonial struggles. In the postcolonial context the language of
political Islam continued to influence and inform both ruling and oppositional political
ideologies in Pakistan and Bangladesh.160
Indian subjects and, thus, Bengali-Muslims encountered liberalism through the
experience of colonialism, where the colonizing power was becoming increasingly liberal and
used liberal discourses to justify and make possible the exercise of colonial power.161
Consequently, colonialism produced the kind of political terrain in which liberal discourses
provided the most effective, if not the only, way for the colonized people to engage with colonial
power.162 Despite the construction of “colonial difference” or the maintenance of racial and
civilizational superiority by the liberal colonizers, liberal conceptions of freedom and rights
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created possibilities for the colonized subject to negotiate and, perhaps even resist, colonial
power. As Chris Bayly puts it, “Despite classic British liberalism’s amnesia about others’
territory, race, and community, emphasized by Uday Singh Mehta, Indians were able to
excavate, appropriate, and cannibalize the thought of European and American liberals in their
search for modicum of freedom.”163 As discussed above, a significant portion of Bengali-Muslim
middle-class intellectuals and political actors of the colonial and postcolonial period more or less
self-consciously located themselves within the liberal, humanist, and secular tradition. The
dominant “Bengali” nationalism and arguably even the “Bangladeshi” nationalism were founded
upon liberal discourses, albeit also containing many illiberal ideas and elements.164
The influence or importance of socialism is harder to trace because unlike Islamic or
liberal political ideas, socialism never managed to establish itself as a ruling ideology. In
contrast, socialists have been persecuted by both colonial and post-colonial states. Socialism, or
more generally egalitarian ideas, however, has profoundly inspired and animated intellectual and
political actors in the Indian subcontinent and East-Bengal. Bengali-Muslims have been
particularly influenced by egalitarian ideas given that one of the most significant periods in their
intellectual history coincided with the Russian Revolution. The Shamyabadi movement of the
1920s – initiated by Mujaffar Ahmad, who was also one of the founders of the Communist Party
of India, and Kazi Nazrul Islam, a revolutionary poet who was later honored as the National Poet
of Bangladesh – placed socialist ideas in the center of Bengali-Muslim intellectual discourses
and influenced generations of intellectuals and political actors in Bengal.165 The other famous
Bengali Communist of that era, M.N. Roy also attracted a following among young Bengali-
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Muslims. Facing violent repression by British colonial and postcolonial Pakistani state, socialists
and communists worked clandestinely or under cover of various front organizations such as the
Pragati Lekhok Shongho and the Student Union.166 Thus, despite being officially suppressed,
communist and socialist ideologies of various stripes influenced intellectual and political
discourses during the Pakistan period and left-leaning intellectuals and politicians managed to
play leading roles in various social and political movements of the era.167 Arguably, the inclusion
of socialism in the 1972 constitution of Bangladesh as a core principle of the new state reflects
the hold of socialist ideas among the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia. And though the governments
of Bangladesh soon abandoned socialism both in practice and in principle, socialism, broadly
conceived, continued to dominate political and intellectual discourses in independent Bangladesh
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.168
The three ideological orientations discussed above, however, cannot always be neatly
separated, nor can we easily put a thinker in only one of these categories. There are degrees of
overlaps among these ideological orientations, which at times create interesting syntheses and at
other times perplexing contradictions. For example, one of the interesting features of
Bangladeshi political thought is that there have been various efforts at combining Islam and
socialism and thereby reimagining both. Islam has been argued to be an essentially egalitarian
political philosophy and perhaps the inspiration behind communism. Moreover, categories of
class struggles have been often elaborated through popular and Islamic political concepts like
insaf [justice], haque [right], jalem [despot/oppressor], and majlum [oppressed/exploited].169
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There have also been attempts to synthesize communist and nationalist projects by elaborating
national liberation movements in terms of class struggle, and vice versa. Communists and
liberals have also tended to converge on the questions of secularism, democracy and progress.
On the question of economic development, communists and liberals differ greatly in theory;
however, a curious synthesis occurred in practice as both liberals and communists have been
engaged with NGO activities and development programs. Islam and liberalism, however, have
found hard it to accommodate each other, particularly given the construction of Bengali
nationalism as secular and in opposition to the Muslim claim to the nation. Nevertheless, the
persistence of Muslim identity often requires uneasy compromises, which find expressions in the
manifestos and platforms of major political parties.
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Conclusion
In an effort to provide a historical context for Bangladeshi political thought in this
chapter I have discussed some of the ways in which the colonial encounter has restructured the
political and intellectual landscape of the Indian subcontinent generally and of Bengal
particularly. I then presented an analysis of the social history of Muslims in Bengal, emphasizing
the transformations of the middle class and the emergence of a modern intelligentsia. By the
1920s, these developments produced the possibilities and necessities for the articulation of the
new identity category of “Bengali-Muslim.” In the third section I provided an outline of the
political history of Bengali-Muslims over the course of the 20th century as they navigate from
colonial to postcolonial political landscape and emerge as a nation. In this section I discussed the
major political events of Pakistan and Bangladesh. In the last and final section of the chapter I
presented a discussion of the Bengal-Muslim thought world based on extensive review of
existing literature on Bengali-Muslim intellectual histories. I presented these broad stroke
historical outlines not only for the benefit of the readers who might not be familiar with
Bangladesh but also as an account of my own understanding of Bangladeshi political and
intellectual histories, which invariably shapes how I approach the analysis of the political lives
and thoughts of my interlocutors that I take up in the next chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE
The First Birth of the Nation Bengali-Muslim Identity and Ideas of the Islamic State in
Producing the “Pakistan Moment”

In producing an account of Bangladeshi political thought, the idea of Pakistan and the
“Pakistani Period” of Bangladesh’s political-intellectual history constitutes particularly difficult
challenges. In post-independence Bangladesh there was a certain degree of amnesia, if not
willful denial, that Bengali-Muslims ever wanted Pakistan, let alone the idea that Pakistan had
embodied radical political ideas and possibilities in their minds.1 However expedient such
amnesia may prove to have been for post-independence Bangladeshi politicians, an account of
Bangladeshi political thought would be much poorer without a reflection upon the ways in which
the idea of Pakistan had inspired and animated a generation of Bengali-Muslim political actors
and intellectuals. The contradictions and shortcomings of the arguments made in the context of
the first birth of the nation (Pakistan) are evident with the hindsight of the second birth of the
nation (Bangladesh). However, to discard or ignore these arguments as unimportant or, worse
yet, as obsolete would limit our understanding of Bangladeshi political thought. In contrast, I
argue in this chapter that the ideas and arguments articulated in the process of decolonization and
the birth of Pakistan reflected the political aspirations and anxieties of the period and laid the
foundations for modern Bangladeshi political thought by expressing concerns and articulating
themes that would prove to be perennial.
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In this chapter I examine Bengali-Muslim political thought of Pakistan period by
engaging with two key figures from this period – Abul Mansur Ahmad and Abul Hashim. I have
chosen to focus on these two figures because of the instrumental roles they played in bringing
about Pakistan and because of the fundamental differences in their conceptions of Pakistan and
reasons for supporting it. Differences between the political ideas of Ahmad and Hashim provide
illustrations of the diversity within Bengali-Muslim political thought in the mid-20th century.
Yet, they were united in their support for Pakistan, a project that few Bengali-Muslim
intellectuals or political actors of the period had resisted or opposed. Both Ahmad and Hashim
would live to see the end of Pakistan and the Birth of Bangladesh in 1971, and thus had
opportunities, if only as old men, to reassess and reevaluate their earlier support for Pakistan in
light of new political realities. Both had argued that the Pakistan that emerged in 1947 and the
politics that followed were not something that they had wished for. Yet, their criticisms of and
struggles against the actual Pakistan did not amount to disavowals of the idea of Pakistan. While
some commentators have evaluated Ahmad and Hashim’s support for Pakistan as anomalies
from their otherwise progressive politics, others have read them as victories of the reactionary
forces imbedded deep within the Muslim psyche.2 However, I argue that support for Pakistan in
the mid-20th century was neither a mistake nor a victory of reactionary forces. Moreover,
privileging Muslim identity or Islamic ideology also did not necessarily make one anti-modern
or backward. Perhaps, for political actors negotiating the end of colonial rule, Muslim identity
and Islamic ideology generally and the demand for Pakistan particularly represented genuine
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possibilities for progressive politics. In this chapter I would like to critically evaluate this
proposition by engaging extensively with the lives, politics and ideas of Ahmad and Hashim.
Abul Mansur Ahmad (1898-1979) was a prominent lawyer, journalist, author, and
politician from East Bengal, whose political and intellectual career spanned from the 1920s to
well into the 1970s.3 His long career coincided with the emergence of the Bengali-Muslim urban
middle class that decisively shaped the politics of Bengal for much of the 20th century.4
Notwithstanding Ahmad’s personal achievements, which were certainly extraordinary, his
trajectory of life from a rural peasant family to urban professional middle class is quintessentially
the story of the Bengali-Muslim middle class overcoming its economic, social, educational, and
political marginalities. Though Ahmad stopped short of drawing an explicit theoretical
connection between his personal biography and the biography of his class, for example in the
manner of Kamruddin Ahmad,5 his memoirs and his political writings display the profound
influence of his biography and class position on his political ideas and outlooks.6 During this
long career Ahmad’s writings about politics and identity captured perhaps better than any other
writer the development and self-realization of Bengali-Muslims as a people. Ahmad’s writings
not only depicted the social realities and life-experiences of the Bengali-Muslims of his time but
also contained sharp criticisms of many of their customs, prejudices, superstitions, and
3
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idiosyncrasies. By the mid-1940s Ahmad had developed a formal theory of Bengali-Muslim
identity, which he named Pak-Bangla, based on the intersections of religious affiliation,
geographic location, linguistic and literary heritage, and class position.7 He also came to regard
the realization of Bengali-Muslim cultural autonomy to be the most important task of anticolonial and post-colonial politics, a position that would critically inform his political thinking
throughout the remainder of his career. He was also self-consciously modernist and aspired to
universalist values such as secularism, social-justice, individual autonomy, equality, and
democracy.8 Ahmad’s awareness of the tensions between the essentialist claims of identity and
the universalist demands of modernity is reflected in many of his theoretical and his fictional
writings and makes him an ideal candidate for studying the post-colonial negotiation between
identity and modernity.
Abul Hashim (1905 -1974) was a lawyer, politician, and a scholar from West Bengal,
whose long political and intellectual career was marked by number of vicissitudes and
contradictions that made him both an enigmatic and, to quote his biographer Mafidul Haq, a
“tragic” figure.9 He is remembered, to the extent that he is, as a progressive and democratic
leader, who fought desperately, though ultimately unsuccessfully, till the very end to resist the
second partition of Bengal and to produce the independent state of United Bengal as a third
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dominion outside of India and Pakistan at the end of colonial rule. His efforts in the spring of
1947 have earned him a reputation for being a forerunner of the Bengali nationalism that would
accompany the birth of Bangladesh in 1971.10 However, he not only supported Pakistan in the
crucial years before the independence but also remained committed to it even when it was being
challenged by a rising tide of Bengali nationalism in the late 1960s. Moreover, throughout the
Pakistan period Hashim devoted his energies to elaborating the ideological dimensions of an
Islamic state and a Muslim nation, which led him to a questionable alliance with the military
dictator Ayub Khan, whom he regarded as the agent most capable of establishing an Islamic state
in Pakistan.11 The diverse trajectories of Hashim’s politics and ideas signaled to some
commentators a tragic failure to realize or embrace secular and progressive potentials fully, a
tragedy that was perhaps induced by his ill health and political defeats.12 Others read them as
impossible efforts to reconcile fundamental and insoluble contradictions between a secular
Bengali and a communal Muslim identity.13 Hashim, however, was not as concerned about
identity as he was with classical questions of political philosophy regarding justice, the good life,
and the best regime. Though these concerns would be more explicitly pursued in years after
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Pakistan became independent, from early stages of his political career Hashim was
fundamentally concerned with articulating an Islamic political philosophy as the possible
alternative to contemporary liberalism and communism. His political philosophy contained a
critique of Western modernity without giving up its democratic and egalitarian ideals, which
Hashim argued could be best served by the correct interpretation and proper implementation of
an Islamic political philosophy. In the years after Pakistan’s independence he sought to establish
his particular reading of Islamic political philosophy as the ideological foundation for the
postcolonial state.
Ahmad and Hashim were not only contemporaries but also in conversation with each
other in their social and political lives. They were, after all, members of the same political party
and working towards the realization of Pakistan. However, there were fundamental differences in
their political ideas and in their views about Pakistan. While Ahmad saw in Pakistan the
possibility of establishing an autonomous Bengali-Muslim cultural identity, Hashim saw in
Pakistan the possibilities for establishing a postcolonial state based on Islamic principles of
justice, equity, and rights. For Ahmad identity was the first concern of politics and Muslimness
was foundational to that identity. He had once quipped that even if he were a communist, he
would be a Muslim communist, and if he were an atheist, and he would be a Muslim atheist.14
On the other hand, Hashim was not much invested in Muslim identity and was even less invested
in the Bengali-Muslim identity that Ahmad was trying to name and represent. For Ahmad
politics was about advancing the interest of Bengali-Muslims. But for Hashim, who came from
an aristocratic Muslim family and did not share an identity with either the rural masses of Bengal
14

Abul Mansur Ahmad, “Amar Dekha Rajnitir Ponchash Bochor” [Fifty Years of Politics As
Witnessed by Me; Henceforth referred to as ADRPB] in Abul Mansur Ahmader Rachanaboli
[Collected Works of Abul Mansur Ahmad], ed. Rafiqul Islam, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Dhaka: Bangla
Academy, 2001), pp. 116
129

or the emerging Bengali-Muslim middle class, politics was about establishing the superiority of
Islamic political philosophy. Their political difference is best highlighted in one of their now
famous exchanges reported by Ahmad. 15 Using a medical analogy Ahmad had accused Hashim
of caring more about the medicine (Islam) than about the welfare of the patients (BengaliMuslims). Hashim reportedly defended his position by arguing that a disease can only be cured
by the application of the proper medicine and thus a doctor’s primary responsibility is to
prescribe the correct medicine. Though Ahmad found this to be a clever and strong argument, it
dissatisfied him. The concerns about the correctness of medicine or the ideological battles among
Islam, communism, humanism, and liberalism seemed an obfuscation of the immediate and most
pressing political question of the time: the national liberation of Indian Muslims generally and
Bengali-Muslims particularly. The convergences and the differences of their ideas make Ahmad
and Hashim an interesting pair to read together in a conversation about Bangladeshi political
thought during the “Pakistan Moment.”
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“The Pakistan Moment”: History Making and Political Theory
In the early months of 1940 Abul Mansur Ahmad found himself almost able to alter the
course of South Asian history. Aged 42 at the time, he was already an established journalist, a
literary figure, and a rising star in Bengal politics. His political and journalistic work had
facilitated an association with the famous Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose.16 In the weeks after the
adoption of the Lahore Resolution by the Muslim League on March 23rd, 1940, Ahmad and Bose
found themselves discussing the controversial resolution, which by then had been dubbed the
“Pakistan Resolution” and had been denounced by many as a communalist and separatist idea
undermining the unity and strength of India’s nationalist movement.17 However, as Ahmad has
recalled in his memoirs and other writings, he was able to offer Bose a different interpretation of
the Resolution and convinced Bose not only of the merits and legitimacy of the Resolution but
also of the necessity of producing a political agreement between the Indian National Congress
and the Muslim League based on it. Inspired and persuaded by Ahmad, Bose sought to broker a
deal between the two parties regarding the post-colonial future of British India by meeting with
Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the leadership of the Congress, including Mahatma Gandhi, despite
having had a recent public falling out. As Bose toured the country to put their ideas into effect,
Ahmad followed the developments with eager anticipation. Ahmad remembers the moment 26
years later in the following manner:
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The next morning I read in extreme jubilation the news item carried by all the
newspapers that Subhash Babu on his way to Bombay saw Mahatmajee at Wardha for
half an hour. Thank Allah, my plan had started working! The victory was near at hand. I
started floating in the air. Next few days my joys knew no bounds. Subhash Babu met
Jinnah Sahib not once but thrice in the course of three days, dined with him, posed before
the camera with him, and what was more he also met Sardar Patel and Mr. Bhulabhai
Desai, the leader of the Congress party in the Central Assembly in between his interviews
with Mr. Jinnah. To add importance to these significant events out came in the press the
biggest news of the time that both Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah have been invited by the
Viceroy to meet him urgently at Shimla. I went ecstatic. Thank Allah. How swiftly He
was fulfilling my dream. The newspapermen naturally went wild with exciting
speculations. They were many and varied. But poor fellows! They did not know what I
knew; my hopes and expectations went sky-high. I was on the point of bursting out in
joy. Great events were surely happening!18
As it turned out, Bose and Ahmad were not to be successful in their efforts to produce a
deal that would bring about a “political solution of the communal problem to prevent a physical
partition of the sub-continent.”19 Of course, the efforts by Ahmad and Bose did not by any means
constitute a singular moment of critical juncture in which an alternate future of the Indian subcontinent could have been determined. During the fateful seven years between the adoption of
the Lahore Resolution and the partition of British India in August of 1947, the history of the
subcontinent experienced numerous twists and turns, each opening up and foreclosing different
possibilities other than the one that ultimately became the reality. Failures of these alternate
possibilities were certainly not inevitable, not least to the protagonists, who often shared the kind
of optimism and exuberance evident in Ahmad’s recollection. Ahmad’s effort to produce an
alternate outcome was neither singular nor successful, but it should not lead us to dismiss his
reminiscence as an indulgence in a counterfactual exercise. Rather, we will be better served to
recognize in them Ahmad’s location in history and by extension an entire generation of BengaliMuslims intellectual and political actors.
Abul Mansur Ahmad, “Netajee’s Attempt”, Observer, December 25th, 1966. Reprinted in End
of a Betrayal (1975), p. 207.
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For Ahmad and thousands of other political activists in British India, the late colonial
period represented a moment when even provincial journalists and sons of peasants could see
themselves as potential makers of history. A meeting here, a right argument there could have
determined the destiny of millions! Had his plans worked, Ahmad could have justifiably claimed
his place among the Jinnahs and the Gandhis. Given the historical circumstances, Ahmad’s
optimism or his desire to affect history should not surprise us. Perhaps more remarkable in the
passage quoted above, however, is the implicit admission of being unable to make history.
Though it was his plan, its success did not ultimately depend on him but rather depended on the
calculations and maneuverings of more important players: Bose, Jinnah, Gandhi, and the
Viceroy. In the face of such a cold reality, all Ahmad could do was invoke an even higher power,
Allah, for fulfilling his designs.
I find Ahmad’s position particularly interesting because arguably it is representative of
the aspirations and the limitations of contemporary Bengali-Muslim political actors. They were
acutely aware of the historical significance of the moment in which they lived, and they had deep
desires to participate in and ideas about how to affect the political processes of the period. Yet,
they were ultimately unable to decide their own destinies. Nor were they mere spectators, as
were the journalists in Ahmad’s recollection. A more accurate assessment would be that BengaliMuslim political actors of the mid-20th century were the supporting actors of history, closer to
power with a more intimate relationship with history than mere spectators. Yet they could not
avoid relying on bigger forces to bring about their desired historical outcomes. The marginal
position of Bengali-Muslim political actors as history makers reflected the political marginality
of Bengali-Muslims generally. Expansion of democratic institutions and acquisition of modern
education had enabled sons of Bengali-Muslim peasants to enter the political arena during the
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1920s and 1930s.20 They still had to struggle against colonial power and the established social
and political hierarchies in which the Hindu bhadralok and ashraf Muslims occupied decisive
positions. Though the Bengali-Muslim political actors of the mid-20th century challenged the
established hierarchies, they also often displayed an attitude of deference towards the “natural
leaders” and acceptance of the reality that they had to live in a history made by others.21
Nevertheless, for Bengali-Muslim political actors and intellectuals the 1940s produced
unprecedented possibilities for political action and political thought. As Abul Hashim has
argued, the 1940s marked a qualitative shift in Bengali-Muslim politics – away from personality
driven patronage politics towards more ideologically oriented and institutionalized politics. For
the Bengali-Muslims, who constituted a politically and economically backward group, the
politics of securing concessions and economic advancement by petitioning the colonial
government were a practical priority.22 Hashim argues that the best example of old school
politics was A. K. Fazlul Huq, who was an institution himself and had little use for a party or an
ideology. Huq’s politics were motivated by concern for members of his backward kin, and he
performed his politics as a gesture of personal generosity towards them. Huq’s strong personality
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and his advocacy for and patronage of the less fortunate secured his political base among them.
Other political leaders, exemplified by Khwaja Nazimuddin, merely sought to preserve and
advance the entrenched interests of upper class Muslims. Hashim argues that these leaders’
adherence to Muslim orthodoxy and conservative views were merely self-serving and not
ideological. Furthermore, someone like Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, who according to Hashim
was personally very secular, liberal, and a nice guy, but in politics was “Machiavellian” and
utterly devoid of ideals.23 However, by the 1940s the end of the British Empire seemed both
possible and imminent, and this prospect of decolonization produced a new dynamics of politics
in which the narrow view of politics as merely pursuit of self-interest no longer sufficed. Rather,
engagement with larger theoretical and normative questions about the state, nation, freedom, and
equality became not only possible but also necessary.
In the shift towards the more idealist politics that Hashim perhaps somewhat wistfully
identified, Bengali-Muslim political actors and intellectuals of the mid-20th century found the
idea of Pakistan useful and perhaps indispensable for advancing their agendas and for working
out their political ideas. The demand for Pakistan was the most powerful political demand of
Indian Muslims in the 1940s.24 However, what was meant by “Pakistan” was not clear to most
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people. Even its most famous champion, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, refused to define Pakistan in
any clear and unambiguous terms.25 Perhaps, the abstract and open-ended conception, which
allowed diverse political projects to claim its name, made the idea of Pakistan so popular within
a short period of time. The meaning of Pakistan and the rational for supporting it necessarily
varied widely among Muslim political actors and intellectuals across British India. Bengali
Muslims embraced the idea of Pakistan because it provided them with ways to navigate their
marginal position within the hegemonic Indian nationalist discourse. The idea of Pakistan
enabled Bengali-Muslims to articulate an alternative nationalist discourse, which was not a
simple reproduction of the “two-nation theory” of the Muslim League or an expression of
“Muslim separatism.” Rather, this alternate nationalist discourse was an expression on the one
hand of the nascent Bengali-Muslim identity and on the other hand of the deep history of class
struggle among Bengali-Muslim peasants.26
Although the creation of Pakistan produced a sense of optimism and euphoria that
touched even the peasants living in the far-flung corners, it is far from certain that anyone really
wanted the Pakistan that actually emerged in the confusing and bloody summer of 1947.27 With
the benefit of hindsight we know that the many contradictions and crises that plagued Pakistan
from the moment of its inception would eventually lead to a civil war and the independence of
Bangladesh in 1971. None of these contradictions and crises negate that Bengali-Muslims played
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an instrumental role in creating Pakistan by embracing it politically and ideologically despite all
the equivocations and ambivalences. And once Pakistan became a reality, Bengali-Muslims had
little choice but to work through the contradictions and crises of the new state all the while trying
to rescue the ideological promises and emancipatory possibilities of Pakistan. For many BengaliMuslim political actors and intellectuals of the mid-20th century, Pakistan was not simply the
name of a political entity but the name of a revolutionary moment and a new, and perhaps
utopian, postcolonial future.28
As Bengali-Muslim political actors of the mid-20th century embarked upon theorizing the
post-colonial future they not only searched for ideals and ideologies to embrace but also began to
produce political theories of their own. The claim here is not that they inaugurated a new and
original tradition of political theory but merely that they began to self-reflexively deliberate upon
normative political questions.29 In their deliberations they could and did draw upon Western and
indigenous politico-philosophical discourses. Bengali-Muslim political actors and intellectuals of
the mid-20th century were drawing upon English utilitarian liberalism, German idealism and
romanticism, American transcendentalism, and increasingly upon Marxism. They also called
upon what Anthony Parel has identified as the Indian canon of political theory that emerged in
the first part of the 20th century through the works of figures like Sri Aurobindo, M.K. Gandhi,
28

Abu Jafar Samsuddin, one of the younger political activists during the Pakistan movement and
later a renowned novelist, has argued that the Pakistan movement for the Muslims of Bengal was
“a revolution similar to the great French revolution. This was the first time in the history of the
sub-continent that an oppressed agrarian people had established a state of their own by removing
at a single stroke the tyrannous foreign rulers and the indigenous vested interests such as the
caste Hindu zamindars, talukdars, moneylenders, professionals, merchants, and industrial
capitalists.” Sociology of Bengal Politics and Other Essays. (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1973), p.
26.
29
Margaret Kohn and Keally McBride in Political Theories of Decolonization: Postcolonialism
and the Problem of Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) provide a general
argument regarding the theoretical possibilities opened by the process of decolonization. I think
their analysis would be applicable for Bengali-Muslim thinkers as well.
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Rabindranath Tagore, Bipin Chandra Pal, and Muhammad Iqbal.30 However, Bengali-Muslim
political thought of the mid-20th century was not simply reproduction or uncritical appropriation
of either Western theories or the theories developed in other parts of the Indian subcontinent.
Rather, Bengali-Muslim political actors and intellectuals were drawing upon these theories and
their own political experiences to produce arguments that would respond to their political
concerns and would intervene in their local political-intellectual discourse. And, in the process
they inaugurated a tradition of political thinking that was particular to Bengali-Muslims of the
time, which became the foundation of Bangladeshi political thought.
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Anthony Parel, “From Political Thought in India to Indian Political Thought,” in Western
Political Thought in Dialogue with Asia, ed. Takashi Shogimen and Cary J. Nederman (Lanham:
Lexington Books, 2008), 187–208. See C. A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the
Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) for a
comprehensive analysis of Indian political thought of the 19th and 20th century. Also see Andrew
Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital (University of
Chicago Press, 2008) and Liberalism in Empire: An Alternative History (Oakland: University of
California Press, 2014). Javed Majeed, Muhammad Iqbal: Islam, Aesthetics and Postcolonialism,
(New Delhi: Routledge India, 2009).
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Self, Other, and the World: Abul Mansur Ahmad’s Politics of Bengali-Muslim Cultural
Nationalism
I
Abul Mansur Ahmad started his political career as a member of the Indian National
Congress and generally subscribed to secular nationalist politics.31 In the 1930s he was deeply
involved in the peasant politics of East Bengal and was highly suspicious of calls for Muslim
solidarity across class divides. Unsurprisingly, he was critical of the Muslim League for being an
elitist organization. However, by the mid-1940s he joined the Muslim League and emerged as a
strong voice in support of Pakistan, a radical shift in his politics, which he maintained was
necessary and justified. In post-independent Pakistan Ahmad would occupy the role of a
dissident politician and would ultimately support the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan.
Yet, Ahmad did not see his support for Pakistan in the 1940s as a mistake. Shortly after
independence of Bangladesh Ahmad argued, “The emergence of independent Bangladesh is
neither an act of organic disruption, nor an erratic revolution. Certainly it has not proved any
blunder on the part of our own forebears.”32 The emergence of Bangladesh represented the
corrective to a deviation from the intents of the Lahore Resolution and the “end of a betrayal” of
the true “spirit of the partition” of British India. He argued that “with the emergence of
independent Bangladesh, ‘Pakistan’ has not been destroyed, but has been more realistic and so
stronger by being based on the Lahore Resolution which was and still is known and observed as
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Ahmad developed this nationalist, that is to say anti-colonial or anti-British, consciousness and
politics through his participation as a university student in the Non-Cooperation movement of the
1920s. (ADRPB, Chapters 2 and 3, pp. 14 to 33) He, like many other young people of his
generation, was also deeply inspired by the Swadeshi movement and the radical politics of the
early 1900s. For example, he deeply admired the Anushilon activists he knew in the 1930s
despite disagreeing with their political strategies. (Atmakotha, pp. 161-162)
32
Ahmad, “Preface” in End of a Betrayal (1975), p. 2 (March 15, 1972)
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‘Pakistan Resolution’.”33 Ahmad was not merely arguing that Pakistan had not been destroyed in
the sense that West Pakistan continues to exist as Pakistan, even after the secession by East
Pakistan. Rather, he was arguing that in the newly independent Bangladesh the idea of
“Pakistan” had been realized more so than in East Pakistan. Given the ambiguous nature and the
diverse interpretations of the idea of “Pakistan” discussed above, Ahmad’s claim that
Bangladesh represents the manifestation of the “true meaning” of Pakistan remains difficult to
refute or substantiate. A more fruitful line of inquiry would be to examine what Pakistan meant
for Ahmad and why he thought the emergence of Bangladesh was the restoration of the Lahore
Resolution.
Looking back at the 1940s, Ahmad commented that it was the most significant
revolutionary epoch in the subcontinent’s history, which revolutionized “not only the social and
political structures of the country but also [Ahmad’s] own structures of thought, along with [that
of] millions of activists like [him].”34 Most significantly, the idea of Pakistan challenged the
hegemonic notion of India as a singular nation and opened up the possibilities for viewing India
as a collection of many communities and nations instead. Therefore, conceptions of post-colonial
freedom could not be confined to the limited aim of ending colonial rule but had to also include
visions for securing recognition, rights, and freedom of various “minority” groups – Muslims,
untouchables, and Dravidians being the larger and most politically significant among them. The
vision of a united India, in which group differences were to be subsumed by national citizenship,
was challenged not only by the Muslim League’s two-nation theory but also by the Communists
and left-leaning intellectuals, who proposed Soviet inspired visions of federated states based on
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Ahmad, “Postscript” in End of a Betrayal (1975), p. 21 (April 12, 1974)
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the principle of national self-determination.35 Ahmad, who had been a subscriber of the Congress
vision of a united India until the 1940s, was inspired to change his position by the general shift in
the intellectual and political discourses and more directly by the persuasions of Abul Kalam
Samsuddin and Mujibur Rahman Khan, the founders of the East Pakistan Renaissance Society.36
Working through the various arguments, Ahmad came to develop an understanding of Pakistan
as a program for cultural autonomy, which enabled him to support the Pakistan movement
despite his commitment to anti-communal politics and his apprehensions about the dominance of
mullahs and ashraf elites within the Muslim League.37
In his presidential address to the East Pakistan Renaissance Convention in 1944,38
Ahmad argued:
Whatever may be the meaning of “Pakistan” in the judgment of the politicians, for
literary men its meaning is tamuddini azadi, sanskritik swaraj, cultural autonomy. You
can get the answer to the question whether a nation can survive without political
independence [rajnoitik azadi] from the leaders of the state [rastra-neta]. We literary
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In a historic resolution adopted by the Central Committee in September 1942 the Communist
Party of India (CPI) laid out its policy on the national question, which greatly influenced the
political discourse of the period and visions for a postcolonial future. Habibullah Bahar, a
Communist and influential figure among the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia, for example, wrote
extensively during the 1940s, defining the idea of Pakistan in terms of the rights of national selfdetermination. The resolution declared “Every section of the Indian people which has a
contiguous territory as its homeland, common historical tradition, common language, culture,
psychological make-up, and common economic life would be recognized as a distinct nationality
with the right to exist as an autonomous state within the free Indian Union or federation and will
have the right to secede from it if it may so desire.” Quoted in Marcus Franda, “Communism and
Regional Politics in East Pakistan,” Asian Survey 10, no. 7 (July 1970): 588–606.
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Mujibur Rahman Khan’s ideas, particularly his 1942 book titled Pakistan, were particularly
inspirational for Ahmad’s conversion to the cause of Pakistan. Ahmad also mentions
Ambedkar’s book Pakistan or The Partition of India” as an important influence on his thinking.
ADRPB, pp.143-144
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ADRPB, p.144
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In Neilesh Bose’s description, “Nearly all the main players of Bengali Muslim politics
attended this three-day festival…The festival was therefore the epicenter of Bengali Muslim
literary, intellectual, and political engagement and a meeting of intergenerational energies all
dedicated to Bengali Muslim self-definition.” Recasting the Region (2014), p. 3.
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men can only say that without cultural autonomy [tamuddini azadi] a literature cannot
even be born, let alone survive.39
Ahmad’s speech was written and delivered in Bengali but contained Urdu, Sanskrit, and English
expressions regarding independence, autonomy, and culture. He used these mixed expressions
not only for establishing equivalency between concepts of tamuddini azadi, sanskritik swaraj,
and cultural autonomy but also for establishing a distinction between the concepts of
independence and autonomy.
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For Ahmad, political independence, or rajnoitik azadi, and

cultural autonomy, or tamuddini azadi, were related but distinct projects. Ahmad’s prioritization
of the demand for tamuddini azadi and deferment of the question of rajnoitik azadi was not
simply a move to evade the question, which he admittedly found difficult to answer in the
tumultuous period preceding the partition of India.41 Rather, for Ahmad the program of cultural
autonomy represented the goal of political independence. He borrowed terms such as azadi and
swaraj from contemporary political discourses to give weight to and make intelligible the
demand for cultural autonomy and argued that the legitimacy of anti-colonial and postcolonial
politics depended on their ability to respond to this demand. He asserted in the same speech:
Political independence of various nations will certainly be the zeitgeist [jugobani] of the
coming future. However, that political independence would become meaningful
[sarthokota] in the free and absolute development [bikash] of the intrinsic self of the
nation. The essential meaning [mormobani] of this development is tamuddini azadi or
cultural autonomy. Its very name is Pakistan.42
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Mul Shovapotir Bhason [Address of the President], East Pakistan Renaissance Convention.
Islamia College Auditorium, Calcutta. May 5th, 1944. Published as “Pak Banglar Renesa”
[Renaissance of Pak Bangla] in Abul Mansur Ahmad, Pak Banglar Kalchar [The Culture of Pak
Bangla] (Dhaka: Ahmed Publishing House, 1966), p. 156.
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Analyzing the speech, Andrew Sartori argues that juxtaposition of “Urduized Bangla,
Sanskritized Bangla, and transliterated English terms” was deployed deliberately to “establish
their interchangeability and equivalence.” “Abul Mansur Ahmad and Cultural Politics of
Bengali Pakistanism” (2007), p. 122.
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ADRPB, p.117 and p.173.
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Ahmad, “Pak Banglar Renesa” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 157.
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By the1940s the demand for Pakistan had become “the political demand of Indian
Muslims,” but it was not at all clear what that demand meant in terms of territory or political
structure. In this context, Ahmad made sense of the Pakistan demand as an expression of the
desire for the recognition of cultural autonomy of Indian Muslims generally and Bengali
Muslims particularly. Though Ahmad became a supporter of the Pakistan demand, he remained
ambivalent regarding the demand for two separate states for Muslims and Hindus. He was
willing to support a single federated state or a commonwealth of multiple states or any other
political settlement at the end of colonial rule as long as it promoted possibilities of cultural
autonomy for the Bengali-Muslims. He accepted the two-state solution as the best outcome under
the circumstances of political strife and tension in the late colonial period. However, he retained
the idea of Pakistan as a program for cultural autonomy to mount a critique of Pakistani state
efforts to repress cultural diversities in the name of national integration.43 Thus, Ahmad
constructed a parallel, if not continuity, between the demand for Pakistan and the demand for
Bangladesh by reading the latter also as a demand for Bengali-Muslim cultural autonomy.
II
To demand cultural autonomy is to argue for, if not to presuppose, the existence of a
distinct cultural identity. Thus, for Ahmad a major intellectual and political challenge was to
name the people whose quest for autonomy and independence justified the projects of Pakistan
and Bangladesh. The two-nation theory of the Pakistan movement provided Ahmad with the
conceptual foundations for articulating his politics of cultural autonomy, as well as for
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For example, Evaluating the significance of the language movement of 1952, Ahmad asserted,
“Five years after the establishment of Pakistan, it has become evident that the majority
population of Pakistan, the East Bengalis, have been denied self-identity, the desire for which
was at the heart of the Pakistan movement.” In “Bhasha Andoloner Mormokotha”, in, Pak
Banglar Kalchar (1966), pp. 116-117.
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constructing the cultural distinctiveness of what he variously named as Pak-Bangla, Muslim
Bangla, or Bengali-Muslim. The spirit of partition, Ahmad argued, was to recognize the “two
great peoples” of India, the Hindus and the Muslims. “Both had separately seen the pinnacle of
glory on the one hand and jointly suffered a common slavery under foreign rule. Both were now
pulsating with a new sense of revival and renaissance.”44 Ahmad argued that only a few of the
great Indian leaders – C.R. Das, Gandhi, Jinnah, and Suhrawardy understood that India was
home to two distinct peoples and their unity depended not on erasing their social and religious
identities or on producing a social “fusion” [transliterated English term was used in the original
Bangla text] but on establishing “political federation,” among them.45 This spirit of partition was
echoed in Ahmad’s speech in 1944, where he proclaimed:
There is room for debate whether the Hindus and the Muslims are separate nations [jati]
in the context of politics. However, in consideration of culture there is no room for debate
that they are different nations [jati]. … The Hindus and Muslims of India are not one
people [jati]. Their cultures are not the same either.46
Despite his equivocation about the political implications of the supposed differences between
Hindus and Muslims, Ahmad was empathetic in his argument about the cultural differences
among them. Since religion, he argued, functions as the “seed of culture,” the differences in the
philosophical, ethical, and aesthetic dispositions of the two religions produce two different
cultural entities. He argued:
The religion of Muslims is the religion of justice and equity, struggle and martyrdom.
Hindu culture, symbolist, beauty worshiping and aestheticist [sic], is person oriented,
whereas Muslim culture is not person centered. Oriented towards equity, justice and
common weal, Muslim culture is society centered... The Muslims are fundamentally
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proponent of federalism in India.
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action-oriented rather than devotionalistic [sic]… Muslim social structure is not founded
on renunciation or otherworldliness.” 47
Though this argument of cultural distinctions between Hindus and Muslim based on
fundamental differences in their philosophical orientation toward the world is foundational in
Ahmad’s thought, it alone was insufficient to articulate a specifically Bengali-Muslim identity.
His idea of a Muslim culture was profoundly different from Jinnah’s and the Muslim League’s
conception of an abstract Muslim nation devoid of any territory, language, or history.48 While the
seed of culture was religion, culture itself was not the seed but the tree, which Ahmad thought
should be rooted in a specific place and nourished by the soil, water, and climate particular to the
place. In his words:
A tree lives by taking in nutrients [rasa] from the ground. Thus, a tree cannot be planted
in any country. If the soil is not suitable for collecting nutrients, a seedling will not
survive. The same is applicable for culture as well. The culture of one country, no matter
how beautiful it is, cannot be established in another country. Lacking local flavor/life
[rasa] it will die.49
Culture had to be territorial, bounded, and concrete. This conception of culture allowed Ahmad
to recover possibilities of many nations within the two-nation theory and to argue for the cultural
specificity of Bengali-Muslims against the ideas of pan-Indian Muslim cultural identity. The
spirit of religion or the seed of culture is shared by all Muslims and produces the possibilities for
trans-regional and transnational brotherhood. Yet Islam or Muslimness does not constitute a
unified culture. Just as Arabs, Persians, and Turks do not have the same culture despite sharing a
religion, Muslims of Bengal, Bihar, or Punjab also do not constitute one cultural unit. Since
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“In “Pak-Banglar Renesa” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 171. The same passage was
quoted by Sartori, “Abul Mansur Ahmad and Cultural Politics of Bengali Pakistanism” (2007), p.
122. I use Sartori’s translation.
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“Pak Banglar Kalchar” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 18.
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“culture can not overcome the boundaries of geography,” Ahmad argued, “the inhabitants of East
Pakistan are an autonomous and distinct people from the other peoples of India and from their
religious brethren in West Pakistan.”50
Ahmad recognized that the Muslim culture of Bengal was certainly shaped by the Islamic
spirit and high culture brought over by Muslim conquerors, traders, and proselytizers during the
six hundred years of Muslim rule.51 However:
Not the courtly expression [shahi-rup] but the popular manifestation [gono-rup] of the
culture of the Muslim period is what is important. That [popular] manifestation
specifically was our culture. We are the inheritors of precisely that [popular culture].52
The popular manifestation or the gono-rup of the Bengali-Muslim culture that developed among
and reflected the life experiences of the Muslim masses, Ahmad further argued, had over the
centuries thoroughly indigenized the “foreign” elements by mixing them with local elements.
This indigenized and popular manifestation of Muslim culture in Bengal “is reflected in and
developed through their religious festivals, rituals and ceremonies, names and badges/signs, diets
and clothing, art and literature, dance and music, and etiquettes and mannerisms.” 53 In the essay
“Pak Banglar Kalchar” and elsewhere, Ahmad provided numerous ethnographic examples to
establish the richness and vitality of Muslim popular culture in Bengal and to distinguish it from
the courtly culture of the Muslim elites.
Though religion is the seed of culture, “not all of culture is religion.”54 Thus, a culture
originating from a specific religion can make room for others outside of the religion. To illustrate
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this point Ahmad used the example of religious festivals, which he argued lose their religiosity
overtime and exist mostly as secular festivals participated in by men and women of different
creeds. He wrote:
At the end when the religion of the religious festivals gets lost under celebration, the
human species [manab jati] does not suffer a loss. Whatever they lose in terms of
religion, they gain many fold more in terms of cultural practice.55
As people from different sects and religions embrace these cultural practices they take on a
popular and a national character. This logic applies not only to religious festivals but also and
perhaps more importantly to language. Ahmad argued that the Bengali language or at least the
literary Bengali language emerged in the 13th and 14th century under the patronage of Muslim
rulers.56 This language from the beginning was a “Musalmani Bangla,” containing Muslim
imageries, idioms, and heavy influences of Arabic and Perso-Turkic, albeit in “Bengali
localized” forms.57 Musalmani Bangla, however, was not confined to Muslims only. Rather,
inhabitants of Bengal, particularly in the eastern parts, irrespective of their religion, used this
Bangla in their everyday lives but more importantly in producing literary works. In effect Ahmad
was arguing not merely that Muslims of Bengal were Bengali, too, but that Muslims produced
the possibility of Bengali-ness. Thus, he wrote, “We [Muslims] were rulers of this country for six
hundred years… during this period we gave Bangla its national identity [jati-nam], language, and
literature.”58 The Bengali culture and national identity produced by the Muslims of Bengal also
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had a regional dimension. Since the Muslims constituted a demographic majority Eastern
Bengal, the ‘Musalmani Bangla’ was more dominant there. Thus, Ahmad envisioned a national
culture East Bengal that, though shaped fundamentally by Muslim spirit, aesthetic, and
imaginaries, was not exclusively Muslim.59 Ahmad’s conception of a national culture of East
Bengal allowed him to defend the idea of Pakistan and his participation in the Pakistan
movement against charges of communalism:
In the demand for Pakistan there were both communal and democratic nationalist voices.
However, under the circumstances [of late colonial period] the soft voice of the
democratic nationalist demand for East-Bengal’s self-identity [shokiota] was crushed
under the loud communal voice. As a result the whole demand was mistakenly judged to
be communalism of the Muslims. This mistake [of judgment] was committed not only by
the Hindus; many Muslims also did the same. Thus, many Muslim intellectuals also
judge the demand for the recognition of the self-identity of East-Bengal’s language and
literature as a communalist demand to partition Bengali language and literature. It will
take time for them to realize the flaw in their idea.60
Ahmad could claim that his arguments for the cultural autonomy of the Bengali-Muslim
and of East Bengal did not constitute a demand to partition Bengali culture for two reasons. First,
Ahmad argued that historically there had not been a common Bengali culture:
Hindus and Muslims of Bengal, in spite of living in the same territory for centuries and
speaking the same language could not grow into a common society because of social and
religious restrictions and barriers like caste system and untouchability, which made social
mixing amongst the Hindus and Muslims absolutely impossible…. There was thus no
common Bengali culture in Bengal… So if any Hindu poet and writer arrogantly called

Particularly influential were works like Abdul Karim’s, Social History of the Muslims in Bengal,
down to A. D. 1538 (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1959) and Momtajur Rahman
Tarafdar’s Husain Shahi Bengal, 1494-1583 A.D.; a Socio-Political Study. (Dhaka: Asiatic
Society of Pakistan, 1965). Though Ahmad did not cite these accounts specifically, he must have
been informed by these alternative historical discourses. See chapter 2, section 2 for a discussion
of the social history of Bengali-Muslims.
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See also Bose, Recasting the Region (2014).
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“Bhasha Andoloner Mormokotha” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 130. Though I have
translated the word shokiota as self-identity, the translation does not do convey the meaning
completely. Shokiota refers to the particular inherent qualities of a person or a thing, something
that define and differentiate the person or the thing from others.
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anything as “Bengali Culture” and many did so, they meant it to be, and it really was,
Hindu culture.61
Second and more importantly, it was not only that the modern Bengali culture produced by the
Hindu bhadralok of Calcutta was fundamentally different from Bengali-Muslim popular culture,
but it was also that the possibilities for establishing a singular Bengali national culture were
foreclosed by the inability and refusal of the bhadralok to admit or accommodate cultural
elements from Muslim Bengal in their construction of modern Bengali culture.
Ahmad argued that while Bengali culture had a popular and Muslim character from the
13th century, a distinctly Hindu-Bengali language and cultural identity began to emerge in the
Western Bengal only around 18th century as a result of the “Hindu renaissance” inspired by
Bengali Vaishnanbism that had emerged earlier in the 16th century.62 The bhadralok class that
emerged over the course of the 19th century as a result of British colonial rule had its roots in
this relatively new Hindu-Bengali culture. The economic and political resources of the bhadralok
class, along with patronage from colonial rulers, produced the possibilities for a second and more
significant Bengali-Hindu renaissance by the end of the 19th century.
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Meanwhile, Musalmani

Bangla languished under state repression and from the inwardness and counterproductive
responses by Bengali-Muslim political and intellectual leaders.64 By the late 19th century the
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language, literature, and culture of the Bengali-Hindus, or more specifically of the Hindu
bhadralok of Calcutta became much more refined than that of Bengali Muslims and was
recognized as the standard bearer of Bengali culture. Meanwhile, Musalmani Bangla literature
and language was relegated to the status of a mere sub-culture and an uncouth dialect.65 Ahmad’s
arguments against the claim of a singular Bengali cultural and national identity were in effect
arguments against the hegemony of this bhadralok Bengali culture and the exclusion of Bengali
Muslims from it.
Ahmad did not begrudge the advancement of Bengali-Hindu literature and culture and
even argued, “As a sophisticated example, the literature of West Bengal is certainly worthy of
our emulation.” However, the core of Ahmad’s politics of cultural autonomy was the argument
that the culture bhadralok Bengali culture was ‘not our culture.”66 The bhadralok Bengali culture
of the 19th century was distinguished from the culture of the Bengali Muslims not only because
it had its roots in the Hindu religion and in Western Bengal but perhaps more importantly
because of the class differences between the two groups. In contrast to the Hindu bhadralok,
Ahmad commented, the “Bengali Muslim is not an aristocratic leisure class [sreni] [that is]
afraid of labor [sromo-kuntho] and [depends on] unearned wealth.”67 The culture developed by
the urban leisure class of Calcutta necessarily failed to reflect the life experiences, aspirations,
and energies [jibon khudha] of the productive masses of rural East Bengal. Modern Bengali
literature, which in Ahmad’s estimation was the most distilled expression of the bhadralok
culture, could not become the national literature of the Bengali Muslims because it failed to
65
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Ahmad made this argument on numerous occasions throughout his intellectual career. One of
his most eloquent expressions is found in his autobiography, where he laments the “loneliness”
he feels because of failure by Bangladeshi intellectuals to appreciate the self-identity and
distinction of Bengali-Muslim culture. Atmakotha (1978), Chapters 14 and 15, pp. 300 – 330.
67
“Pak Banglar Rensa” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 172
66

150

integrate contributions from Bengali-Muslims and because it failed to contribute much to them.
The modern Bengali literature could not accommodate the “spirit,” “subject-matters,” or
“language” of the Bengali-Muslims and thus failed to inspire or give anything to them.68
Therefore, Ahmad argued, “….in our own country we have to rediscover [transliterated English
in the original text] our autochthonous national tradition and culture… Like the Bengali Hindu
renaissance, Bankim-Rabindra and Ramkrishna-Bibekananda of the Bengali Muslim
Renaissance must be born among us.”69
Bengali-Muslims, Ahmad noted, had their own vibrant culture, including well-developed
literary traditions. The idea of popular culture [gono-rup] that Ahmad advanced to produce
distinction of the Bengali-Muslims from the high culture of the ashraf Muslims also served to
distinguish them from the high culture of the Bengali bhadralok. Ahmad’s conception of the
Bengali Muslim identity collapsed the distinctions between regional, religious, and class
identities as it collapsed together the “Muslim spirit” discussed earlier and the political energies
emanating from the economic and social lives of Bengal’s peasants. The discourses of justice,
equality, and rights, which for Ahmad constitute the essential ethical core of Muslim spirit, help
to give voice to the political aspirations of the Muslim peasants exploited by the colonial state, as
well as the landlords and moneylenders, who were mostly Hindus. Thus, the demand for cultural
autonomy of the Bengali-Muslims was then not only a demand for the recognition of a formal
equality between anthropologically distinct cultural entities but also a demand by an exploited
and oppressed class for its own liberation. Ahmad’s collapsing of Muslim identity and peasant
interests in naming the Bengali-Muslim nation is reflective of the sociological and political
reality of mid-20th century Bengal and his own personal experiences.
68
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III
As we have understood from philosophical discourses about identity over the last two
centuries, identities are relational and are not products of autogenous processes. Identities are
constructed through complex and dialectical relationships with the “other,” in which producing
distinction from and negation of the “other” fulfills a vitally constitutive function.70 Although
Ahmad was careful to delineate the distinctions between Bengali-Muslims and other Muslims
based on geography, language, literature, and other elements, he was primarily concerned with
emphasizing the distinctions between Bengali Muslims and Bengali Hindus. For Ahmad, the
constitutive other of the Bengali-Muslim was the Bengali-Hindu, or more specifically the uppercaste Hindu bhadralok. His reasons for emphasizing the differences between Bengali Muslims
and Hindus were two-fold. First, he argued that Bengali-Muslim intellectuals, particularly those
with secular and progressive politics, recognized their cultural differences with other Muslims of
India and elsewhere more easily but failed to sufficiently appreciate their difference from the
Bengali-Hindus. Second, and on a deeper level, Ahmad’s political and intellectual outlook was
shaped by the impulse to push back against the marginalization of the Bengali-Muslims, which
emanated from their double location of being a peasant and a Muslim.
For Ahmad, like many of his contemporaries, the distinction between Bengali Muslims
and Hindus was not a matter of choice or a mere theoretical proposition. Rather, the distinction
was experienced as being marginalized on account of religious identity, which also marked class
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position and provinciality. Perhaps the experiences of the upper-class ashraf Muslims were
different but for ordinary Muslim peasants, who constituted the vast majority, 95% in Ahmad’s
estimation, of the Muslim population in Bengal, Muslimness often entailed experiences of
exploitation, humiliation, and even violence. Moreover, as Ahmad recounts in his memoirs, the
experiences of being secondary persisted even as the sons of Muslim peasants made their way
into the ranks of the urban middle class. Even in the anonymity of the city they could not hide
the markers of Muslimness ingrained in manners of dress, speech, food, and countless other
everyday practices, all of which in turn engendered varying degrees of contempt, ridicule, and
discrimination.71 These experiences made Ahmad a particularly “sensitive Muslim” and
provoked him to wear his Muslim identity proudly despite his agnosticism and his own criticisms
of various aspects of Bengali-Muslim society.72 Although Ahmad was a passionate advocate of
peasant interests, arguably his politics from an early age were more fundamentally motivated by
concern for the dignity of Muslim peasants.73 Inspired and enabled by the Lahore Resolution and
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the political discourses surrounding the Pakistan movement, Ahmad became increasingly
convinced that the dignity of the Muslim peasants of Bengal could only be secured by
constituting them as nation and not merely as an interest group or a class that can be
accommodated within an Indian or a Bengali nation.
The concern for dignity not only inspired Ahmad’s politics of cultural autonomy but also
provided legitimacy for that politics. Dignity for Ahmad was closely tied up with atma-marjada,
or self-respect. He argued that one must have a sense of one’s own individuality and pride in
oneself to demand recognition from others. If it is true for individuals, it is more so for
collectivities and nations. Culture, according to Ahmad, provides the “individuality” or
“personality” of a nation.74 Though “among nations and peoples there are more unity than
divisions, more similarities than differences,” those differences and distinctions matter the most
because they determine different identities and give cultures their distinct personalities.75 Thus,
the goal of the politics of cultural autonomy for Ahmad was the recognition and realization of the
self-identity of the people. Or, as Ahmad puts it, the goal is, amra ‘amra’ hobo or to become
“we” by discovering our “we-ness.”76 Ahmad articulates the goal and legitimacy for the demand
of cultural autonomy in the following manner:
If we have flaws in our social customs and traditions, rituals and ceremonies,
entertainments and celebrations, we will reform and correct them ourselves to be suitable
(ADRPB, pp.6-7) and his longstanding feud with a teacher at his secondary school, who had
mocked and insulted him because of his Muslimness (Atmakotha, 1978, pp. 105 - 113).
74
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identifiable through those differences; those differences are his autochthonous identity
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for modern sensibilities. We will not blindly imitate others’ ways of life. We will make
everything our own. We will not turn ourselves into others. This is not a matter of
stubbornness or envy or even anti-reformist stasis. It is a matter of self-identity. It is a call
for a sense of self-respect and national pride. This is a call to know the self and to recover
and revitalize the self.77
Evident from the passage above, Ahmad did not advocate cultural autonomy at the
expense of modernization or progress. To render the project of cultural autonomy compatible
with modernization Ahmad contrasted the concept of culture with the concept of civilization,
which for him signified “the total progress of humanity in terms of education, knowledge,
science, literature, commerce, industry, technology, etc.”78 Thus, civilization represented the
qualities of a historical period and not of a particular group of people. “Whereas culture must
have an identity or a national expression, civilization cannot be confined to a nationality.”
Comparing civilization to light, Ahmad argued that a torch lights the path not only of the
torchbearer but also for others on the path. Thus, certain civilizational progress may originate
from a group, but civilization is universal and belongs to all of humanity. Modern Western
civilization, Ahmad argued, is not an exclusive property of the West. Non-Western peoples are
also part of that civilization as beneficiaries, creators, and contributors.79
Despite the admitted difficulties in demarcating culture from civilization in their
expressions in social practices, conceptually they must be distinguished. Just as all the
individuals of a society do not possess the same personalities, all the nations of a civilizational
epoch do not share the same culture. Thus, in the modern era, despite sharing the Western
civilization and despite the dominance of Western nations as conquerors and colonizers, “people
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of other countries have resolutely held on to their own cultures.”80 Different cultures are different
expressions of life or different ways for life to be experienced, Ahmad argued somewhat
metaphysically. Thus, cultural differences are to be celebrated as diverse expressions of life
intended by the creator. Accordingly, those who criticize the demand of cultural autonomy in the
name of universal humanism or anti-sectarianism are in effect advocating a uniformity that goes
against natural or divine design favoring diversity, which is tantamount to “cultural fascism or
tamuddini zulumbaji [cultural oppression].”81 Ahmad’s politics of cultural autonomy, however,
did not rely merely on arguments for diversity for the sake of diversity. Rather, cultural
diversities and autonomies are to be valued for their potential contribution to human civilization
and progress. If all human societies were to adopt “Western culture,” Ahmad reasoned, they
would “lose their personalities and would become a herd of cows under the Western cowherd.”
And in the process would “lose all their independent thought, motivation for work, and aspiration
for creativity.” Consequently “they would have nothing to contribute towards worldcivilization.”82 Thus, he argued:
No nation or human society can move forward on the path of progress by forsaking or
overcoming its own culture. Those who try, merely imitate, they do not create. They
cannot contribute anything to the progress of the world. 83
Ahmad’s theory of cultural identity, while demanding recognition and dignity, could
remain open to modernization and progress because culture, for him, signified not ossified
traditions dictating human lives but a dynamic field of action that “is the foundation of the
practice of life [jibon shadhonar bunyiad].” Culture is foundational because it provides
guidelines or norms regarding self-conduct. Furthermore, culture provides a mooring or an
80
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identity from which life’s action can be carried out. Culture for Ahmad is also kristi, which is
closer to the meaning of culture in the sense of cultivation or refinement. Thus, a culture, though
based on certain traditions or oitijjo, is also a dynamic process oriented towards refinements of
individuals and improvements of social lives. This conception of culture allowed Ahmad and his
colleagues to conceptualize the project of cultural autonomy, to be a project of cultural
renaissance and a call to action. The demand for cultural autonomy should not be mistaken,
Ahmad warned, “as a call from behind” but should be taken as “a call to move forward. Not
revival but renaissance”:
The world has advanced much distance in the path of progress. We have to catch up to
that progress and be part of it. Thus our pace has to be very fast. Our culture will also
have to become modern and scientific. This is not an epoch of feudalism but of
democracy. Thus our culture will also have to be democratic.84
To catch up with progress Bengali-Muslims must produce a total revolution in their sociocultural lives, a renaissance, a project of reawakening and revitalizing – “producing a lightning
flash of life on its dead bones” – a humiliated nation that has forgotten its proud history and is
mired in superstition and strife.85 Renaissance is also a project of social revolution, whose “fire”
would burn away “all the clutter and debris of exploitation and injustice,” along with all the
superstition and ignorance.86
As Ahmad envisioned the cultural renaissance to be a revolutionary project of social
transformation, it could not be reduced to mere “turnovers in political leaderships or even
transformations in the structures of the state [rastro-rup].”87 The broader meaning of human
freedom that Ahmad was grasping at could not be realized by mere political means. Real swaraj,

84

“Pak Banglar Kalchar” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 58.
“Pak Banglar Rensa” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p.162.
86
Ibid, p.168
87
Ibid, p.162
85

157

freedom, had to be something more than political independence, whether it be from British
colonial rule or the Pakistani state. As I have discussed, whether the state was Pakistani or
Bangladeshi was of a secondary concern for Ahmad. Certainly, the character of the state and the
freedom and democracy it permits matter. Yet the establishment of these states in and of
themselves did not or could not produce cultural renaissance. Rather, renaissance was to be
ushered in through “revolution in the thought-world and collective psyche of the nation, without
which revolutionary action will not be possible.” The responsibility for producing the
“revolution in thinking,” Ahmad argued, “lies with the poets and men of letters.”88 This
emphasis on thought over action as the primary site of renaissance and his identification of poets
and men of letters as its primary protagonists allowed Ahmad not only to construct literature as a
site and medium of political intervention but also to recover possibilities for universalistic
enlightenment within his politics of identity.
Ahmad had been associated with and deeply influenced by the Muslim Shahitya Shomaj
(MSS) or the Muslim Literary society, which was a self-consciously modernist organization
dedicated to the “emancipation of intellect” among the backward and unenlightened Muslim
masses of Bengal.89 As such, Ahmad also shared with MSS the vision of producing social
transformation among Bengali-Muslims. The bulk of his literary work, particularly his early
satires, was sharply critical of the puritanism, backwardness, small-mindedness, intolerance, and
hypocrisy of Bengali-Muslims and was aimed at awakening and reforming them.90 Like many of
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his contemporary university-educated young intellectuals, he was highly critical of the
conservative, anti-modernist character of the Bengali-Muslim society of his time and came to
regard the dominance of the mollas [clerics] and pirs [sages] among Bengali-Muslims to be a
fundamental obstacle in the path of progress. However, there was a difference between Ahmad
and many of his progressive contemporaries, intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s who saw Islam
to be inherently conservative and thus the root cause of the backwardness of Bengali-Muslims.
Accordingly, they argued that modernization and progress of the Bengali-Muslims would require
overcoming their Muslimness.91 Ahmad, however, could not subscribe to a program of
overcoming Muslimness since it was foundational to his conception of Bengali-Muslim identity.
Since culture is a tree that sprouts from the “seed of religion,” the self-identity of a
culture and politics demanding its autonomy must also acknowledge that religious identity. Thus,
Ahmad could not forsake Muslimness but needed to conceptualize it in a way that he would
allow him reconcile his modernist and progressive politics with his Bengali-Muslim identity
politics. He did so by conceptualizing Muslimness in secular terms, by separating its identity
from the ideology of Islam and by distinguishing between culture and religiosity. By Muslimness
he referred to its popular manifestation in the everyday lives of Bengal peasants or the gono-rup,
which did not conform to fundamentalist interpretations of sharia law.92 The Muslims of Bengal

well as by latter day commentators and biographers. See for example, Rajib Humayun, Abul
Mansur Ahmader Byangaracana [Satires of Abul Mansur Ahmad] (Dhaka: Bangla Academy,
1985) and Rahman, Abul Mansur Ahmader Chintadhara (2008).
91
Nur Muhammad makes this argument analyzing early 20th century Bengali-Muslim intellectual
trends. See his Bongio Muslim Shomaj: Ouponibesik Shikhkha Babostha O Shamprodayikota
[Bengali Muslim Society: Colonial Education System and Communalism] (Dhaka: Jatiya
Shahitya Prokash, 2015). See also Shahadat H. Khan, The Freedom of Intellect Movement in
Bengali Muslim Thought, 1926-1938 (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007) and Hasan, Purba
Banglay Chintachorcha (2007) for a more detailed discussion of some of the prominent figures
of the Bengali-Muslim progressive intelligentsia of this period.
92
Atmakotha (1978), pp. 21-24, pp. 155-236.
159

were distinguishable in their social lives from their Hindu neighbors with a different language,
manners of dress, eating habits, song and dance, art and architecture, etc. The cultural practices,
however, had no inherent connection to Islamic theology, law, and injunctions – Quran, sunnah,
sharia, etc.93 This popular Muslim culture, Ahmad argued was defined not by iman [faith],
namaz [prayer], or any other of the pillars of Muslim religiosity but by a philosophical and
ethical disposition or a “Muslim spirit,” that was worldly, action oriented, society centered, and
based on principles of equity, justice, and right. That “Muslim spirit” was as much a reflection of
Islam as it was a reflection of the occupation of Bengal Muslims as peasants, as the productive
class of society.94 In Ahmad’s conception, this popular culture of Bengali-Muslim was as
dynamic and lively as it was liberal and tolerant. Thus, Ahmad could argue, in stark contrast to
many of his contemporary progressive intellectuals, that the root cause of conservatism and
backwardness that characterized Bengali-Muslim culture in the 20th century was located not
with Muslimness or Islam but with exploitative and oppressive colonial rule and the Permanent
Settlement regime. The economic exploitation and political repression of almost two centuries
generally produced an atmosphere of fear, grief, and insecurity among the masses, which was not
conducive for cultural vitality. Moreover, Ahmad argued, the Bengali-Muslim resistance to
colonial rule and economic exploitation were expressed through religious movements like the
Ohabi and Faraizi movements, whose revivalist and “puritanical” ideologies served only to
further stifle Bengali Muslim culture.95
This understanding of the causes of Bengali-Muslim backwardness and his secular
conception of Muslimness enabled Ahmad to propose his program of cultural renaissance as a
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project of improving the lives of Bengali-Muslims and not a project of reforming or saving
Islam.96 His support for Pakistan was premised upon the understanding that Pakistan was a
democratic demand for advancing the cultural autonomy of the Muslims and not a demand for
establishing an Islamic state. For Ahmad, Pakistani nationalism and the two-nation theory from
the beginning was a secular nationalism, which he argued, I think accurately, was also the vision
of Jinnah, the Quaid-E-Azam.97 The cultural autonomy of the Muslims would be ensured,
Ahmad argued, not by instituting sharia as the law of the state but by constituting the Muslim
population as the majority and giving them, through constitutional measures, the democratic
right to make decisions about their social lives. Ahmad wrote:
Both Pakistan and India are to be secular nation-states… One with Muslim majority, the
other with Hindu-Majority…. nationalism of Pakistan will be Muslim-oriented that is to
say moulded in accordance with Muslim concept of political culture and that of India
Hindu-oriented… This will be so not because they will do it deliberately from a
communal angle, but because of normal democratic decisions of the majority. Both will,
no doubt, be modern and science and technology-oriented. [They will strive towards]
developing progressive liberal democracy based on social justice and equality.98
As such, Ahmad saw the demand for Pakistan as an extension of the democratic demand of
Muslim-majority provinces for their autonomy. He was, as we have discussed earlier, open to
possibilities that the demand for autonomy could be accommodated within a unified India or a
democratic Pakistan. However, the anti-democratic politics and the imperial ambition of the
Congress and Muslim League leadership meant that the demand for autonomy could not be
realized under either arrangement. The establishment of Bangladesh represented a new promise
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to fulfill the demand of Bengali-Muslims to democratically decide the character and future of
their cultural and social life. The future was certainly oriented towards modernity and progress
but without giving up their identity and self-respect as a nation.
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Political Philosophy in Nationalist Time: Abul Hashim’s Visions for a Modern Islamic
Polity
I
Abul Hashim was alive for only three years after Bangladesh’s independence. He spent
these last years writing a memoir, In Retrospection, that was published a month after he died on
October 5, 1974. As the preface of the book makes clear, he intended the memoir to be not
merely his autobiography but an eyewitness account of the political realities of the Pakistan
movement for the benefit of future generations and historians.99 Did he, in retrospection and with
the hindsight of history, think the movement for Pakistan to be a mistake? The answer seems to
be negative. The bulk of this 164-page memoir is devoted to discussing and defending his role in
leading the Bengal Provincial Muslim League (BPML) and advancing the cause of Pakistan:
The Lahore Resolution was the basis of our movement for carving out of [British] India,
independent and sovereign states as homelands for the Muslims of India. It did not
contemplate creation of a single Pakistan State but it contemplated two independent
sovereign states… In the Lahore Resolution I saw my complete independence as a
Muslim and as a Bengali and for this I supported the [Pakistan] movement… Mr. Jinnah
preached the two-nation theory and this was the burden of his song. I never believed in
Mr. Jinnah’s two-nation theory and I never preached this in Bengal. I preached the multination theory. I maintain that India is a subcontinent and not a country. India consists of
many countries and many nations.100
Here, Hashim’s assessment of the Pakistan movement is remarkably similar to Abul Mansur
Ahmad’s. Both saw the emergence of the single state of Pakistan as a betrayal of the spirit and
intention of the Lahore resolution and the Pakistan movement. Was then the emergence of
Bangladesh in 1971 a restoration of the intent of the Lahore Resolution and spirit of the Pakistan

99

Hashim, who had been blind for decades, composed the memoir by dictating it in English. He
also utilized the help of several research assistants to consult and incorporate historical
documents to corroborate his account of the events. The “preface” of the memoir is missing in
the original English version of the memoir but has been published in a later Bengali translation
of it. Haq, Abul Hashim (1992), p. 130.
100
Hashim, In Retrospection (1974).
163

movement for him, as it was for Ahmad? In his retrospection Hashim remained silent on this
question. Some commentators have read this silence along with his silence during the crucial
months of Bangladesh’s independence war as tacit approval of and support for the birth of
Bangladesh.101 Certainly, Hashim’s argument about India being a subcontinent composed of
multiple nations and his efforts, unsuccessful as they were, to achieve an independent United
Bengal make it possible to read him as a Bengali nationalist. Such a reading has been offered
most famously by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), the leader of Bangladesh’s independence
movement, who credited Hashim as being his ideological mentor and one of the first ones to
articulate the conception of a Bengali nation based on linguistic and cultural unity among Hindus
and Muslims of Bengal and to demand a nation-state for them.102 Many contemporary historians
have argued that Hashim laid the foundations of Bengali nationalism not only by agitating for an
independent United Bengal but also by inspiring and training a generation of Bengali-Muslim
political actors and intellectuals, including Mujib, who would go on to play important roles in
advancing Bengali nationalist causes.103 However, a closer reading of Hashim may complicate
his claim to being a forerunner of Bengali nationalism. Hashim was ambivalent about Bengali
nationhood and much distrustful of nationalist politics in general. And, this distrust of
nationalism makes Hashim a particularly interesting figure in a moment of history when
nationalism dominated the horizons of political imagination.

101

See Haq, Abul Hashim (1992) and Chowdhury, Abul Hashim O Banglar Rajniti (2014)
See Chowdhury, Abul Hashim O Banglar Rajniti (2014), p. 51 for a discussion of Mujib’s
assessment of Hashim.
103
See, for example, Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh (2010). Hashim’s account of his
associates and followers of this period in his memoir In Retrospection (1974), and the
testimonies assembled in Syed Mansur Ahmed’s memorial anthology Abul Hashim: Tar Jiban O
Shomoy [His Life and Time] (Dhaka: Jatiya Shahitya Prokash, 2008) give a sense of Hashim’s
ideological and political influence on Bengali-Muslim intellectuals and political actors.
102

164

In the Lahore Resolution and in the ideal Pakistan, Hashim saw the possibilities for his
“freedom as a Bengali” and “freedom as a Muslim.” However, while Hashim devoted
considerable energies, especially after the emergence of Pakistan, for elaborating his conceptions
of “freedom as a Muslim,” he never developed any rigorous theory about what “freedom as a
Bengali” or being Bengali may mean. One of the few occasions when he articulated his
conceptions of and arguments for a Bengali nation came during his agitations for United Bengal
in the early months of 1947. In a press statement delivered on 28 April Hashim argued, “Hindus
and Muslims of Bengal, preserving their respective entities had by their joint efforts, in perfect
harmony with the nature and climatic influence of their soil developed a wonderful common
culture and tradition which compared favorably with the contribution of any nation of the world
in the evolution of man.”104 Since as a cultural unit Bengal was already a country and a nation,
Hashim argued, Bengal must be granted its right to self-determination and complete sovereignty.
Yet, when he was pressed to define this “common culture” in concrete terms and to differentiate
it from the common culture of India or the common culture of Indian Muslims he was at a
loss.105
Hashim was unable to defend his position with his thin idea of culture because ultimately
he was not much committed to the idea of cultural nationalism. Unlike Abul Mansur Ahmad,
Hashim did not see culture encompassing the totality of life experiences. Neither did he produce
a systematic synthesis between “Bengali” and “Muslim” identities as Ahmad did so
meticulously. Culture for Hashim was limited, at least in this context, to language and formal
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cultural expressions like literature and arts.106 And, he subscribed to the Bengali cultural identity
of the Calcutta bhadralok following family tradition rather than out of any theoretical or political
reflection.107 He failed to reflect upon the exclusion of Bengali-Muslim life experiences from
bhadralok Bengali culture and dismissed Bengali-Muslim to be a politically relevant category.
Perhaps being an ashraf Muslim from West Bengal rather than an upwardly mobile peasant from
East Bengal partially explains his reluctance to embrace Bengali-Muslim identity. Bur more
importantly perhaps, he did not embrace Bengali-Muslim identity because it did not make sense
to him logically. For Hashim, Bengali and Muslim were two independent categories, which were
not logically or politically connected to each other. While Bengali signified a cultural identity,
Muslimness referred to an ethico-political ideology.
“Muslims are a nation,” Hashim wrote, “not in the Jewish sense but in the sense where a
nation means a brotherhood based on common ideology.”108 The invocation of the “Jewish
sense” here was meant to distinguish Pakistan from Israel and to produce an argument against
many leaders of Pakistan, including Jinnah, who saw Pakistan as the Muslim Zion or the
homeland of Indian Muslims.109 The Nafsani or identitarian conception of Pakistan sought to
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produce a “state of the Muslims, by the Muslims, and for the Muslims,” where Muslimness was
constructed in terms of biological and cultural identities and not with any reference to the
political philosophy of Islam. The “Nafsani Islamists,” Hashim argued, were not only
communalist and “intolerant of non-Muslims” but also were “in essence imperialist and
capitalist” and thus were against “the Islamic spirit of love and tolerance” and “the most
dangerous enemies of Islam.”110 In contrast, Hashim envisioned Pakistan to be not a Muslim
state but an Islamic state that would pursue Islamic political and economic principles and would
allow the majority Muslims to realize their particular outlook on life while providing protection
and cultural autonomy for minority non-Muslims. Muslimness, for Hashim, was defined not in
terms of identification with the court cultures of “imperial cities” like Damascus, Bagdad, Delhi,
etc. but in terms of faith and adherence to principles of Islam both in personal conduct and in
political orientation. This decoupling of Muslimness from particular cultural identities of the
ashraf Muslims mirrored the late 19th century Islamic revivalist movements in Bengal and like
the earlier movements argued that since Islam accommodates and encourages diversity of
languages and cultures within the Muslim ummah or the ideological brotherhood, it is possible to
be both Bengali and Muslim simultaneously.111 Since Muslimness was a matter of adherence to
an ideology, Hashim saw no apparent contradiction, as some of his critics saw, in his desires for
freedom as a Bengali and a Muslim.112 Just as one could claim to be a Bengali and a liberal or a
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Bengali and a communist without the charges of self-contradiction, one can also claim to be a
Bengali and a Muslim.
Living in a nationalist hour as he did, Hashim’s politics were shaped by a critique of
colonial and imperial domination and by a desire to secure the right of national selfdetermination. However, he did not see national liberation as an end in itself. Rather, the ability
to determine the course of national politics independent of colonial or imperial dictates was
important to him because it would produce the possibilities for articulating and establishing
alternate conceptions of ethics and the good life. As Hashim’s provocatively titled press release
of 1945 “Let Us Go To War” suggests, the struggle for Pakistan for him was not only a struggle
against the imperial domination and economic exploitation by both “Delhi and London” but also
a struggle to secure for Muslims of India the freedom to “govern their own society according to
the laws of the shariat.”113 What Hashim referred to in this public statement as “laws of the
shariat” were in effect a reference to a political philosophy that he was beginning to develop by
radically reinterpreting Islamic political and legal traditions. Though the written articulations of
this political philosophy that he would go on to name Rubbaniyat appeared only after the
independence of Pakistan, Hashim was already developing and preaching it throughout his years
as the general secretary of BPML.114 As his memoir and testimonies by his erstwhile supporters
indicate, Hashim spent his days expanding and strengthening the party and his nights in
countless hours of study circles and informal conversations discussing the merits of
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Rubbaniyat.115 In these discussions and later in his writings, which often took the form of
comparative analysis of political-economic ideologies and systems, Hashim advanced a vision of
political, economic, and social arrangements that would promote social order and justice and
enhance the quality of people’s lives. In the years preceding Pakistan’s independence, Hashim
merged the political philosophical concerns of justice and the good life with the questions of
national liberation. The establishment of a nation state was a necessary prerequisite for
establishing an Islamic socio-political order. After Pakistan became an independent state,
however, the question of national liberation became obsolete and concerns for the establishment
of an Islamic polity assumed central importance. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s he became
increasingly critical of “European style nationalism” and the ideas of national sovereignty,
national interest, and national allegiance. Instead, he sought to establish Islam as a universalizing
political ideal that can transcend the parochialism of national differences.
In an essay titled “Greatness of Nations” Hashim wrote, “… The world today is divided
into nations on the basis of racial, linguistic and geographical affinity. ‘My nation right or
wrong’ had been the guiding principle of national conduct until the end of World War II.
Modern achievements of science mark the beginning of a new era of human existence.
Time and space are no longer inevitable factors standing in the way of universal
brotherhood of man.” 116
So much was his distrust of nationalism that by the time a Bengali nationalist movement began
to emerge in East Pakistan he did not see it to be more than the cynical ploy of opportunistic
politicians. He wrote in 1967:
It is as much ridiculous now for the peoples of India to think of a united India as it is for
the Pakistanis to think of dividing Pakistan on the basis of a Lahore resolution. Referring
back to the Lahore Resolution is merely a political camouflage for the political
liquidation of Pakistan. Wisdom suggests that the peoples of Pakistan should reconcile
themselves to Pakistan as it is, consider its problems and make sincere and earnest efforts
115
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to solve the problems in a manner which may consolidate and strengthen Pakistan instead
of weakening it.117
II
Since Hashim was not a nationalist thinker in a nationalist time his ideas and actions were
often at odds with the drift of the time, and he suffered tragic defeats. Perhaps, in this regard
Hashim was closest to another and more famous enigmatic and tragic figure from subcontinental politics, M.K. Gandhi. Hashim himself implied a kind of parallel between their lives
in his memoir. The last pages of In Retrospection are devoted to a reflection on a conversation he
had with M.K. Gandhi on 15 August 1947, the day of India’s birth. The reflection conjures a
particularly melancholy moment – two defeated figures looking at the unfolding of political
outcomes that they both played significant parts in producing but ultimately did not desire and
were powerless to prevent.118 When Gandhi saw Hashim that day he said, “Hashim you are
defeated…. You could not resist the partition of Bengal.” And for Gandhi, Hashim reflected, the
defeat was that he could not prevent the partition of India. Both Gandhi and Hashim were united
in their defeats that they could not produce political solutions for Bengal and India based on
Hindu-Muslim unity.
However, perhaps the most significant of their tragic parallels was that despite their
stature as leaders, their political ideals were never fully accepted by their followers. As Hashim
wrote, “Mr. Gandhi’s lieutenants… never accepted [his] ideals but they utilized him as a leader
for promoting their ambition. This Mr. Gandhi deeply realized and here was the defeat of his
life-long struggle.”119 Perhaps, this was also Hashim’s own realization about his own political
career when he penned these words almost three decades after the events of ‘47. As the general
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secretary of the Bengal League, Hashim led the “left” faction in a struggle against the dominance
of religious orthodoxy, feudal aristocracy, and the imperial ambitions of the central leadership of
both the Congress and Muslim League.120 While some of his disciples were attracted to him
because of his proto-socialist ideas and others gravitated towards him because of his advocacy of
the idea of a united Bengal, a majority were not interested in his project of articulating an Islamic
political philosophy.121 As Hashim moved away from nationalism and became increasingly
critical of socialism, many of his erstwhile supporters stopped following him. They found his
philosophy of Rubbaniyat to be increasingly esoteric and removed from practical political
concerns of the day.122 While Hashim’s insistence on principled politics profoundly inspired
many young and progressive Bengali-Muslim political actors searching for ideological
foundations for their politics, he failed to be relevant to mainstream nationalist politics of either a
Pakistani or Bangladeshi variety. Thus, beginning in February of 1947, when he lost the bid to
become the president of BPML and subsequently took a leave of absence from his post as
general secretary of the party, Hashim became increasingly marginalized within the party and in
the political arena generally. 123 Decades later, he however found an unlikely ally and admirer in
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General Ayub Khan, whom he thought to be the only one among the Pakistani statesmen to take
the idea of an Islamic state seriously. Though with Ayub’s patronage Hashim became the
founding director of the Islamic Academy and an influential figure in the scholarly circle, his
scholarly pursuits of the principles of an Islamic polity failed to inspire any political
movement.124
Gandhi once famously argued that he did not object so much to the rule by Englishmen as
he did to English rule and that true swaraj or self-rule would mean not merely replacing English
rulers with Indian ones but establishing different political logics and principles from the ones
instituted by colonial rule.125 Hashim held a similar view, though he was more susceptible than
Gandhi to give voice to anti-imperialist nationalism and decry the domination of Bengal by
London, Delhi, or Karachi.126 Surveying his political scene Hashim concluded that modern
political structures produced by colonial rule rendered the end of politics to be the seizure of
power, either for individual gain or in the name of a nation or a class. Consequently, most
politicians lacked any “social programme” or vision that may advance the good of man or
society.127 Though the Communists and the “left” claimed to have a vision for future society, the
only concrete program they advanced in the years preceding independence was the “liberation of
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the tenants of Bengal from the exploitation of land-lords.”128 Of liberal democracy he was even
more dismissive and argued, echoing Plato:
All the ills of the human race of the present age is due to that vicious and stupid political
system which gives political leadership to inefficient and dishonest demagogues and
accepts as perfect wisdom the decision of fifty-one asses against the judgment of fortynine Arab horses by the procedure of counting noses which they call democracy!129
Witnessing the horrors of the Second World War, the communal violence plaguing India, and
most immediately the abject misery and the tremendous loss of human lives in the infamous
1943 Bengal Famine,130 Hashim came to the conclusion that politics needed to be radically
reoriented. Rejecting the Machiavellian and modern understanding of politics as the “vulgar art
of seizing power and deceiving men,” Hashim argued for a return of the classical understanding
of politics as the pursuit of good and justice. Following Plato, he further argued that for such an
idea of politics to be realized politics needed to be grounded in philosophical reflections; only
the knowledge of the good can get one closer to the good. These convictions were already
evident in the arguments he presented to Muslim League activists in his famous nightly study
circles and would inform many of his later writings. However, the most systematic and eloquent
expressions of these ideas are to be found in his 1950 book The Creed of Islam or the
Revolutionary Character of Kalima.

III
The remarkably philosophical and erudite The Creed of Islam, dedicated to “Seekers of
Truth,” referred to Rousseau’s famous lamentation, “Man is born free but everywhere he is in
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chains” and asked, “Will then humanity never find salvation?” The answer that Hashim provided
to this question was radically different not only from the one provided by Rousseau but also from
the ones provided by modernity in general. True, Hashim conceded, there have been historical
changes and even progress because the “unhappy man in fond hopes and expectations is ever
engaged in a restless struggle for liberty and freedom.” Yet, he wrote:
There is no happiness anywhere. Enslaved humanity liberates itself from one bondage
and embraces another. He shakes off the prison of his ancestors and enters a new prison
of his own making. 131
Echoing Hobbes, Marx, and Gandhi, Hashim believed the reasons for man’s continued
enslavement and unhappiness were that men in modern civilization treat each other as mere
means for making profit and thus are in “a state of constant internecine war,” where states of
peace are mere pauses for making preparation for “yet greater killing.” But this state of war is not
the state of nature, as it was for Hobbes. Rather the state of war emerges from the perversion of
the nature of man and from the artificial man’s war against nature. The root cause of the
perversion of the nature of man is his ignorance of the Nature of God, perpetuated first by
corrupt and ignorant theologians and keepers of religion and then by nihilistic rejection not only
of “all religious and moral principles” and “constituted authority” but also of the idea of “the
absolute or eternal nature.”132 According to Hashim:
Man can be liberated from bondage and be really free in an order of life which will be in
perfect harmony with his nature, will fully recognize the psycho-physical needs of man
and prescribe definite methods for their orderly satisfaction.133
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Such an order, however, cannot be produced by secular modern political philosophies because
they do not correctly recognize the nature of man. Though Hashim conceded that Western
modernity has played a progressive role in human history and though “organized Nihilism was a
necessary phase in the evolution of man for clearing the Augean stables of Priests, Pundits, and
Mullahs, and it has done its job admirably well,” he argued, “time has now come for the
reappearance of religion in the full-flood of its pristine glory.” Ultimately salvation can be found,
he argued, by making “Islam once again a living force in the affairs of man” and by establishing
a vision of politics and society grounded in principles of Islam.134
In The Creed of Islam, Hashim pursued a number of interrelated arguments against
Western modernity, the first of which was against philosophical secularism or the banishment of
God and religion from politics, the public realm, and from philosophical outlooks and moral
considerations of everyday humans.135 As the Islamic concept of deen and the Vedantic concept
of dharma connote the ‘nature of things,’ Eastern religions must be properly understood, Hashim
argued, not merely as dogmatic adherence to the pronouncements by the priestly classes but as
the paths or the philosophies that enable man to discover and act in accordance with the true
nature of man and the universe.136 Mirroring Platonic ontology, Hashim argued for recognizing
the existence of an absolute and transcendental reality, which is nature or fitrat, brought into
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existence or moved to action by qudrat or the supreme power of God. The cosmic nature and
natural laws that govern the entire universe, for Hashim, were but the expressions of the
unchangeable will of God.137 However, materialistic nihilism, which arises out of man’s ego and
his desire to be free of all constituted authority, limits its inquiries to fitrat without any respect to
qudrat and thus fails to understand both human nature and the universal. Yet, since “qudrat
manifests and reveals Himself in Nature as well as in the affairs of man,” argued Hashim, an
“earnest seeker of truth,” will ultimately be led to qudrat.
To discover the true nature of man and universe a seeker of truth must overcome the
hold of the materialistic epistemology that values only the intellect and recognizes only the
knowledge accessible through external sense organs. Materialistic epistemology, Hashim argued,
mirroring the Platonic concept of the “world of appearances,” can only produce a partial and
perverted conception of the universe and man. “Knowledge of transcendental truth and
acquisition of objective conscience and ideas,” Hashim argued, “are the products of coordination
of the mind with intuition.” Though, he concedes, various Western philosophers, including many
from the modern era, have advanced or accepted some variations of this argument, “the Rishis
and the Sufis of the East” through their careful study and culture have achieved higher levels of
development of “intuition or the internal sense organs of direct perception of truth.” 138
In the modern era, however, the vulgar materialistic nihilism coming out of the West “has
been given a scientific basis and has been accepted by a considerably powerful and dominant
section of humanity as the corner-stone of all progressive schemes of human existence.”139 The
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political and material superiority of the West has served to dismiss other epistemologies and the
knowledge and precious legacy of the East. Hashim argued:
For political reasons the white guardians and custodians of modern knowledge made a
dishonest blackout of the East… Thanks to the vanity of the White races! Every collegepassed man of today will tell you that crafty Machiavelle [sic] is the first original thinker
in politics and sociology, and chancellor Bacon, the first philosopher after Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle. Nowhere in the textbooks of Europe there is mention of intellectual
giants like ‘Firabi’, ‘Ibn-Arabi’, ‘Gazzali’ and ‘Ibni-Khaldun’. Nearly two thousand years
rolled between Aristotle and Machiavelle. According Western exponents of knowledge
there had been a complete deadlock of cultivation and culture of intellect during these
years. We hear so much of sociology of Spencer and Marx and we hear so much of social
interpretation of history but whether the West has the honesty and courage to admit or
not, Ibni-Khaldun is the father of sociology and social interpretation of History.140
Many in the East, “misguided and practically blinded by the immediate comforts and advantages
of material prosperity” have also accepted the dominance of Western knowledge.141 However,
the nihilistic materialism, which cannot value anything and ends up making “nothingness” as the
meaning of life, places man in a state of perpetual war not only against each other but also
against his own nature. To rescue humanity from the inevitable disaster and misery that nihilism
produces, Hashim contended, the East must again reappear “on the horizon of knowledge and
wisdom” by reviving the “ancient genius and spirit” of its religious teachings.
Eastern religions generally and Islam particularly differ from modern Western
conceptions of religions, argued Hashim, insofar as they are not confined to “matters of private
faith and contemplation” but take “a totalitarian view” and “cover all aspects of human
existence.”142 “Islam is a science,” he declared, “which deals with man – individual as well as
social and collective organisms” and thus the Quran provides guidance for both duty to God,
Huq-ul-Allah, and duty to man, Huq-ul-ibad, and makes “the performance of duty to God void
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and invalid when duty to man is ignored or is not duly performed.”143 Since the Quran was
revealed in a particular time and place, Islamic social laws necessarily addressed the problems of
its immediate historical context. The Quran, however, also contains visions for “the ideal or the
ultimate” and “the gap between the immediate and the ultimate programme of Islam is so wide
and so vast that it can comfortably accommodate ever expanding progress of man till eternity,
that is, till the cycle of creation and evolution of man is complete.”144 Thus, the fundamental
social ethics and laws prescribed by Islam, like those prescribed by other major religions must
serve as the foundation of “any social order in which man may be happy and really progressive.”
Accordingly, in The Creed of Islam Hashim called for spiritual, intellectual, moral, social,
political, economic, and cultural revolutions based on the Islamic ideal of “Rubbaniyat” or the
“natural philosophy of creation, sustenance and evolution of the Universe” to produce the
“complete man.”145 Such revolution was once carried out by Muhammad and his shahabis
[followers] to produce the first Islamic state in Medina, which, Hashim argued, should serve as
the inspiration and model for future revolutionaries.
According to Hashim the cornerstones of an Islamic political philosophy are the ideas of
sovereignty of God and the caliphate as the vicegerency of God on earth.146 Man is not sovereign
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over his nature; rather his nature is sovereign over him. And, since nature is but the expression of
god’s will, man’s submission to the laws of nature means his submission to the will of God.
“Acceptance of sovereignty of God and negation of sovereignty of man must be the starting
point of political philosophy.”147 Practically the negation of the sovereignty of man means that
man cannot claim the right to do whatever pleases him. A sword of the king or laws of men,
however, are neither necessary nor the most efficient instrument for compelling men to do what
they ought. Hashim argued:
A steady and a uniform moral sense born out of transcendental knowledge of Nature and
the Laws of Nature which determine the destiny of man and a faith that any behaviour
inconsistent with such moral sense, however pleasant it may appear at first sight, is
ultimately and inevitably suicidal to man’s own interest and ruins his destiny, is the only
natural and absolutely effective compelling force of individual behaviour whether the
individual is in the solitude of his bed-room or is in the midst of a crowd.148
An individual who attains, through a combination of intellect and intuition, a deep
transcendental knowledge and faith will need neither laws of men nor fear of the sword to fulfill
his duties towards god or men. Thus, anarchy or the absence of political power is the “perfect
state of human existence.” But “perfect anarchy will not be a practical proposition until humanity
completely shakes off its artificial civilized existence and goes back to the state of Nature,”
which is “well-nigh impossible.”149 Thus, Islamic political philosophy recommends a “practical

147

Hashim, The Creed of Islam (1950), p. 99. Hashim also argued that man’s estimation of
himself as a sovereign being is borne out of his arrogance, particularly that regarding his reason.
Since scientific knowledge have allowed man to use and exploit nature to accomplish wonders
that seemingly defy nature, man has thought that he can conquer and overcome nature. However,
all of men’s achievements were made possible, Hashim argued, not by defying laws of nature but
by acquiring more intimate and thorough knowledge of them. “Nature is knowable but is not
conquerable.”
148
Ibid, p. 70.
149
Ibid, p. 120. Hashim’s argument that the state of war is not the state of nature but one
produced by corruption of human nature is remarkably similar to Rousseau. However, unlike
Rousseau, Hashim thinks of the state of nature not as the primitive underdeveloped stage of
humanity but an enlightened one in perfect harmony with the laws of nature, Garden of Eden.
179

and a maximum attainable anarchy with a minimum state,” which was the guiding principle of
the first Islamic state of Medina under the auspices of Caliph-al-Rashedeen. 150 The caliph is not
a sovereign or a king but vicegerent of God on earth. Any man who molds his life according to
God’s will and advances His will on earth is already a caliph whether he holds the title or not.
The office of caliphate institutionalizes the concept of vicegerency. “The office of Caliphate is
not an office of power, privilege and dignity but it is an office of duties, responsibilities and
trust,” the goal of which is to “nourish and develop their people as vicegerent of God faithfully in
the manner in which the Creator nourishes and develops His wonderful creation.”151 Thus, the
caliph is not a ruler but is a leader or, more accurately, an “administrator of the state” that is
ruled not by the arbitrary will of man but by laws of God set down in the Quran and subsequent
body of Islamic jurisprudence. Ultimately the caliph is obliged, just like every other human
being, to fulfill his duties towards God and man and must be both alim [wise and
knowledgeable] and salih [honest, unselfish and righteous] to discharge the responsibilities of
the office properly.152
Rejecting the sovereignty of man and upholding the ideal of the caliphate advanced by
Islamic political philosophy necessarily challenge fundamental ideas and institutions of modern
politics such as nationalism, property, individualism, socialism, and democracy. Though Hashim
had fought as late as 1947 for an independent United Bengal on behalf of a Bengali nation, by
1950 he regarded national identity as merely an accidental yet unalterable trait of a human being,
which if “accepted as basis of division or constituent elements of the human race then humanity
can never be one and the universal brotherhood of man can never be a reality and there cannot be
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abiding peace and happiness in the world.”153 He did not, however, demand humans overcome or
denounce their national or cultural identities. Rather, he argued for a rejection of the ideas of
national sovereignty and interest and the principle of “my nation right or wrong.” Since man is
not sovereign, neither a nation nor a state can legitimately claim sovereignty. And, no nation has
the right to promote national interest at the expense of other nations or by violating universal
principles of justice. Hashim pointed towards the creation of the U.N. as an example of the
West’s rejection of nationalism and embrace of the ideal of universal brotherhood of man
advanced by Islamic political philosophy. In place of nationalisms based on identity or what he
called “biological” nationalisms, Hashim calls for nationalisms based on ideological affinities,
which are matters of “free choice” and are not “permanent and invincible impediments to
universal brotherhood.” If all of humanity were to have one common ideology, there would be a
universal nation despite all the differences of racial, cultural, and other identities. Hashim
contended that this common ideology is provided by Islam and that Muslims have the
responsibility to preach and advance an ideology of universal nationalism, “not in the spirit of
conquest but in the spirit of humble missionaries dedicated to the noble cause of universal peace
and happiness.”154
In The Creed of Islam and in a later essay titled “Islam and Economic Problems” Hashim
combined the idea of a universal nation with a rejection of property rights to produce radical
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critiques of capitalism and socialism.155 He argued that while “Capitalism recognizes private
ownership of individuals” and “Socialism is social ownership of wealth, Islam negates both and
teaches economic universalism.” The fundamental principle of Islamic political economy is that
it does not recognize anyone’s ownership except God’s. The earth and its fruit are blessings from
God for the creation, substance, and evolution of life, and as such they belong to all of mankind
and the other creatures of God. Every form of ownership other than God’s – whether individual,
national, or collective humanity – denies someone else’s right to use or consume the bounties of
God equitably.156 Thus, “man’s rights and freedom of his dealings with his material possessions”
must be restricted by ethical considerations towards not only “the general welfare of the entire
human species, but also of all creatures that draw sustenance from the resources of earth.”
Individuals and nations must devise ways of satisfying their needs without diminishing the
means or capacities of others to do so.157 Practical forms of “private ownership” or “social
ownership” may be institutionalized according to particular historical circumstances, Hashim
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anthropocentric ethics, inclusion of non-humans in his ethical considerations and the argument
for humans to act as stewards of non-human interests during an era of high modernism
demonstrate his progressive thinking.
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argued, as long as there are mechanisms to prevent hoarding and excessive accumulation and to
enforce the obligation towards general welfare. Such mechanisms were, Hashim argued,
prescribed by the Quran and institutionalized under the Caliphate of Medina. For example, the
system of zakat, which is a tax on wealth and not on income, and the Islamic inheritance laws,
which allow distant relatives and even unrelated poor to make claims, effectively guard against
accumulation and hoarding by individuals.158 However, the complexities of the modern industrial
mode of production require institutionalization of more expansive regulatory regimes regarding
consumer and environmental protection and worker’s right to uphold the Islamic economic
principle of promoting the general welfare. Hashim, in his various writings, proposed in detail
regulations and argued that, if necessary, production and distribution should be nationally or
even globally coordinated and managed. He also argued that the economic universalism of Islam
prohibits accumulation and hoarding by nations and, thus, people of relatively poor countries
have a claim and right over the wealth of prosperous countries. Anticipating 21st century debates
regarding migration by more than a half a century, Hashim argued, “…all the talks of world
peace must end in a fiasco until the world’s available space be made open for the use of all the
peoples of the world.”159
Recognition of divine sovereignty necessarily restricts man’s legislative powers and
places limits on democracy. Men should make laws not according to their whims or will but
according to the laws of nature established by God for the creation, sustenance, and evolution of
the universe, argued Hashim in a manner similar to John Locke’s arguments about positive
law.160 And, following Plato’s arguments about qualities of a ruler, he argued that state leaders
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and makers of laws should be deeply knowledgeable and divinely guided in order to correctly
interpret and institute the laws of nature. Thus, what is important is that the best men are elevated
to leadership positions, which can be achieved through any number of procedures, including selfappointment.161 Modern parliamentary democracy, Hashim argued, is founded upon the principle
of “omnipotence and omniscience of the judgment and will of the majority.” Adherence to this
principle, however, is hypocritical and illogical. It is hypocritical because parliamentary
democracy does not enable the majority to make decisions or laws but merely allows it to select
the best men for doing so. And, it is illogical because a majority will does not guarantee that the
best decision or best men will be chosen. Reification of a process such as majority will over the
quality of the outcome is not only illogical but also is based on a lack of faith in citizens, argued
Hashim. If citizens of a polity are righteous and vigilant, they will necessarily oppose and fight
unjust rulers or laws and thus will act as a check against tyranny. The institution of Mujlis-iShura in an Islamic state can ideally act as an open but self-selected body that not only counsels
and ratifies the decisions of a caliph but also checks and constrains his power. Hashim argued
that in a rightly guided Islamic state or caliphate not only will there be freedom of opinion and
dissent, but other basic human rights will be protected.162 “Democracy of Islam,” argued
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Hashim used the examples of various methods for selecting caliphs in support of this
argument. He particularly used the example of ascension of Ali, the fourth caliph, for
legitimizing the argument for self-assertion. (The Creed of Islam, pp. 110 – 113) Later this
argument would provide convenient ideological covers for the military dictatorship of Ayub
Khan and would help Hashim secure Ayub’s patronage. (Haq 1992, pp. 98-99).
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Hashim wrote extensively in The Creed of Islam (pp. 87 – 99) and elsewhere (for example, his
essays “Islamic Values” and “Muslim Views of Family and The Place of Women in Islamic
Society” – both reprinted in his anthology As I see It) arguing for Islamic conceptions of social
and political rights, which in substance were not very different from social and political rights
advocated by liberal democracies. The1946 Draft Manifesto of the Bengal Provincial Muslim
League, of which he was the author, and the founding Manifesto of the Awami-Muslim League,
which was influenced and inspired by his ideas, contained many of Hashim’s progressive views
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Hashim, “is just and equitable distribution of rights and privileges of the state but not equal
participation of all in the affairs of the state.”163
The idea of an Islamic polity that Hashim envisioned remained quite abstract and
philosophical in The Creed of Islam. The only concrete example of such a polity he could cite
existed fourteen hundred years ago. He had hoped, however, that in Pakistan an Islamic polity
could be reincarnated in a modern context. Though this desire had informed his political ideas
and actions throughout the Pakistan movement, it was balanced against the more secular and
immediate concerns of nationalism and to lesser degree the economic struggles of BengaliMuslim peasants. After the emergence of Pakistan he became increasingly opposed to nationalist
and class politics, preferring to focus on producing programmatic politics based on his
conception of Islamic political philosophy. His politics, however, failed to gain traction with the
ruling strata of the new state of Pakistan, which were either decidedly secular modernist or paid
lip services to Islam for advancing chauvinistic Muslim nationalism. Abul A’ala Mawdudi, the
Deccan cleric and the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, was one of the few among Indian Muslim
leaders to advance the idea of an Islamic state in any serious way.164 It is striking that Hashim
and Mawdudi never formed a political alliance and Hashim never engaged with Mawdudi’s ideas
or writings, despite the affinities of their political positions. Perhaps, Hashim found Mawdudi
and his brand of politics to be too fundamentalist, intolerant, and philosophically unsophisticated
to engage with. In any case, both Hashim and Mawdudi remained at the fringes of Pakistan
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politics and at times were persecuted as secular modernist visions dominated center stage.165 In
1953, Hashim advanced his political philosophy by launching a new political party, Khilafot-eRabbani, but he failed to challenge the ruling strata and failed to gain much traction among his
erstwhile followers and allies among the Bengali-Muslim progressives, whose politics were still
much centered on nationalist and class concerns. His failures to connect increased his political
marginality and led to his total defeat in the historic 1954 election.166 Hashim finally found in
Ayub Khan an ally and patron for his ideas and advanced scholarly discourses about an Islamic
state, though these discourses remained politically marginalized. During this period, Hashim
opined that Pakistan needed to realize an Islamic state for the sake of its own citizens and for the
future sake of humanity. In the Cold War ideological battle over the fate of humanity both liberal
capitalism and socialism had their own states to rely upon. Despite many states claiming to be
Muslim, Hashim noted, there was no state that was committed to realizing and advancing Islamic
ideology. Pakistan, thus, occupied a special place in human history having the potential to serve
as a model of and advocate for an Islamic way of life, which Hashim believed was far superior to
the materialistic nihilism and egocentrism of both capitalism and socialism.167 Unfortunately for
Hashim his dream of an Islamic state would remain unfulfilled in Pakistan. And though the
emergence of Bangladesh represented at least a partial realization of his earlier struggle for an
independent Bengali state, it was in many ways a pyrrhic victory because the Bangladeshi state
was founded on explicitly secular principles and foreclosed the possibilities of establishing an
Islamic state. Thus, Hashim, like Gandhi, remained a tragic figure who failed to realize or be
hopeful about the ideals he had held dear.
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Conclusion
I argued previously in chapter 2 that by the 1920s Bengali-Muslim became an identifiable
category as the members of the emerging urban middle class claimed simultaneous belonging to
Bengali and Muslim identities. The writers and intellectuals of this highly dynamic and
productive period began to produce a distinctively Bengali-Muslim literary form and cultural
sensibility by consciously employing both Bengali and Muslim languages, themes, and
imaginaries in their works.168 This nascent Bengali-Muslim culture was self-consciously
modernist, secular, egalitarian, and progressive.169 The operative argument of the cultural
movements of 1920s and 1930s was that Bengali-Muslims were both Bengalis and capable of
modernity. The project of establishing the Bengaliness of Bengali-Muslims, however, translated
into a program seeking their inclusion in the bhadralok Bengali culture that saw Muslimness as
both backward and foreign. Thus, the programs of promotion of Bengali literacy and literature
among the Muslims of Bengal and “improving” their literary and cultural standards often
constructed Muslimness as something in need of overcoming.
Bengali-Muslim efforts in this period to articulate a counter to this patronizing and
exclusionary discourse of Bengaliness, however, often reverted to 19th century constructions of
“Muslims in Bengal” at the expense of a composite category of Bengali-Muslim.170 Other
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challengers to the hegemony of the bhadralok Bengali culture, for example by A.F.M. Abdul
Hye, asserted the rural culture of Muslim peasants to be the most authentic representation of
Bengali culture.171 Hye’s equation of Bengaliness with Muslim peasants would find profound
resonance in the decades to come among Bengali-Muslim intellectuals coming from the peasant
families of East Bengal.172 However, by identifying the cultivator, rather than the educated
middle class as the true Bengali, Hye’s formulation problematized the emerging urban Muslim
middle class’s claim to Bengaliness. Abul Mansur Ahmad, a representative of the new middle
class, sought to work through this challenge and articulate a cultural identity that, without
denying its peasant roots, was thoroughly urban and modern and yet distinct from the modern
bhadralok Bengali culture. Ahmad was not necessarily the biggest name of the intellectual and
political movement that produced Bengali-Muslim identity but what he did better than other
luminaries of the period was to name the phenomenon of which he was a part.
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In a pamphlet titled Adarsha Krishok (The Ideal Cultivator), published in 1920 from Ahmad’s
hometown Mymensingh, Hye commented, “By Bangali, I mean the cultivators… Those who are
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The program of naming the Bengali-Muslim was not merely an intellectual exercise for
Ahmad but was a political necessity produced by the desire for a postcolonial future. His ideas
and politics were shaped by the political and discursive context of the late colonial period and
particularly by the demand for Pakistan, which, among other things, facilitated the emergence of
a regionalism in East Bengal.173 The idea of Bengali-Muslim or Pak-Bangla was not his original
idea. Figures like Abul Kalam Samsuddin, Mujibur Rahman Khan, and Habibullah Bahar – some
of the notable names who founded the influential East Pakistan Renaissance society – were more
likely to be considered pioneers of Bengali-Muslim identity than Ahmad. However, Ahmad’s
intellectual rigor and, more importantly, his commitment to secularism and Bengaliness enabled
him to produce a synthesis between Bengali and Muslim identity that proved more durable in the
long run. While his colleagues Samsuddin and Khan would toe the Muslim League’s party line
during Pakistan period by privileging Muslim solidarity and Islamic ideology over Bengali
identity, Ahmad would remain committed to Bengali and Muslim components of that identity
and would advocate for the autonomy of Bengali-Muslims against the homogenizing demands of
a Pakistani nationalism. Yet during the 1960s and even after the independence of Bangladesh, he
defended his arguments for the cultural distinctions between Bengali-Hindus and BengaliMuslims when the politics of “Bengaliness” were highly popular among secular and progressive
intellectuals.174 This commitment to preserve the Bengali-Muslim as an autonomous cultural and
political identity without dissolving it either into to Muslim or Bengali identities, makes Ahmad
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a particularly relevant thinker for contemporary discussions of Bangladeshi identity, which has
yet to develop the “we-ness” that Ahmad was advocating.
In articulating the Bengali-Muslim cultural identity Ahmad was borrowing explicitly and
implicitly upon Indian and Western discourses of culture and national identity. He was informed
by the discourse of culture that, since the late 19th century, had begun to envision a Bengali
culture and had argued that culture to be the basis of national identity.175 He did not, however,
engage with this discourse explicitly, perhaps because his project was to emphasize the
distinctions between “Bengali-Muslim” and “Bengali” culture. Rather, Ahmad engaged
explicitly with European and American social and cultural theories and philosophies of history.
His arguments of cultural autonomy were explicitly constructed against the totalizing humanism
of the likes of Aldous Huxley and Bertrand Russell, who were immensely influential among
mid-20th century Indian intellectuals. Ahmad adopted Mathew Arnold’s idea of culture as a
study of perfection but insisted in line with Ralph Waldo Emerson, who perhaps shaped
Ahmad’s thinking more than anyone else, that cultural distinction and autonomy were
indispensable for cultural vitality. Also, particularly influential in Ahmad’s thinking was
Christopher Dawson, the British philosopher and historian of Catholicism, who argued in the
1920s and 1930s about the foundational role of religions in culture. By drawing upon all these
discourses Ahmad produced a systematic and influential theory of Bengali-Muslim cultural
identity.176
In contrast to Ahmad, Hashim subscribed to the idea of a common cultural identity of the
Bengali Hindus and Muslims and celebrated the modern bhadralok Bengali culture of Calcutta
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as the expression of that common heritage. This embrace of Bengali identity endeared Hashim to
many Bangladeshi secular nationalist politicians and commentators, who tended to either
downplay the Islamist aspect of Hashim’s intellectual-political project or dismiss it as an
unfortunate lapse into reactionary politics.177 Such approaches are understandable given the
association of religious politics with retrogressive ideas and the ways Islam particularly was
mobilized to undermine nationalist politics before and after the independence of Bangladesh.
Such approaches conflate the different varieties of Islamist politics and fail to appreciate the
radicalism and critical edge of Hashim’s ideas. As Hashim took pains to make clear, his
argument for “making Islam a living force” was neither an argument for a Muslim nationalism
nor a dogmatic retreat into orthodoxy and rituals. Interestingly, his Islamism was not inspired by
or oriented towards the class struggles of the Muslim peasants, as so many Islamist movements
in Bengal had been, including to a degree the movement for Pakistan.178 Rather, Hashim’s
Islamism was based on a radical philosophical critique and a rejection of secular modernity or
what he called “materialistic nihilism” or “nihilistic materialism.” Though his philosophical and
political criticisms were directed primarily against secular modernity, he was vehemently critical
of religious orthodoxy and traditionalism. He was also well aware that his efforts carried the risk
of being misunderstood and discredited. Regarding the reception of The Creed of Islam, for
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example, Hashim anticipated, “The modern guardians of religion will call [the author] a ‘Kafir’
or a heretic while zealots of Nihilism will curse him as a reactionary revivalist.”179
In this rejection of modernity Hashim was following a tradition of anticolonial thought,
which turned to Eastern religions as sources of critique not only of colonial rule but also of
Western civilization generally. Protagonists of this tradition were generally educated in modern
Westernized institutions and were deeply immersed in Enlightenment philosophies but
nevertheless found them to be less than emancipatory. Mahatma Gandhi was of course the most
famous champion of this tradition, which emerged in the late 19th century and profoundly
informed the Swadeshi movement of the early 20th century.180 Amir Ali and Muhammad Iqbal
were notable figures among Muslim thinkers who rejected European modernity in favor of an
Islamic modernity.181 Since a comparative study of Hashim and these earlier thinkers is out of
the scope of the present discussion, it will be difficult to make claims about what he borrows
from and what he adds to the tradition. What makes Hashim particularly interesting for our
discussion, though, is that the audience of his critiques of modernity was young and progressive
Bengali-Muslim intellectuals and political actors, who became increasingly critical of Islam.
Hashim sought to defend Islam against the charges of being a reactionary and anti-progressive
ideology that had hitherto perpetuated Muslim backwardness. By reconstructing a progressive
tradition within Islam and by comparing Islamic political philosophy with contemporary liberal
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and communist ideas, Hashim endeavored to demonstrate that democratic and socialist ideals
could be better realized through Islam than through the other two political ideologies.
Despite their differences, Ahmad and Hashim were united in their efforts to reclaim
Muslimness without denying Bengaliness or giving up their commitment to progressive politics.
Thus, it is not surprising that both Hashim and, to a lesser degree, Ahmad were relegated to the
sideline of nationalist politics in Bangladesh, which in its early formulation was constructed in
explicit denial of Muslimness either as a source of national identity or as a source of state
ideology. However, the resurgence of Muslim identity and Islamist ideology in Bangladesh soon
after independence and the contemporary struggles between Islamist and secular political forces
point towards the continued relevancy of Islam in the social and political lives of Bangladeshi
people. Perhaps, commentators and analysts of Bangladeshi politics from inside and outside of
Bangladesh would be served better, if they were to recognize this centrality of Islam in
Bangladesh, suspending their negative assumptions about Islam that arise out of centuries of
Orientalist constructions and the contemporary Islamophobia. In doing so it may be beneficial to
revisit the ideas of Ahmad and Hashim in order to recover the progressive potentials of Muslim
identity and Islamist politics.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Second Birth of the Nation: Aspirations of democracy, equality, freedom, and social
uplift in producing the Bangladesh Moment

Bangladesh’s emergence as a nation-state has involved a process of “double-birth” – first
as Pakistan and then as Bangladesh. Consequently, a central tension in Bangladesh’s
historiography and politics has been establishing acceptable narratives about the relationship of
these two moments. The dominant nationalist response has been to construct the “Bangladesh
Moment” as the negation of the “Pakistan Moment” by arguing that Bangladesh emerges as a
result of the awakening and self-discovery of a secular Bengali nation in explicit rejection of the
idea of the Muslim nation that had produced Pakistan. In these accounts, Bangladeshi
nationalism is constructed as a cultural nationalism based on linguistic identity. As Ranabir
Samaddar has pointed out, “the nation is narrated in terms of literature,” and little else is
considered to constitute the “nation’s soul.”1 Though not necessarily false or incorrect, these
narratives produce partial and incomplete accounts that ignore or remain silent about other
histories or alternative possibilities. In the previous chapter we noted that nationalist histories of
Bangladesh have often been silent about the enthusiasm with which Bengali-Muslims had
participated in the creation of Pakistan. They are also equally silent about the range of ideas and
concerns that animated politics in the years and decades before 1971, preferring instead to read
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Ranabir Samaddar argues this point persuasively in Paradoxes of the Nationalist Time:
Political Essays on Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press, 2002, p. 21) by analyzing the ways
institutions like the Bangla Academy have used literary production for “building up of national
culture and … the maintenance of it.” Abul Mansur Ahmad advocated a project to produce
“cultural nationalism,” as we have discussed in the previous chapter. The distinction of course is
that Ahmad emphasized “Bengali-Muslim” identity, whereas the Bangla academy emphasized
“Bengali” identity.
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them as the “background to the inevitable emergence of Bangladesh.”2 A closer look at the
political and intellectual histories of the fifties and sixties, however, reveals that the nation was
constructed and the Bangladesh Moment was produced by multiple streams of political ideas and
movements coming together through the unfolding of specific and contingent historical
processes. 1971 was not merely a result of the self-awakening and discovery of the Bengali
nation but was also a result of democratic and socialist movements against the Pakistani state’s
extant socio-economic conditions and political repression. Democratic and egalitarian ideals
were equally important, if not more, as linguistic and cultural identity in contributing to the
emergence of the nation. In this chapter I examine this proposition through an interrogation of
the political ideas that produced the birth of Bangladesh, as well as the ideas produced by its
birth. The shift in focus from cultural nationalism to other concerns will illustrate the continuities
and breaks in the political and intellectual histories of Bangladesh and will clarify why so many
Bangladeshi nationalists could become so without disavowing their ardent support for the
Pakistan movement.
One of the arguments of this chapter is that we cannot understand the Bangladeshi
national movement only or even primarily through the prisms of identity or cultural nationalism.
If we examine the ideas and actions of Bengali-Muslim political actors of the 1950s, 1960s, and
early 1970s without the blinders that Bangladeshi nationalist narratives impose, we find
continuity in political concerns of pre- and post-independent Bangladesh. For Pakistan and
independent Bangladesh the central political concerns had been drafting a progressive
constitution, securing democratic and political rights, and producing social transformation and
2
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uplift. The failures of Pakistani political process to deliver on the promises of national liberation
produced, by 1971, the program of Bangladesh’s independence, in which Bangladeshi national
liberation was now expected to deliver what Pakistan had failed to do. Independence of
Bangladesh meant that Bengali-Muslim political actors were now in charge of a state, perhaps in
a more meaningful way than they had ever been in modern history. Thus, they could not simply
play the role of critical opposition but had to become statesmen and state builders and were
required to think about the state more seriously and systematically than before. The concerns
with state building, economic development, social transformation, and political rights gave
intellectual practices and political thought of this period a particularly modernist character,
which was reinforced by the dominance of high-modernism globally during that time.3 In this
context the question of national identity, particularly of the Bengali nation, did not take on a
central political importance until the moment of independence or even after the nation was born.
The project of imagining or constructing the Bengali nation was not, by any means, complete at
independence. Rather, nation building became a central political project in post-independence
Bangladesh because the nation provided the ethical foundation and the political legitimacy for
the post-colonial projects of state-building and social transformation.4
In the coming pages of this chapter I will substantiate the claims outlined in the
paragraphs above by examining the political life and ideas of two figures, who were arguably the
most instrumental in bringing about Bangladesh’s independence – Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani
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(popularly known as Maolana Bhashani or just Bhashani) and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
(popularly known as Mujib). Bhashani and Mujib had a complex and shifting relationship with
each other as they contended for command over East Pakistani politics. Though Mujib was
bestowed with the honorific Bangabondhu [Friend of Bengal] and eventually Jatir Janak [Father
of the Nation], Bhashani’s influence as the Majlum Jononeta [leader of the oppressed masses] in
the Bangladeshi nationalist struggle was arguably no less significant. Both Bhashani and Mujib
were paradigmatic examples of charismatic leaders, of the kind that function as the “fulcrum of
the transition from colonial-ruled traditional society to politically independent modern society”
by leading charismatic or even revolutionary movements of social change.5 They exhibited the
kind of self-confidence, sense of purpose or calling, and willingness to suffer and sacrifice that
produce charismatic legitimacy. As a result, they commanded the devotion of millions of
followers and through their emotional union with followers produced “charismatic
communities.” In doing so Bhashani and Mujib shaped the political conversations and struggles
of East Pakistan and Bangladesh from the 1950s to 1970s and produced the collective entities or
the peoples that would constitute the nation in 1971. It is thus impossible to talk about
Bangladeshi political thought without considering the ideas and politics of these two leaders. I
focus on two political rather than intellectual figures because they provide better examples of the
political thinking of the period than their intellectual counterparts. Intellectuals of this period
were much invested in the question of cultural and national identity and subsequently
constructed the history of Bangladesh’s emergence through the prism of cultural nationalism.
Yet such narratives remain partial and fail to recognize the more radical impulses of the politics
5
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and political thought of the period. By engaging with political figures like Bhashani and Mujib
we can better understand the aspirations and anxieties surrounding Bangladesh’s second birth.
However, choosing political leaders like Bhashani and Mujib as interlocutors for the
purpose of reading political thought presents several methodological and tactical challenges. As
major political leaders their lives and politics, particularly in the case of Mujib, have been
subject to innumerable commentaries and analyses, most of which are hagiographical and highly
partisan. Bhashani and Mujib’s role in and impact on Bangladeshi politics have been and are the
subjects of tremendous controversy and intense political debates. Any commentary on them risks
significant political and even legal backlash. To wade through the controversies and understand
their place in Bangladeshi politics I have immersed myself in the seemingly endless secondary
literature and partisan debates. In writing, however, I have stayed clear of these controversies as
much as possible because my aim is not to pronounce judgment on their political actions or to
correct historical controversies. Rather, I hope to capture their political ideas and thinking about
questions of identity and modernity.
But neither Bhashani nor Mujib were prolific writers. Thus, one is compelled to extricate
their political thought primarily from their speeches, along with their political actions and
practices and a limited archive of written work. Both Bhashani and Mujib were exceptionally
eloquent and moving speakers, qualities that contributed significantly towards their charisma.
Their speeches as well as their political lives have been well documented and preserved. The
challenge is not the lack of material but is discerning patterns and structures in it, which becomes
even more difficult given their political positions shifted often to meet the demands of changing
local and international political realities. Their political thought, though reflecting deep
commitments to their constituencies and to an emerging nationalist consciousness, were highly
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eclectic and often displayed uneasy, contradictory, and at times profound co-habitation and
mixing of various ideas and identities. Thus, it may be justified to question whether it is possible
to extract systematic thinking or philosophical reflections in actions and speeches of political
leaders, whose primary function was to persuade. Here I take an Aristotelian, rather than
Platonic, position that political speeches are not always self-serving instruments of political
leaders and demagogues but can be expressions of political reasoning and moral arguments that
recognize the agency of the audience to make rational and informed choices.6 Moreover, I see
eloquence as civic virtue as Romans did and speech acts as mechanisms for producing political
agreements, i.e., political communities.7

6

James Martin, Politics and Rhetoric (New York: Routledge, 2013) and Giuseppe Ballacci,
Political Theory between Philosophy and Rhetoric: Politics as Transcendence and Contingency
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
7
See Joy Connolly, The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
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Between Radical Democracy and Social Justice: Maolana Bhashani’s Arguments for
Pastoral Governance
I
Abdul Hamid Khan – Maolana Bhashani – was born circa 1885 and was at least 90 years
old when he passed away in 1976. In his long life he experienced and participated in many of the
events and moments that shaped the history of Bangladesh and modern South Asia.8 Bhashani is
best known as a political leader because of the roles he played and the positions he held for more
than four decades in constitutional party politics in colonial India and post-colonial Pakistan and
Bangladesh. He became the president of the Assam Provincial Muslim League in 1944, formed
and led the Awami (Muslim) League from 1949 to 1957, and finally founded and led the
National Awami Party from 1957 until his passing. During his long political career Bhashani
played significant roles in the independence struggles of Pakistan and Bangladesh, in the latter
case his importance being second only to that of Mujib. Before Bhashani became a politician of
national stature, he was a peasant activist for more than two decades and organized fierce and
often violent peasant struggles against local and regional economic and political elites.
Organizing farmers and fishermen through independent organizations, he continued his role as a
peasant activist even after he became a leader of national parties. Besides being a politician and a
peasant leader Bhashani was also a Sufi pir. In his late teenage years, he was initiated as a murid
or a disciple in a Sufi tariqua or path by Pir Syed Nasiruddin Bogdadi, and he eventually

8

Among the many biographies and commentaries on Bhashani, Saied Abul Maksud’s Maolana
Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1994) remains the most complete and
informative, particularly because of its large number of primary documents and first person
interviews. My presentation is also informed by Nurul Kabir’s polemical yet highly sophisticated
account, The Red Moulana : An Essay on Bhashani’s Ever-Oppositional Democratic Spirit
(Dhaka: Samhati Publications, 2012), and Abid Bahar’s dissertation, “The Religious and
Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s Political Leadership” (Ottawa: Concordia University, 2004).
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attained the status of a pir himself in his late 30s.9 In his more than half a century long career as a
pir, Bhashani initiated and served as the spiritual master of thousands of murids from all walks
of life in Bengal and Assam. Bhashani also worked vigorously to promote education among the
rural masses and to reform the highly elitist education system that Pakistan and Bangladesh had
inherited from their colonial past. He helped to establish and patronized many schools and
colleges throughout his life. In the last decades of his life founding an Islamic university became
his “dream project,” envisioning an education program for producing radical social
transformation. Bhashani was also active in the field of journalism and publishing. Besides the
many bulletins, pamphlets, and newsletters he published to propagate his political ideas and
programs, he played an important role in establishing the Daily Ittefaq, the largest circulating
daily in East Pakistan and Bangladesh for decades and a critical role in Bangladesh’s
independence struggle. Between 1972 and 1976 he published the short-lived but influential
Weekly Haq-Katha, which provided a platform for critical interrogation of politics in postindependent Bangladesh.
How are we to understand the politics and ideas of a man who led such a long and
colorful life? His biography, political career, and archival texts – mostly speeches and
interviews, along with a few articles, pamphlets, and political manifestos – offer a bewildering
diversity of ideas and concerns that shaped his politics. Despite the range, it is possible to
identify a core concern or a unifying theme that ties together the different aspects – nationalist
political leader, peasant organizer, Sufi pir, education reformer, and journalist – of his career.
Shirajul Islam Chowdhury, a prominent Bangladeshi scholar and cultural critic, has suggested
9

Often translated in English as “saint” the Persian word pir literally means “elder” and in Sufi
tradition connotes the figure of a spiritual teacher or master. Pirs are often thought to possess
great spiritual wisdom, supernatural powers, and the ability to perform miracles. See Barbara
Metcalf, ed., Islam in South Asia in Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
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that Bhashani’s core politics are motivated by a simple but powerful desire to bring a smile to the
destitute masses of Bangladesh and beyond:
The kind of smile that doesn’t hide tears, the kind of smile that doesn’t cause pain in
faces deformed by starvation, the kind of smile that is full of life’s rich and vibrating
energy [praner prachurjo o jiboner uchchas].10
Bhashani knew extreme poverty and misery not as abstract concepts but as concrete experiences
from his life. Though he was born in a relatively prosperous peasant household, he was forced to
fend for himself from an early age having become orphaned before he was ten, losing his father
at four and mother at age nine. Throughout his teen years a homeless Bhashani drifted through
the villages and towns of northern Bengal and survived doing odd jobs, mostly as a farmhand or
a fisherman’s assistant, before he was taken in by Pir Bogdadi as a disciple and a servant. Thus,
he came to know viscerally how the relentless struggle just to survive occupies and depresses the
sharbahara, the dispossessed, and saps their humanity, creativity, and life.11 Bhashani’s politics

10

After a three-week trip to China as a guest of the state in 1963, Bhashani wrote a booklet titled,
“Mao Tse Tung er deshe” (“In the land of Mao Tse Tung”). There he noted that above all what
impressed him most about China was the lively smile on the faces of ordinary people. He
lamented the lack of such a smile on the faces of his countrymen and contemplated if and how
such smiles could be brought to the faces of the poor in Bengal. The booklet is much adored in
Bangladesh because it is written in the popular literary trope of travel narratives and conveys
powerful emotions and arguments in simple yet elegant poetic language. In his essay “Maolana
Bhashanir Bhumika” (The Role of Maolana Bhashani) Sherajul Islam Chowdhury provides a
perceptive analysis of Bhashani’s politics, centering on a reading of this booklet. See his Neta,
Janata, Rajniti [Leader, Public, Politics] (Dhaka: Dana Prokashoni, 1987).
11
Among the many words that are available to connote poverty, Bhashani often chose to use
sharbahara, which translates literally as “one who has lost everything” or “one with nothing to
lose.” The similarity here with the Marxist concept of the “proletariat” has led some scholars to
translate Bhashani’s sharbahara as the “proletariat.” See Kabir The Red Maulana (2012).
However, I think that such an equation is problematic given Bhashani’s critique of communism
and because the sharbahara that Bhashani was talking about were mostly peasants and landless
farmers not industrial workers. Perhaps, the phrase “wretched” as used by Fanon or the term
“subaltern” as used by the Subaltern Studies Group, in Vinayak Chaturvedi, Mapping Subaltern
Studies and the Postcolonial (New York: Verso Books, 2012), would be better translations of
sharbahara. However, to stay clear of these conceptual debates, I have chosen to use a less overdetermined “dispossessed” to translate Bhashani’s sharbahara.
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was thus structured by an emotive rather than a theoretical response to the destitution of the
masses, which produced an identity between him and his followers and made him a powerful
leader. Perhaps, as with all political philosophies that emanate from powerful emotions about the
human condition, we may view Bhashani’s political ideas as indignation and protest against the
poverty and destitution of the masses.12 Yet, insofar as he was interested in ending the misery of
the masses and bringing smiles to their faces, his politics and ideas reflected an evolving
understanding of the causes of and solutions to the problems of poverty and destitution.
Bhashani’s politics and worldview were instinctively structured by an organic
consciousness of the oppressed about his own oppression.

More specifically, his politics

reflected the class-consciousness of the peasant in opposition to feudal structures of
exploitation.13 The system that keeps peasants perpetually hungry and insecure and denies their
dignity and humanity despite their hard work from dawn till dusk felt inherently unjust to
Bhashani. And he refused to accept it as the natural order or even God’s will. He recalled the
formation of his class-consciousness:
The so-called aristocracy of society struck my mind in childhood. I could never tolerate
the idea of class distinction between human beings on the basis of the amount of land
they own. My mind wanted to demolish the [class-based] social system, and introduce a
new one on the debris of existing one from the day I came to understand the deliberate
12

I think a comparison can be made here, for example, between Bhashani’s lamentation about
the way the sharbahara is denied his humanity and dignity and Marx’s arguments about the
alienation experienced by the proletariat. Both Bhashani and Marx produced their political
theories and programs in efforts to overcome what they felt to be the unbearable. See Istvan
Meszaros, Marx’s Theory of Alienation (London: Merlin Press, 1970) for an argument about how
a reaction against alienation shaped Marx’s political thought.
13
The question of a subaltern consciousness and agency has been debated extensively within
subaltern studies and postcolonial theories over the last three decades. See Chaturvedi, Mapping
Subaltern 2012 and particularly Rosalind O’Hanlon’s “Recovering the Subject” Subaltern
Studies and Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia” in that anthology. I agree with the
line of argument advanced by some subalternists that the subaltern is capable of an insurgent
consciousness and agency that is relatively autonomous from both colonial and nationalist
discourses.
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and systemic exploitation [of peasants] by the landed aristocracy of zamindars and
moneylenders. 14
During his long political career Bhashani participated in different political movements and
struggles, some of which had diverging ideals and gave his politics an eclectic character. Yet, at
the core his commitment to class struggle and social revolution remained unchanged. He
participated in different movements with the hope of finding a way to break the system of
exploitation and usher in a new society based on social justice and human dignity. Though many
of those movements failed to deliver their promised results, Bhashani did not regret his
participation in the movements, nor did he become depressed. With lessons from the failures, he
jumped into new movements with an indomitable spirit because for him there was no room for
defeat in the marginalized millions’ fight for life and dignity. Bhashani’s core political
commitment and his indomitable spirit was expressed wonderfully in the answer he provided in
the year after Bangladesh’s birth to a question about whether with hindsight he regrets his
participation in the Pakistan movement:
I am not at all remorseful. The reason is that I am pursuing the same politics [political
objectives] today as I did 25 years ago in the struggle for Pakistan. The foundation of that
politics was economics, not the lure of political power. We struggled for Pakistan as a
symbol of the struggle to end exploitation, and it was a reaction against the exploitation
and oppression of the Muslim peasants and workers by Hindu landlords, moneylenders
etc. However, it appears that the oppressor has no religion. Exploitation did not end, after
the establishment of Pakistan, only the face of the exploiter had changed. The poor
became even poorer. The rich became richer. Thus, for economic emancipation we have
again fought for [political] independence. Political ideas and realizations are doubtless
shaped by contemporary situations. And, if they contain possibilities for truth and justice

14

Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, ‘Amar Jindegee’ (My Life), Dainik Paigam, Dhaka, January 13,
1971. Quoted and translated by Kabir, The Red Maulana (2012), P. 27. Bhashani provided a
similar account of his motivations and political life in a speech to a special session of the
National Awami Party held in Rangpur in 1967, quoted by Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994)
pp. 7-10.
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and good of humanity at least for the time, that movement, that wakening is nevertheless
worthwhile.15
Bhashani’s instinctive class-consciousness would not of course remain only instinctive but
would rather become informed and modified by the different ideas and thinkers he encountered
and was influenced by in his long political career. Tracing these influences will give us a deeper
understanding of his politics and thought.
Bhashani grew up on the legends of various peasant movements that swept through
Bengal during the 19th century such as the Faraizi movement and the Pabna uprising and was
cultured in what he would describe as the “revolutionary tradition” of Indian Islam that
combined religious-social reform with struggles against local systems of exploitation and the
emerging colonial state.16 He first encountered, however, a coherent articulation of the ideas of
the revolutionary tradition during his two-year stint at Darul Uloom Deoband, where he was sent
by Bogdadi, his guardian as well as the spiritual master, in 1907 to receive formal religious
education. At Deoband, a center of Islamic revivalism in the 19th century that had also become a
hub of anti-colonial politics by the beginning of the 20th century, Bhashani studied under Shikhul
Hind [leader of India] Maolana Mahmudul Hasan and Maolana Husain Ahmad Madani. The two

15

In the Weekly Haq-Katha, Bhashani wrote a regular column “amar jobab” (my answer)
answering readers’ questions regarding political, spiritual, and philosophical questions. I think
this column bears similarities to and was perhaps deliberately styled after M. Gandhi’s
engagement with readers through question and answer in the weekly Harijan and Young India.
This response is from the inaugural issue of March 10, 1972. Reprinted in Abu Salek, ed., HaqKatha Shomogro [The Collected Volume of the Weekly Haq-Katha] (Dhaka: Ghash Phul Nadi,
2002), p. 48.
16
In an essay titled “Ahimsha O Biplob [Nonviolence and Revolution]”, published in the March
17, 1972 issue of Haq-Katha, Bhashani presented a genealogy of his politics by locating them in
a “revolutionary tradition” of Indian Islam going back to the late 18th century. In Abu Salek, ed.,
Haq-Katha Shomogro (2002), pp. 59 – 62. See Iftekhar Iqbal, The Bengal Delta: Ecology, State
and Social Change, 1840-1943 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) for a detailed analysis
of the peasant movements of the late 19th century Bengal and the roles that radical Islamic
ideologies played in them.
205

leaders and the general culture of Deoband provided him with a religious and philosophical
understanding of jihad as the struggle for personal moral and spiritual purification and as the
fight against social injustice and imperialism.

17

Throughout his more than six decades of

political activity he held onto this basic teaching and declared in 1971 in his philosophically
reflective essay “Amar Shomadhan” [“My Solutions”]:
Our struggle will be two pronged. One direct and the other indirect. The direct one will
be of [social] revolution [biplob] and the indirect one will be of purification and reform
[of the self] [shodhon]. We can only reach our desired destination, if we can pursue both
sides in the same rhythm.18
Bhashani engaged in this two-pronged struggle of social revolution and the development of an
ethical self from early on, even if not always in the same rhythm.
His first explicit political engagement came in his late teens/early twenties through his
association with the violent revolutionary group Anushilan. It was arguably motivated more by
his revolutionary impulses and his youthful adventurism than concerns with the purification of
the self.19 Throughout his twenties and thirties Bhashani restlessly sought to balance the demands

17

For a discussion of the impact of Deoband on politics and intellectual practices in colonial
India, see Barbara Metcalf’s Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1982) and Husain Ahmad Madani: The Jihad for Islam and India’s
Freedom (London: Oneworld Publications, 2012). See Bahar, The Religious and Philosophical
Basis of Bhashani’s Political Leadership (2004) for a discussion how the experience of Deoband
had radicalized and shaped Bhashani’s intellectual-political outlook.
18
Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, “Amar Shomadhan (My Solutions),” Dainik Pakistan, January
5, 1971, p. 331. Reproduced in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 694 -698.
19
Anushilan was one of the short-lived revolutionary terrorist organizations to emerge from the
anti-colonial Swadeshi movement precipitated by the 1905 partition of Bengal. Most Anushilan
members were university educated idealist young men from upper-caste Hindu families, who
hoped to produce social revolution and compel the British to leave India through terrorist
agitation. See Asok Kumar Ray, Party of Firebrand Revolutionaries: The Dacca Anushilan
Samiti, 1906-1918 (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1999). Bhashani was physically strong,
daring, and one of the few Muslim members of the group and thus rose to relative prominence
within the group despite coming from a peasant background. He reportedly participated in
robberies to raise funds for the group. However, by 1913 he came to see the limitations of secret
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of livelihood with his inclinations for a politically engaged life. He floated among the riverine
communities along the Brahmaputra/Jamuna corridor where the shifting flows and floods of the
mighty river created precarious conditions and the constant struggle against nature in the chars,
or river islands. Often venturing north into the deep interior of Assam, he worked in these
communities as a teacher or served as an imam performing religious rites. Eventually he attained
the status of a pir with thousands of disciples spread throughout north Bengal and Assam.
Bhashani was no ordinary pir, argues Peter Custers, but one of the last in the long tradition of
Bengal “frontier pirs,” who had for centuries provided spiritual, social, and political leadership in
remote agricultural communities and protected them from dangers both earthly and magical.20
Initially Bhashani’s social-political activities were limited to providing relief to victims
of floods and river erosion that were all too common and regular in the region. He also organized
resistance against Christian missionaries, whom he viewed to be preying upon the poor in their
quest for religious conversions.21 However, soon he became embroiled in the more contentious
struggles of the local peasants against the excessive tax/rent burden imposed by the zamindars
and against the exploitative and predatory practices of the mohajons, or moneylenders. By the
1920s Bhashani began to organize the peasantry more systematically beyond episodes of

terrorist campaigns and left the group in search of alternative political engagements. See Kabir,
The Red Maulana (2012), p. 30.
20
See Peter Custers, “Maulana Bhashani and the Transition to Secular Politics in East Bengal,”
The Indian Economic and Social History Review 47, no. 2 (2010): 231–59. Here Custers builds
upon a provocative thesis by Richard Eaton (The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 12041760, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) that argues that charismatic pirs,
encouraged and supported by Mughal rulers, provided the leadership – both moral and political –
for producing agricultural settlements by clearing out marshes and forested land. The practice
encouraged migration of large populations into Bengal from elsewhere in the Indian subcontinent
and beyond and led to both a significant increase in population and the rise of Islam in Bengal.
See also my discussions on the matter in chapter 2.
21
Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), p. 19.
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spontaneous resistance through a deliberate mix of politics and religion.22 His rise as a religious
and political leader depended in large part on his oratory, which was necessary to communicate
ideas to and inspire the illiterate masses. He honed his oratory skills in the waz-mahfil (religious
congregation/ concert) and would often mix political messages and calls for actions in ostensibly
religious sermons. He would also ask his murids [spiritual disciples] to take a vow as a part of
their boyat [formal oath of initiation] to join the Krishak Shomiti [farmers/peasant association]
that he had organized and to fight for social justice generally.23 Also, he began to organize
krishak shommelan [peasant conferences], which in spirit and form looked and felt like the
religious festivals [uros] and attracted hundreds of thousands of attendees. 24 The line between
spiritual disciple and political supporter was blurry within the large and dedicated following that
Bhashani had generated among Bengal’s rural masses, which by the 1930s made him a legendary
figure and force to contend with.
Beyond the peasant moments, Bhashani was involved in the nationalist and anti-colonial
movements of the 1920s. In 1919 he joined the Indian National Congress and became an active
member of the faction led by C.R. Das, whose sincerity, concern for the downtrodden, and
commitment to Hindu-Muslim unity greatly influenced and inspired young Bhashani.25 In the
1920s he actively participated in the Khilafot and the non-cooperation movements, which
brought him in contact with more radical Muslim leaders and intellectuals of the period and
22

Bahar, The Religious and Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s Political Leadership (2004), pp.
92-94.
23
Kabir The Red Maulana (2012), p. 32.
24
Maksud cites a moving firsthand description of one such gathering by Abul Kalam Samsuddin,
a prominent journalist and public intellectual, who was amazed not only by the sheer number of
attendees but also by the organization, efficiency, and spirit of the conference. Maolana
Bhashani (1994), pp. 49 – 50.
25
Throughout his political life Bhashani mentioned C.R. Das was one of his political idols. See
his 1971 essay “Amar Shomadhan (My Solutions)” reproduced in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani
(1994), pp. 694 -698.
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further solidified his anti-imperialist and revolutionary political outlook. Regarding his
involvement in these movements, he wrote:
At that time my political realization was not clear or deep. However, as a child from a
poor family I joined the independence [azadi] movement with the hope that if we can
become free by expelling the capitalist imperialist British, our agrarian community and
the working people generally will benefit.26
Such connection between struggles and conditions of local communities that grappled with
international structures of power would inform his politics throughout and would make him a
potent political force. In the 1930s, however, Bhashani became increasingly occupied with local
struggles and somewhat detached from the larger national movements. This was due in part to
the fact that in 1926 the Bengal government, facing intense pressures form local landlords,
declared Bhashani persona non grata and forced him to limit his activities in Assam. Between
the1920s and 1940s Bhashani became a pivotal figure in the Bengali-Muslim migrant settlers’
struggle against the infamous “line system” and the general discrimination and violence they
suffered in Assam.27 In the 1930s he joined the Muslim League and became active in the
constitutional party politics of Assam with the aim of pushing Assamese politicians and
government to adopt policies favorable to Bengali-Muslim migrant settlers. With the
26

Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 7-8.
In the 19th century the “frontier” – as conceptualized by Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the
Bengal Frontier (1996) – of agricultural, population, and Islamic expansion moved north
towards Assam after it was conquered by the British and integrated into the colonial
administration. After 1900, the influx of Bengali-Muslim peasants from densely populated
eastern Bengal grew dramatically causing a nativist reaction that would become more or less a
permanent feature of Assamese politics. In 1920 the Assamese provincial government introduced
the so-called “line system” to restrict and control the movements of Bengali migrants, which was
enforced through increasingly draconian means by both governmental and non-governmental
forces. See Myron Weiner, “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-Immigrant Movement,”
Population and Development Review 9, no. 2 (1983): 279–92 for historical background and
analysis of anti-immigrant violence of the 1980s. See Harsh Mander, “Bengali & Muslim: What
next for Assam’s Forever Foreigners in Modi’s India?” South China Morning Post, August 5,
2018, online edition, for a discussion of the most recent waves of violence and persecution
directed at Bengali-Muslims in Assam.
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introduction of electoral politics in the late 1930s, the more numerous Muslims in Assam were in
position to dominate the state government. However, there were several parties jockeying for
power, and it was Bhashani’s support for and leadership in the Muslim League that ensured its
eventual emergence as the ruling party.28 Through his participation in the Muslim League
Bhashani reconnected with nationalist politics and by the 1940s he, like most other Muslim
leaders of the period, began to hitch his political programs with the demand of Pakistan. He was
moved by the ideas of Islamic socialism espoused by some of the leaders of the Pakistan
movement and saw in Pakistan possibilities for the social and economic emancipation of the
peasants of Assam and Bengal.29 Though his efforts to include the whole of Assam in Pakistan
were unsuccessful, the Muslim majority district of Sylhet was partitioned from Assam and
included in Pakistan, which he viewed as a partial victory. After partition Bhashani chose to live
in the newly created Pakistan and relocated to the Tangail district in 1948, after more than two
decades of absence.
Bhashani had fought against British colonial rule for more than three decades and thus
was genuinely elated by its demise, and he was optimistic about realizing the promises of
Pakistan. He wanted to take part in building the new utopia or, as one scholar has recently
described, “the land of eternal Eid” and became a member of the newly constituted East Bengal
Provincial Legislative Assembly.30 However, Bhashani was soon to be disappointed and
discovered that the new state dominated by the upper classes had no interest or desire to deliver
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Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), p. 47.
See Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, Pakistan As a Peasant Utopia: The Communalization of Class
Politics in East Bengal, 1920-1947 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) and my discussions in
chapter 2.
30
See Layli Uddin, “In the Land of Eternal Eid: Maulana Bhashani and the Political Mobilization
of Peasants and Lower-Class Urban Workers in East Pakistan, c. 1930s-1971.” (Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of London, Royal Holloway, 2015).
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political freedom or economic justice to the peasants and destitute masses of Bengal. Most
concretely, it became apparent that the new regime would not carry out any substantial land
reform beyond abolishing the zamindari system in a manner that would only benefit a handful of
the rural middle class, or the jotedars.31 Bhashani also discovered the hard way, what Ranabir
Samaddar has described as the invariable truth of postcolonial nationalism: that the peasant is
mobilized for the nationalist cause only to be demobilized soon after independence.32 From the
perspective of the ruling elites there was no room for someone like Bhashani, a rabble-rouser and
a provincial peasant leader, in the affairs of postcolonial state building. Bhashani’s critique of the
regime and its policies not only failed to generate any positive response but instead incurred
political and legal harassment. Bhashani resigned from the Legislative Council within a few
months, but in a press release announcing and explaining his decision, he assured, “My
countrymen should not think that I will quit serving the people. On the contrary, I will choose the
right path for serving the country.”33 For the next three decades Bhashani would devote himself
to defining and elaborating the “right path” both in theory and practice and in the process he
would become the legend that he is.
II
In the press release announcing his resignation from the Legislative Council Bhashani
also announced the formation of an organization named “Islam Mission” because:
31

The excerpts from Bhashani’s speech during the Legislative Council’s budget session on 19
March, 1948 indicates both his expectations from and frustration at the government of the new
state. In the speech he railed against the exuberant amount allocated for salaries for government
officials, defense, police, et cetera, while allocating little for social services, agricultural
development, or relief for the poor. He also was highly critical of the large compensations
provided for in the scheme to abolish the zamindari system. Quoted in Maksud, Maolana
Bhashani (1994), pp. 64-65.
32
Samaddar, Paradoxes of the Nationalist Time (2002), p. 97.
33
Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, “Press Release,” Weekly Sainik, Sylhet, December 10, 1948.
Quoted in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 66-67.
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After much reflection I have come to understand that not communism or any other ism
but only Islam can save the helpless and oppressed peasants, workers, and other destitute
of the world… Islamic ideals of equality, fraternity, and peace that had been announced
fourteen hundred years ago should serve humanity better than communism, not only
today but until the end of days. Thus, I have come to take up promotion [prochar] of
Islam as my only life-goal.34
How are we to make sense of his intention here to serve Islam? We may see it, as many of his
secular followers did, as an occasional lapse into pious sentimentality that did not reflect the
fundamental character of his thoughts or politics. We can point out that Bhashani abandoned the
“Islam Mission” project within a year and worked tirelessly for the next quarter century building
up secular, non-communal and inclusive, working-class organizations, political parties, and
political movements that provided the political foundation for the emergence of a secular Bengali
nationalism.35 For example, he was the strongest voice for reconstituting the Awami Muslim
League as the secular Awami League between 1953 and 1955. He was a leading voice in the
state language movement of the 1940s and 1950s and even suffered imprisonment for his role,
which in turn endeared him to the Bengali middle class and catapulted him onto the national
stage.36 He also strongly protested the proposal to ban Rabindranath Tagore from Pakistani
media. Furthermore, throughout the 1960s Bhashani expressed great admiration for the
Communist and godless regimes of China and Cuba. He called for the establishment of socialism
and accommodated many Communists within the ranks and leadership of his political parties and
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Ibid.
See for example Custers, “Maulana Bhashani and the Transition to Secular Politics in East
Bengal,” (2010). See also Kabir, The Red Maulana (2012) for supporting arguments.
36
The state language movement started soon after Pakistan’s independence as a reaction to the
government’s intention to make Urdu the only state language of Pakistan, snubbing Bangla and
other regional languages. The movement, initiated by university students, was an expression of
Bengali middle-class anxiety that not having Bangla as a state or official language would limit
their economic and political opportunity. Bhashani was one of the first politicians to join the
movement. Kabir The Red Maulana (2012), pp. 40 – 45.
35
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advocated for a revolutionary social change.37 Thus, when Bhashani began to voice increasingly
Islamic ideas in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many of his erstwhile followers were extremely
surprised and could only make sense of it as an old man’s lapse into religiosity.38
Bhashani himself provided an alternative reading of his political career, claiming that his
politics had always been shaped by his religious ideas and since at least the mid-1940s they were
determined by his formal commitment to a particular Islamic political philosophy. In a booklet
published in 1974 Bhashani recounted how in 1946 he had been formally initiated into the
philosophy of Rububiyah by Maolana Azad Subhani and took the oath to “never stray in politics
from the goal of hukumate Rabbania [God’s rule].”39 Bhashani argued that he adopted
Rububiyah as his formal political philosophy because he found it to be consistent with the
teachings of his earlier political and theological mentors and expressive of the politics that he
had been already practicing since at least the 1920s. He further argued that though he had to
adopt different tactics and strategies and participate in diverse movements and organizations in
response to the demands of the time, his politics was always oriented towards the establishment
37

The Communist Party was banned throughout the Pakistan period, as it had been during British
colonial rule. Communists thus had to work through various front organizations like the Student
Union and mainstream political parties like the AL. When Bhashani formed the National Awami
Party (NAP) in July of 1957, many Communists joined the party. One of them was Haji
Mohammad Daneesh, a member of the covert CPI since the 1930s and a leader of the historic
Tevaga peasant movement of the late 1940s and early 1950s, became the vice-president and later
general secretary of the Party. See Lawrence Lifschultz and Kai Bird, Bangladesh: The
Unfinished Revolution (London: Zed Press, 1979).
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For example, see the criticisms advanced by Mohammad Toha and Haji Daneesh, who broke
with NAP and Bhashani in 1970, accusing him of betraying class politics for religious
sentimentality. In Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 341 – 343 and 364 – 367.
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Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, Rububiyater Bhumika (The Role of Rububiyah), (Santosh:
Hukumate Rabbani Samiti Publications, 1974). Reprinted in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994),
pp. 698 - 702. As I discussed in chapter 3, Shubhani was also a foundational influence on Abul
Hashim’s political philosophy, which he began to construct formally from the late 1940s under a
slightly different moniker, Rubbaniyat. It is striking that Hashim and Bhashani, despite their
philosophical affinity, never worked together nor shared the same political platform to any
significant extent.
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of hukumate Rabbania or a political order based on God’s commands. Without questioning
Bhashani’s sincerity or commitment to Rububiyah, which has been meticulously documented in
Abid Bahar’s dissertation,40 I suggest an alternative reading.
Bhashani’s 1948 announcement to serve Islam was also a way to appropriate the
ideological edifice of Pakistan for the purpose of holding the new ruling elites accountable to the
interest of the destitute. Secular leaders like Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan espoused the idea of
“Islamic socialism” and sought to make Pakistan a secular and democratic state based on the
principles of Islam.41 Similarly, Bhashani defined Islam in terms of broad principles and not in
terms of narrow interpretation of sharia. His construction of shammo, moitri, o shanti – or
equality, fraternity, and peace – as the basic principles of Islam allowed him to appeal to Islam in
his concrete critiques of government policies and decisions.42 While he promised to support and
help the “government of Pakistan wherever it worked sincerely for advancement of Islam and for
the good of the people,” he also vowed to mount “forceful agitation [probol andolon]” if it acted
against the interests of the people.43 Here, Islam and the good of the people became synonymous
and the source of political legitimacy.
Though Bhashani believed that government should be an agent for establishing and
carrying out God’s commands, he was decidedly against a theocratic government or the “rule by
mullahs,” which substantially differentiated him from his contemporaneous religious political
40

The primary thesis of Bahars’s dissertation, The Religious and Philosophical Basis of
Bhashani’s Political Leadership (2004), is that Bhashani’s political action and leadership were
structured by the philosophy of Rububiyah.
41
See Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1963), pp.142-143.
42
For example, during his brief tenure in the East Bengal Legislative Council he often invoked
the Islamic principle of equity to not only advocate for land reform and pro-people budget but
also to resist centralization of government power and imposition of Urdu as the sole state
language. Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 63-67.
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Bhashani, “Press Release,” Quoted in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 66-67.
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leaders like Abul A’la Mawdudi.44 He rejected the idea that Godly government can be
established by mere implementation of sharia because, as the diversity within Islam
demonstrates, no particular iteration of Islamic law can claim to be the true interpretation of
God’s command.45 He was particularly suspicious of the sincerity of the traditional ulema and
the rightwing religious parties’ claim to represent God’s will because they never renounced
private property despite professing to acknowledge Allah as the malik or the owner of the
universe.46 On the other hand, unlike the secular leaders of Pakistan, Bhashani did not see Islam
merely as a source of ethical principles for guiding politics. Rather, his understanding of Islam
through the lens of Rububiyah led him to formulate a political philosophy that challenged the
foundational principles of the modern state and modern politics. Like other proponents of
Rububiyah, he understood its foundational principle to be the acceptance of God’s sovereignty
over and ownership of everything.47 He did not spend much time or energy on philosophical
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See Bahar, The Religious and Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s Political Leadership (2004),
particularly pp. 85- 88, regarding the differences in interpretation of Islam by Bhashani as
compared to Mawdudi and Maolana Muhammad Illiyas, the founder of Tabligh- a Jaamat. While
Illiyas sought to produce pious Muslims and Mawdudi sought to establish sharia law, Bhashani
saw his jihad or struggle as the establishment of a just society. See also Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr,
Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford University Press, 1996) for further
analysis of Mawdudi’s thoughts about political Islam.
45
Despite adhering to somewhat orthodox religious rituals in private life, Bhashani as a Sufi pir
was not a religious fundamentalist and was sensitive to and tolerant of the diverse ways people
interpreted and practiced Islam, not only in terms of the sectarian differences between Shia,
Sunni, and the innumerable Majhabs (ideological schools) but also regarding the methodological
difference between shariat and marefat. While shariat understood piety as adherence to the
juridical interpretations of God’s command, marefat disregarded Islamic law and orthodox
rituals in favor of much more individualistic and esoteric connection with God. See Metcalf,
Islam in South Asia in Practice (2009) regarding diversities within Islam and Bahar, The
Religious and Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s Political Leadership (2004), for Bhashani’s
location in these theological debates.
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Bhashani, “Rububiyater Bhumika”. Reprinted in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), p. 701.
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Bhashani’s understanding of Rububiyah very much echoes Abul Hashim’s formulations in The
Creed of Islam: Or the Revolutionary Character of Kalima. (Dhaka: Umar Brothers, 1950). See
my discussions in chapter 3. See Bahar, The Religious and Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s
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arguments about God’s sovereignty but simply took it as the starting point for understanding
society and for elaborating concrete political programs. The argument of God’s sovereignty
enabled Bhashani to advance both a critique of private property and a critique of the sovereignty
of the state. In an essay written in 1973, Bhashani outlined his critique of the sovereignty of the
state, which he claimed had informed his politics throughout his career.48 In the essay, he argued
that the sovereignty of the state or politics based on human sovereignty could only produce
shasonbad or a system of rule based on coercion and repression, a system based ultimately on
the power of the sword and the ability to produce death. Instead, he argued, since God is the Rab
or the nurturer of the universe, acceptance of God’s sovereignty would oblige the state,
conceived as an agent of God, to establish palonbad, a system of pastoral government oriented
towards the life and wellbeing of its subjects. By advancing this neologism palonbad, which can
be literally translated as a system or ideology of rearing or tending, Bhashani sought to produce a
Bengali conception of the Islamic political philosophy. By arguing that palonbad should be the
obligation and source of legitimacy of the states, Bhashani produced an argument that is
remarkably similar to Foucault’s idea of governmentality and his critique of Hobbesian
sovereignty, though there is no indication that Bhashani had ever read Foucault.
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remarkable that a peasant leader with little formal education was able to produce a critique of the
Hobbesian idea of sovereignty that was foundational to the modern state, an idea that secular

Political Leadership (2004), for a history of Rububiyah as a Sufi concept and for various
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argues that Rububiyah remained a highly philosophical, somewhat esoteric, and mostly nonpolitical concept for most thinkers other than Bhashani.
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Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, “Palonbad Ki ebong Keno [What is and Why Palonbad]?” 1973.
Reproduced in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 687-891.
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leaders of Pakistan were unwilling to abandon despite their professed commitment to establish
an Islamic Republic.50 Perhaps, more remarkable is that Bhashani’s critique of state sovereignty
did not lead him to support a theocratic government, as Mawdudi and his party Jamaat-e-Islami
did. Instead, Bhashani’s critique of sovereignty served as the foundation for envisioning a
politics that was democratic, egalitarian and transformative.
What kind of government did Bhashani prescribe for realizing the principles of
palonbad? The answer that Bhashani provided to this question may be his most significant
contribution to Bangladeshi political thought. Bhashani reasoned that though there had been
many experiments in setting up governments based on Islamic principles that the Prophet
announced some 1,400 years ago none succeeded fully.51 Thus, the question of what kind of
government can realize the principles of palonbad cannot be answered by simply pointing to a
pre-existing model but has to be produced through new analysis and practice. Instead of
prescribing institutional designs for a utopian government, Bhashani focused on the question of
the kinds of political action that would bring about the best government. At some level, the form
of government did not matter much to Bhashani because he understood politics to be
fundamentally premised upon a division between the ruler and the ruled, which perhaps could
not be overcome. And he also understood that rulers could not be relied upon to do the right
thing on their own but had to be educated, persuaded, and compelled to do what is good. Thus,
50

See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2001) on the inherent contradiction facing Pakistani politicians,
from Jinnah to Zia, in their effort to construct a secular Islamic state. Despite using Muslim
identity as a mobilizing factor and despite professing adherence to Islamic principles of social
justice tolerance, et cetera, Pakistani leaders were unwilling and unable to give up the
fundamentally secular claim regarding the sovereignty of the state, fearing that it would lead to a
theocratic state.
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One of the many occasions in which he expressed this view was in his essay, “Amar
Porikolponai Islami Bishsho-biddyaloy (My Visions of The Islamic University).” Reproduced in
Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), p. 669.
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Bhashani saw it as his “calling” or a part of his moral religious obligation towards his fellow
men, particularly those who are destitute, to stand up against injustice and oppression and to
guide and force the rulers to the path of good. In his politics of “pious opposition,” as one
commentator has dubbed it, Bhashani invoked on the one hand the traditional authority of the
religious leaders to hold political power morally accountable and on the other hand the authority
and obligation of the “frontier pir” to watch over and protect his flock.52 Bhashani claimed,
however, that the modern period was “the era of the multitude [jonogon],” in which, unlike in
previous epochs, no single advocate or righteous individual would be sufficient to hold political
power accountable or advance the interest of the poor. Nor would the power and intention of a
righteous and just monarch like Asoka or Akbar be enough to produce good government. In the
modern era meaningful historical social change cannot be achieved without people’s awakening
[gonojagoron].53 These arguments and his life-long record of fighting against authoritarian
regimes suggest that Bhashani viewed democratic politics to be an indispensable means for
establishing and maintaining the ideals of palonbad.
Though Bhashani saw democracy as essential for ending the poverty and misery of the
destitute masses and for producing good government, he did not share much enthusiasm for
liberal or electoral democracy. Up until 1948 he harbored some hope of affecting change through
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Ranabir Samaddar argues in Paradoxes of the Nationalist Time (2002), p. 62 that Bhashani’s
politics, at least partially, was a form of “pious opposition” that protested against the impiety of
the rulers. Impiety, as Bahar makes clear in The Religious and Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s
Political Leadership (2004), meant a failure to observe duties towards God and a failure to
observe duties towards fellow humans. Thus, injustice was also a form of impiety. Custers,
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Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, “Amar Shomadhan (My Solutions),” Dainik Pakistan, January
5, 1971. Reprinted in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 694 – 698. He had advanced a
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parliamentary politics, particularly if controlled by politicians of a free country and not by the
colonial masters. He resigned, however, from the Legislative Council after 10 years of a
parliamentary career, expressing his dismay at the betrayal of the interest of the destitute masses
by the self-interested political leaders of independent Pakistan. By end of the Pakistan period his
negative assessment of electoral democracy hardened, which he expressed in a highly critical and
controversial pamphlet “Voter Age Bhat Chai [We Need Food Before the Ballot].” After
presenting a sophisticated analysis of the causes and effects of the expansion of electoral
democracy Bhashani argued:
I declare unequivocally, no matter how well anyone does in the elections and no matter
how grand their victories are, they will not be able to do any good for the multitude
[jonogon], the working people, the farmers and the laborers…. All they will succeed in
doing would be to push the people into the black hole of electioneering in the name of
democracy… The general truth of the history of electioneering is that elections and
ballots have never solved the problems and concerns of the working people – the farmer,
the laborer – of any country; nor have ordinary people been allowed to occupy the seat of
power.54
If not electoral democracy, what then should politics be?
There is no example in the history of the earth that a demand has been realized or a law
has been enacted that supports the interest of the multitude [jonogon] without mass
movement, without strong petitioning, and without dauntless and overwhelming struggle
by the people… For the multitude the only path for securing its demands is the path of
struggle, that path of ‘the street [agitation].55
This, of course, was not new for Bhashani. He had argued something similar in the historic 1957
Kagmari Council Session of the Awami League where he declared:
Talks between the oppressor and the oppressed never benefit the latter; it is always the
oppressor who wins at the negotiating table… there should, therefore, be no discussion
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Sultan, Gonotantrik Kormi Shibir, 1970). Reprinted in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994),
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with a tyrant; the people are to realize their legitimate demands through mas
movements.56
Thus, while criticizing electoral democracy, he advanced a much more expansive vision of
democracy, one marked by active and vigilant presence of the people, of the ordinary masses in
the political arena. In this regard Bhashani’s views were probably closer to Rousseau’s view of
democracy. Bhashani, like Rousseau, did not propose any sort of direct democracy where
ordinary masses occupy the seats of government. Rather, he envisioned the people, when awake
and active, to be the force that keeps the government accountable and aligned with the interest of
the masses.57
Visions of democracy as the political empowerment of the destitute or the subaltern may
be impossible to institutionalize, and institutionalization may be the death of such a democracy.
Since the people cannot constantly remain assembled the best one may hope for is what Sheldon
Wolin has described as “democratic moments.” And these democratic moments, when the people
wake up, come together, and assert their collective will are “fugitive” and uncertain.58 Bhashani
certainly had not read Wolin and there is no indication that he had read Rousseau, either. Yet,
one can detect echoes of Rousseau and Wolin in his argument that the biggest challenge in
modern politics is to produce and sustain gonojagoron [people’s awakening] and to channel that
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From a speech given by Bhashani at the historic Kagmari Conference. Quoted by Kabir The
Red Maulana (2012), p. 25.
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Rousseau’s views on democracy of course have been debated endlessly, which we cannot
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Contract, particularly the first chapters of Book III. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Basic Political
Writings, trans. Donald A Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). See Majid Behrouzi, Democracy
as the Political Empowerment of the People: The Betrayal of an Ideal, (Lanham: Lexington
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people’s power for social change.59 The people do not always rise up automatically to take up
their historic responsibility. They have to be, as both Rousseau and Bhashani claimed, prodded
and poked to do so. Thus, it was not enough for Bhashani to remain a moral critic of political
power or an advocate for the poor. He had to also become an active agent for rousing the masses.
Bhashani did not see himself as a mere political agitator and nor did he see politics
simply as struggles for advancing earthly interests. Because politics was about producing a
society based on Islamic ideas of justice, brotherhood, and peace, political action was a service to
God, a form of worship. In his essay “Rububiyahr Bhumika” he compares his role in politics to
that of a muazzin, one who calls Muslims to prayer by reciting the adzan or ritual call. In the
essay Bhashani quotes the morning adzan, “Assalatu Khayrum Minan-Naum (prayer/worship is
better than sleep),” to call on people to wake up and fight against injustice and corruption. In the
context of the essay ritual worship becomes synonymous with political action.60 In his efforts to
awaken the masses and advance their interests Bhashani adopted different means that can be
classified into three broad categories. He advocated for and facilitated direct action by the
masses, strategically used institutions of electoral democracy, and promoted a program of moral
education not only to rouse people but also to make them advocates for particular visions of
social justice rooted in Islamic values. In the next section we will analyze the modes that
Bhashani used to put his ideas into action.
III
Bhashani’s own political awakening, as I suggested earlier, was organic and spontaneous,
experienced as a member of the sharbahara against the exploitation and violence of the
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landlords and moneylenders. He would maintain his identification with the sharbahara
throughout his life no matter how high he climbed politically. He never acquired a taste or desire
for material wealth and remained content living in straw huts, sleeping on bamboo mats, and
wearing peasant garbs of lungi and panjabi till the end of his life.61 His commitment to simple
living was both ethical and political. He abhorred the idea of living in luxury, while millions
struggled daily against poverty and starvation. Moreover, as advised by his spiritual and political
mentor Azad Subhani, Bhashani made a lifelong commitment to respect and remain one of the
poor masses in all aspects of life to become an effective leader of and advocate for them.62 As a
champion of the sharbahara, he was concerned first and foremost with protecting and advancing
the political agency of the subaltern. There have been several studies that analyze Bhashani’s
role as a peasant leader, and Bhashani himself provides a short yet elegant analysis of peasant
movements and class struggles in Bangladesh and his role in them in a 1972 essay titled
“Bangladeshe Sreni Shongramer Itihash [A History of Class Struggle in Bangladesh].” 63 From
these analysis it becomes clear that he valued the direct and spontaneous action of the masses as
the most effective and potent form of political action and organized public meetings, rallies,
marches, and protest actions, including occupations and encirclement. Because of his exposure to
constitutional nationalist politics, however, Bhashani could see the limits of spontaneity (as
Fanon would) and sought to give organizational coherence and continuity to peasant actions.
Bhashani sought to promote self-organization and political actions of the destitute masses by
founding and leading various associations [shomiti] and by organizing conferences [shommelon].
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The numerous conferences Bhashani organized in his long political career deserve special
analysis as a notable part of his “repertoire of contention” and mobilization, which served to
teach political lessons to both the subaltern and the elite.

64

Held in remote rural areas, these

conferences reversed the geography of power by requiring urban intellectuals and politicians
wishing to attend to travel instead of making the peasant travel to the capital, the supposed center
of power. Organized through voluntary labor and donations from ordinary rural folks and
attended by hundreds of thousands of people, these conferences served to demonstrate the selforganizing capacity and power of the people. The speeches, cultural performances, and the
decorative artifacts such as banners and gates used in these conferences were designed to convey
political messages that would educate the illiterate masses and subvert the hegemony of the
ruling classes and institutionalized politics.65
Though Bhashani was acutely aware that electoral politics had the potential to stifle the
political agency of the sharbahara by substituting electoral politics for subaltern direct action, he
countered that electoral democracy could produce political openings and opportunities for
participation that would encourage subaltern pressure on the political system.66 Thus, he fought
against colonial and post-colonial authoritarian regimes to establish electoral democracy.
Moreover, unlike many of his Communist colleagues, he did not see politics exclusively as class
64
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struggle. Rather, he recognized the necessity of multi-class political parties and united fronts in
the struggles against colonial rule and post-colonial authoritarianism. Bhashani founded the AL
and the NAP, both of which were multi-class political parties, and he was a strong proponent of
the 1954 United Front, a multi-party electoral coalition, and the National Democratic Front, a
multi-party platform pushing the Ayub regime for democratic reform. His willingness to work
with others across class and party lines often infuriated his deputies such as Mujib and Oli
Ahad.67 However, except for an eleven-year parliamentary career between 1937 and 1948 as a
member of provincial legislative councils, Bhashani did not seek public office. Rather, he
assumed the role of the proverbial gadfly with the goal of holding political power, elected or
otherwise, accountable through relentless critique and street agitation, all the while advocating
for the expansion of electoral democracy.
Thus, during the 1954 East Bengal legislative elections, the first to be held after
Pakistan’s independence, the septuagenarian Bhashani campaigned vigorously but neither
contested a seat in the elections nor sought a government post after the coalition led by his party
came to power.68 Rather, he continued his role as a critic of government, even when it was his
own party, which earned him the ire of many of his party colleagues and led to a division within
the party. Bhashani and his left-leaning followers sharply criticized the ruling faction led by H.S.
Suhrawardy and his trusted deputy Mujib for failing to deliver many of the election promises, for
stifling the question of full autonomy for East Pakistan, and for supporting a political-military
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alliance between Pakistan and the United States.69 Unable to alter the course of the government
or reconcile the growing divide between left and right factions of the AL, Bhashani broke with
the party and formed a new one under the name of National Awami Party (NAP) in July of 1957
with the promise of a new kind of politics geared towards “the emancipation of the oppressed
public” and “the realization of the ideals of independence and democracy.”70 He would not,
however, have the chance to pursue this new kind of politics for long or build up his party
because within a year Pakistan’s fragile democracy finally would break down, and Ayub Khan
would seize control of the government declaring martial law. NAP was banned and Bhashani,
like many other political leaders of the time, was arrested in 1958 and spent the next four years
in prison, ironically often sharing prison cells with his former colleagues from the AL, including
Mujib.
During the second half of the 1960s East Pakistan experienced increasing political unrest
and agitation against the authoritarian rule of Ayub Khan. The agitations were led by students
and middle-class politicians and demanded restoration of electoral democracy and political
freedom, provision of full federal autonomy to East Pakistan, and the end of prosecution of
political prisoners, particularly of Mujib who was on trial on charges of treason and was facing
the death penalty. There were also agitations by workers and peasants seeking relief from their
69
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dire economic conditions. By 1969 these agitations became more unified, at least partially,
because of Bhashani’s efforts and leadership and took on the form of a mass insurrection or
gono-obhyuthyan that often utilized tactics such as encirclement, barricades, arson, vandalism,
and pitched battles against the police.71 Instead of denouncing or distancing himself from the
violent elements of the uprising, Bhashani defended the violence as the legitimate right of the
sharbahara in their fight against oppression, earning Bhashani the designation, “the prophet of
violence.”72 In his refusal to renounce violence Bhashani embodied the political consciousness of
the rural masses, who as Fanon said, “have never ceased to pose the problem of their liberation
in terms of violence.”73 For the subaltern, lacking voice and access in the constitutional political
arena, “the strength of their muscles” and use of “brute force” remained indispensable tools of
their political action. In an essay written in 1972 and titled, “Ohimsha o Biplob [Non-violence
and Revolution],” Bhashani advanced an argument in favor of revolutionary violence that was
strikingly similar to Fanon’s famous tract:
Do not get carried away by the concept of ahimsa. If you do, you will lose the
revolutionary spirit. You can at best pretend to be an amateurish patriot, but cannot do
anything effective for the emancipation of the toiling masses… Ahimsa subdues the
people who, with the flag of revolution hoisted high, could defeat the exploiters, make
humble appeals to the palaces of those who would never free the people from
exploitation… Ahimsa, after all, is a great tactic of exploitation… a soft means of
controlling or destroying the people’s revolutionary spirit of taking bold steps towards
abolition of exploitative systems… That is why I have never tolerated the theory of
ahimsa – however sweet it may sound or however philosophical it may seem. The
welfare of ninety-five percent of the people lies, I believe, in rejecting with disgust the
principles of ahimsa and the retention of revolutionary programs… An interesting
seminar could be held among educated circles on Gandhian and Tolstoy’s philosophy of
71
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ahimsa, but no effective program could be adopted on the basis of ahimsa that would put
an end to imperialist, colonialist and capitalist exploitations, and would ensure the
democratic emancipation of the destitute masses.``74
Bhashani was often challenged to answer how his endorsement of violence can be compatible
with his conception of Islam as a religion of peace and Rububiyah as a philosophy of love and an
obligation to care for others. He replied that violence could at times be a higher form of love and
peace than non-violence. Violence may be necessary to protect the oppressed from the oppressor
and to save the oppressor from his own wrongs and misdeeds.75 One who does not see the good
must be compelled to see it by force, if necessary, declared Bhashani, echoing Rousseau’s
famous claim that people must at times be “forced to be free.”76 From his confrontations with
zamindars to his youthful adventures with the revolutionary terrorist group Anushilan, Bhashani
had exhibited his willingness to resort to violence. However, Bhashani’s openness to violence
had its most significant impact in the late 1960s and early 1970s in pushing political discontents
against authoritarianism and West Pakistani domination towards an armed nationalist struggle.77
Bhashani provided crucial leadership in the uprising of 1969 that freed Mujib from prison
and toppled the Ayub regime a month late. However, after his release from prison, Mujib quickly
pushed all the other elements of opposition politics, including Bhashani to become the “supreme
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leader of the nationalist Public” and “the chief tribune of Muslim Bengal,” argues Ranabir
Samaddar. In Samaddar’s recounting of the nationalist narratives of Bangladesh, there is a sense
of historical inevitability about the rise of Mujib, representing the urban middle class, and demise
of Bhashani, representing not only the subaltern but also a mode of politics that was out of sync
with sanitized processes of negotiations, meetings, and roundtable conferences.78 Bhashani, the
relentless fighter, saw no inevitability about the end of his political career and was not ready to
give up in his fight for a social revolution. In 1970, when the middle class was celebrating the
upcoming general election, the first one to be held in Pakistan, as the crowning achievement of
their decades-long struggle for democracy, Bhashani wrote “Voter Age Bhat Chai (We Demand
Food Before the Ballot),” sharply criticizing electoral politics. He was apprehensive that the
revolutionary possibilities produced by the mass awakening and uprisings of the previous years
would be extinguished if electoral victory were to be viewed as the goal. Bhashani himself was
not interested in running for office and was more comfortable in the gadfly role. Moreover, he
possessed the political acumen to realize that the Awami League, representing the urban middle
class, had a better chance in electoral politics than his own party. Thus, he made a calculated
decision to cede the field of electoral politics to Mujib and the Awami League, while exerting
pressure through street agitation and mass mobilization to adopt more progressive and radical
positions.79 In a 1971 interview Bhashani explained his logic:
I myself thought that revolution or no revolution, the timing was perfect for earning
[national] independence. If I had participated in the elections, the voters would have been
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divided into two camps. Differences of opinion would have reached an extreme point.
Subsequently, there would not have been a War of [National] Independence. Hence, I
[thought] let Mujibur win. Let territorial independence come, although that would not
ensure [the people’s] emancipation. We will do the rest.80
Though the time for independence might have been ripe, arguably it was not on the
agenda of the Awami League until Bhashani pushed them to it. He had raised the slogan
“Shadhin Purba Pakistan [Independent East Pakistan]” as early as 23 November, 1970 in
response to the Pakistani government’s utter failure to deal with the Bhola Cyclone, one of the
deadliest natural disasters of the 20th century.81 Over the next few months Bhashani intensified
the call for independence in meetings, rallies, and newspaper articles, making clear that this was
no sentimental outburst of an old man but a well-reasoned and indomitable political demand.82
His rhetoric and incessant agitation greatly inspired many Bangladeshi nationalists, particularly
the radical student factions, and pushed Mujib and the Awami League to adopt an openly
nationalist and pro-independence position in place of the moderate demand of provincial
autonomy that they had hitherto advocated. Mujib and the AL would eventually adopt the
demand for independence by March of 1971, which would lead to the emergence of Bangladesh
by the end of the year, after a bloody nine-month war of liberation.
IV
Though Bhashani formed a strategic alliance with the Awami League during the war to
bring about national independence, after the war he continued to push for radical social
transformation by pressuring Mujib and the Awami League. To many nationalist commentators
and to Mujib himself, Bhashani’s oppositional and critical stance appeared counterproductive
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and anti-nationalist. But to Bhashani such oppositional politics was only logical because he was
never really a nationalist politician. It is true that his political philosophy was informed by antiimperialist and anti-colonial ideologies advanced by the likes of Jamaluddin Afghani and Syed
Hussain Ahmad Madani, the latter being his direct teacher and political mentor. Yet he sought
national independence not as the ultimate political end but only as a necessary step in
dismantling the existing structures of oppression and exploitation. Moreover, his understanding
of Islam as an ideology of universal brotherhood that transcended national, racial and other
parochial differences made nationalist politics ultimately untenable. In the early days of his
political career his nationalism had been tempered by the idea of trans-national Muslim ummah.
Towards the end of his political career Bhashani began to embrace a more universal humanist
position, declaring that “every human being on Earth is part of the same universal history” and
Islamic conceptions of social justice and brotherhood recognize and promote that unity of
humanity.83 Despite actively participating in the nationalist struggles for Pakistan and
Bangladesh, Bhashani was never committed to nationalism as a political end. And he felt not
only justified but also obliged to adopt a critical stance towards the government of the newly
established Bangladesh, just as he had done in the case of Pakistan, despite his great personal
affection towards Mujib.
Although ambivalent about nationalism, he was a proud Bengali and expressed his
Bengali identity, sometimes quite deliberately, through his language, clothing, food, and
etiquette. It was an organic identity that emerged from the lived experiences of the peasants of
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Bengal and not the refined urban cultural identity that was constructed through literature and
other high arts. Because Bhashani was from the village and he embodied the folk, he need not
return to the village or rediscover the folk, as Bengali nationalists since the beginning of the 20th
century sought to do. He was the “real Bengali” that writers like Abdul Hye celebrated.84 Yet this
Bengali identity was not politically relevant for Bhashani except to the extent that identity
coincided with a marginalized and oppressed group. As discussed above, he rose to political
prominence in the 1920s and 1930s as an advocate for Bengali-Muslim migrant farmers in
Assam. However, his political stance was motivated not by Bengali-Muslim identity but by his
outrage against the violence and discrimination that poor farmers suffered. That during this
period he also fought alongside the indigenous Assesse population against the corrupt and
exploitative practices of Bengali-Muslim traders points towards his capacity to move past
identity politics.85 His activism in Assam, and later in Pakistan, to make Bengali an official
language is thought to be an indicator of his Bengali nationalism. His language activism,
however, had less to do with nationalism and more with overcoming the denial of subaltern
political agency produced by using English or Urdu as the language of governmental affairs.
Bhashani insisted on delivering his speeches in Bengali in the East Bengal Legislative Council,
just as he had done so in the Assam Provincial Legislative Council, declaring that conducting
government business in the language of the masses is a minimal prerequisite for making the
political process accessible to the masses.86 Lastly, when Bhashani spoke of a cultural revolution,
he did not have in mind a literary movement like Abul Mansur Ahmad had advocated or a
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national culture that an organization like Tamuddin Majlish had sought to construct.87 Rather,
Bhashani’s cultural revolution, like the Chinese one that he admired, sought to revitalize,
educate, and modernize the destitute and oppressed masses. “The goal of cultural revolution is to
construct a social system that is happy, prosperous, and free of exploitation.”88
Despite his antipathy towards nationalism, national liberation had been an overriding
concern for him throughout his political career because the question of social transformation had
always run up against the reality of colonial rule. Independence for Bangladesh had settled for
him the question of national liberation much more conclusively than the independence of
Pakistan, allowing him to focus on establishing a just society rather than being preoccupied with
ending colonial domination. Consequently, one can trace a significant shift in Bhashani’s
political thinking after Bangladesh’s independence.
The project of social transformation had always been a two-pronged struggle – one of
rebellion and the other of moral purification. If the realities of colonial rule had forced him to
emphasize rebellion, national independence allowed him to focus more on moral purification.
Thus, towards the end of his political career, Bhashani placed greater importance on the moral
education of rulers than on mass movements and acts of resistance, without completely foregoing
the latter. This shift, however, was not entirely new or inconsistent with his previous thinking.
As a pir or spiritual teacher Bhashani had always been concerned with reforming moral
characters and his political activism had always contained a pedagogical element. As I have
discussed above, he used his speeches, sermons, and the conferences [shommelon] as tools for
political mobilization and means to educate and enlighten the masses. By the 1960s, he began
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thinking about a more formal pedagogic project in the form of an Islamic university that would
provide holistic, practical, political, and moral education based on Islamic principles of equality,
fraternity, and peace. In the 1970s Bhashani wrote several essays that criticized the failures of
the existing education system to be socially relevant and proposed curriculums and structures of
a university that would become the centerpiece of an alternative education system.89 These
proposals echo the perennial theme of education as a mechanism for training human beings to be
more just and good that is present in the political philosophy of diverse thinkers such as Plato
and Rousseau.90 Bhashani envisioned his university not as an institution of mass education but as
a mechanism for producing self-sacrificial men [tyagi-purush] who would be dedicated to and
practitioners of truth and good, or shadhok. These men would be the “thinkers, activists, and
leaders,” who would foster mass awakening and move society “to the future.”91
In laying out the visions for the university, Bhashani reasoned that education was a
powerful, if not the primary, mechanism for producing progressive social transformation, and he
emphasized the critical role played by a vanguard leadership in that process. After the
independence of Bangladesh, the concerns about moral character of and the roles played by
political leaders in social transformation became even more central to his thinking. By 1974 he
argued, “Changes in government or state will not be fruitful, if the ruling strata is not moral. If
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the rulers possess good moral character, the whole of society moves towards purity and
welfare.”92 This argument informed his decision to launch a new organization, Hukumate
Rabbania Shomiti [The Association for the Establishment of the Rule of Rab], with the goal of
reforming the moral character of the rulers. After all, the new rulers of the country were not
abstract foreign oppressors but individuals whom Bhashani knew intimately and shared a sense
of kinship with. Mujib, one of Bhashani’s erstwhile deputies, was like a son to him. He did not
see Mujib and the new rulers as enemies with whom negotiations were impossible. Rather he
saw them as legitimate rulers who needed moral and ethical guidance for avoiding corruption
and for staying on the path of justice.
The increasing concerns with character purification and the explicit embrace of an
Islamic ideology towards the end of Bhashani’s career prompted many of his erstwhile followers
to question his commitment to social revolution and progress. Bhashani addressed these concerns
directly in a 1972 essay: “I have never conducted my politics by considering what is
‘progressive’ or ‘revolutionary’… My fundamental concern is regarding what contains and
produces human welfare [manusher kolyan] and whether I am on the path of justice and truth.”
In that essay he added that though religion had been “exploited” throughout history to “deceive
people” and “strengthen instruments of oppression,” the essence of religions [dhormer
mormokotha] had been to “nourish the soul.” Moreover, true religions had played “undeniable
roles in establishing universal peace and welfare” by keeping men on “straight and honest” paths
and by advancing ideas of equality and brotherhood among men. Lastly, Bhashani argued,
politics and economics based only on “absolute materialism” cannot bring about “ultimate and
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permanent good for humanity.”93 Bhashani continued this theme in another essay written in the
last year of his life where he argued, citing Russian nuclear physicist and peace activists Andrei
Sakharov, who had just won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975, that the ideological and practical
differences between communism and capitalism were decreasing and that both had contributed
positively to improve the material conditions of humanity. He pointed out that even the
“proletarians” in capitalist societies are not quite literally “destitute” and that technological
achievements could make their conditions even better. Despite these achievements, Bhashani
argued, human beings remained not only unhappy but also in a state of absolute existential terror
because both capitalism and communism subscribed to nafsania, or materialist conceptions of
good based on bodily pleasures and self-interest, which ultimately failed to overcome the
artificial divisions among humans and thus to recognize dignity and equality of all humans.
Humanity’s continued unhappiness and insecurity can only be overcome by a reorientation of the
human psyche toward ruhunia, or concerns about the good of the soul, which is the essential
focus of Islam and all the other true religions. Bhashani had once stated that “I don’t understand
communism, Leninism or Maoism, I haven’t even read Marx’s Capital but what I understand
pretty well is that the majority of our people suffer from hunger.”94 Thus, ending material
destitution was fundamental to his politics. Yet, he also thought that improvements in material
conditions alone would be insufficient to produce individual emancipation or world peace. He
did not see any contradiction between religion and progress, but saw religion to be indispensable
for the true emancipation of the destitute.
V
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Bhashani lived in a time and a place where the boundaries between politics and religion
were not well demarcated. Like many contemporaries from the Indian subcontinent, Bhashani
was both a religious and political leader and relied on his status as a spiritual leader to generate
his political authority and mobilize his constituency. His political projects were shaped
fundamentally by religious sensibilities generally and Islamic ideas particularly. Ultimately his
goal was the establishment of a political order or a state based on the fundamental principles of
Islam. Unlike many other religio-political leaders, however, Bhashani’s politics were neither
motivated by religious chauvinism nor oriented towards theocracy. Instead, he practiced secular
and progressive democratic politics even when secular politicians themselves were lost in the
blind alleys of religious nationalism. His secularism emanated from his understanding of Islam
as an essentially tolerant religion and as one founded on the principles of fraternity,
egalitarianism and peace. Such interpretation of Islam combined with the poverty and
exploitation that he witnessed and experienced as a “son of a poor family” set him on a path of
political activism against local and global structures of oppression. He came to see the pursuit of
a political career dedicated towards the advancement of social justice and end of exploitation as
his calling and a part of his duty to men and God. Thus, in his long political career his calling
played a role that was a mix between the traditional religious authority serving as the moral
conscience of the political power and the modern public-advocate prodding the political leaders
to enact and implement policies for the social good and for the advancement of the interests of
the downtrodden.
However, Bhashani was more than an advocate because he understood that an advocate
or a leader alone couldn’t possibly hold political power accountable. He noted, like Rousseau,
that only the active and continuous participation of the people could compel rulers to submit to
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the popular will and serve the public interest. He took on a role that can more appropriately be
described as a Socratic gadfly or even a Rousseauian educator, who seeks to awaken and educate
“the people” to take up their responsibility for watching over and keeping political power
accountable. Some commentators have compared Bhashani to Gandhi based on their style of
politics and life, particularly in terms of their strict adherence to a minimalist dress-code and
frequent use of hunger-strikes as a mode of protest and persuasion. It may be more reasonable,
however, to compare him to the leaders of Latin American liberation theology movements or
even the North American civil rights movement. Though both movements were
contemporaneous, there is nothing to suggest that he had any direct connection with or influence
from any of these movements. Perhaps, the similarities of their politics and ideas are produced
by the zeitgeist that was expressing the un-suppressible yearnings of marginalized peoples
around the world to be free. Perhaps, Bhashani can be best understood as a voice of third world
peasants thrust willy-nilly into the modern world and the stages of modern politics. In the
political landscape of colonial and post-colonial Bangladesh dominated by nawabs, knights,
lawyers, generals, and university-educated intellectuals, Bhashani was a lonely “organic
intellectual” of the subaltern. If it were not for his presence, the subaltern voice would have been
even less audible in the political arena of Bengal and the Indian subcontinent generally.
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Between Liberal Democracy and Social Uplift: Sheikh Mujib’s Struggle to Found a New
Order
I
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was only fifty-five years old when, on August 15, 1975, he was
brutally murdered along with most of his family. A mere three and a half years earlier on January
10, 1972 he had returned from a Pakistani prison to the newly independent Bangladesh as a hero
and the country’s undisputed leader.95 He had been dubbed Bangabondhu [Friend of Bengal], in
February of 1969, by adoring students and masses for the great courage he had displayed and the
tremendous sacrifices he had endured as an advocate for the political and economic rights of the
people of East Bengal. After independence of Bangladesh he had been proclaimed as Jatir
Janak, or Father of the Nation, an honorific that Mujib not only accepted all too readily but also
allowed to become official.96 Yet, on the day of his assassination the streets of Dhaka were eerily
empty, devoid of any mourners or protesters. Whatever the grief people felt at the murder of the
once beloved leader and the Father of the Nation, it was stifled by the terror the brutal killings
had induced, and it was expressed most privately.97 After the coup, the junior military officer
assassins, some of whom had participated in the country’s liberation war, took to the airwaves
proclaiming that they had to kill the nation’s father to save it from corruption, violence, and a
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megalomaniac bent on replacing democracy with dynastic rule. Their claims were endorsed by
Khondokar Mustak, the commerce minister in Mujib’s cabinet who became the next president
and applauded the killers as surjo-shontan [children of the sun]. Successive heads of the state
also furthered the narrative and protected, rehabilitated, and even rewarded the killers for the
next 21 years. It was only after Sheikh Hasina, one of Mujib’s two children to survive the 1975
massacre – she was out of the country, became the prime minister of Bangladesh in 1996 that the
infamous Indemnity Act protecting the killers was scrapped and the prosecution of the killers
began.
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various political setbacks, five of the perpetrators were executed on January 28, 2010, during
Sheikh Hasina’s second term at the helm of Bangladesh.99
Tales of Mujib’s and the Awami League’s corruption, ineptitude, and authoritarianism
served to justify the assassination and subsequent military rule. They became staples of political
discourse in Bangladesh beginning in the mid 1970s. Such views were advanced by the
propaganda machines of the military rulers and by many left-leaning scholars and intellectuals
who derided the petty bourgeois character of the Awami League and Mujib and held them
responsible for stifling the possibilities for revolutionary social change in Bangladesh in the
wake of the Liberation War.100 Even the most sympathetic readers saw Mujib as a tragic failure,
who despite all of his great personal qualities and the crucial role he had played in inspiring and
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leading the movement of national liberation proved to be a failure as a governor and a statesman
during the critical moment of post-war reconstruction and state building.101 Critical and scholarly
accounts condemned Mujib’s murder and the military regimes that followed. They also argued
that Mujib himself must bear some responsibility for the way he squandered the tremendous
political capital he had as the undisputed leader of a newly independent country. Against these
critical accounts there have been numerous hagiographical accounts of Mujib, in which it was
claimed that he was not only the greatest Bengali personality of all time and but also worthy of
belonging alongside Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., all of
whom had sacrificed their lives as champions of the oppressed and the downtrodden.102 The
hagiographies treat Mujib not as a failed statesman or a failed revolutionary but as a visionary
leader who was brutally murdered and systematically defamed afterwards to stop the
revolutionary program of social transformation for which he had fought. His murder, declare
many of these accounts, was not a result of rash actions of some rogue military officers but the
outcome of a deep and vast conspiracy that involved not only local elements like pro-Pakistani
political forces, bureaucratic-military elites, and opportunistic and corrupt Awami leaders but
also international elements like the imperialist United States determined to prevent any third
world country from either going over to the Soviet camp or pursuing economic independence.
Abdul Guffar Chowdhury, a prominent political commentator and a long-time associate of
Mujib, has wondered whether Mujib’s assassination and the subsequent political turmoil could
have been averted if Mujib had been a little more careful, a little more ruthless, and a little more
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efficient in statecraft. Chowdhury answered his own question in a resigned tone, “How can I
make the impossible claim that Sheikh Mujib would have been able to do what Lumumba,
Nkrumah, Sukarno, or Allende could not do?”103 But Chowdhury ends on a hopeful note, stating
that the visions of democratic and egalitarian societies held by founders and leaders of third
world countries are making an inevitable comeback. Perhaps Chowdhury’s optimism was due to
the return to power of the Awami League, which he viewed as a democratic progressive party,
under the leadership of Mujib’s daughter Sheikh Hasina.
Since her first term in office as prime minister of Bangladesh, beginning in 1996, Sheikh
Hasina has sought to avenge her father’s murder and reinstate him as the Father of the Nation
with all the glory and honor that such a lofty designee deserved.104 Over the last decade, Sheikh
Hasina and the Awami League government have sought to construct a sanctified image of Mujib
not only as the leader of the nationalist movement but also as the harbinger and embodiment of
the “Spirit of Liberation.” And claiming inheritance – both biological and ideological – of the
“Spirit of Liberation” has allowed Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League to produce an
alternative political legitimacy and exercise hegemonic hold on the country’s political system,
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when their democratic legitimacy has been less than optimal.105 In this context, the adulation of
Sheikh Mujib has become a state policy and strategy for producing a personality cult. Criticisms
of Mujib have faced increasing legal restrictions.106 Of course, many factions on the right and
left in Bangladesh are politically and ideologically opposed to Awami League hegemony.
Moreover, many in Bangladesh have grown up with discourses critical of Mujib, some of them
deserved and others merely partisan hit jobs. Mujib’s sanctified image remains a fundamentally
contentious issue in Bangladeshi politics. Any discussion of the political thought of Mujib carries
a risk of getting caught up in these highly partisan and at times violently contentious debates.
The challenge in thinking about and discussing political ideas of a figure like Mujib is to
find a way to wade through all the legends, folklore, and propagandas – both positive and
negative – to discern the “real Mujib.” Particularly challenging is also the task of distinguishing
between Mujib’s own thought from the political ideology Mujib-bad or Mujibism. The ideology
can be traced back to Mujib’s first-ever public address as the leader of independent Bangladesh,
delivered in front of a jubilant crowd at the historic Race Course grounds on January 10, 1972.
He had been released from a Pakistani prison, where he came close to being executed on charges
of treason, just two days before and was still coming to terms with the reality that he was the
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president of an independent but war-ravaged country.
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In an emotional and moving speech

Mujib urged the assembled crowd that they would have to work hard to not only solve the
immediate crises facing his Shonar Bangla, Golden Bengal, but also to build up a new state
based on new sets of political ideas. Rejecting the ideas of a Muslim nation and Islamic state that
had defined Pakistani political ideology, Mujib stated:
I do not want to insult Islam. I want to, however, declare in clear and unambiguous
language that our country [desh] will be a democratic, secular, and socialist one. The
farmers and laborers, the Hindus and Muslims of this country will all live in happiness
and in peace.108
From the next day Mujib started to work with gusto to construct the institutional infrastructures
of the new country while tackling immediate and urgent problems such as the establishment of
law and order, disarmament of the Mukti-Bahini (the guerilla forces that fought for Bangladesh’s
independence), and resettlement of millions of refugees. Impressively and exceeding all
expectations, he set in motion processes for producing a constitution in less than three months
and declared that nationalism, along with democracy, secularism, and socialism would be the
foundational principles of the constitution.109 By May of 1972 factions of the Awami Leagueaffiliated Chatra (Student) League began to proclaim that these four principles amounted to
Mujibism, a unified political ideology that would be a more appropriate alternative in
Bangladesh than capitalism, communism, or “scientific socialism” that other factions of the
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Chhatra League and some left intellectuals were advocating. Soon the idea was picked up by the
Awami League hierarchy and ideologues, who sought to make Mujibbad the ideology of the
party and the official ideology of the state.110 Mujib himself, not impervious to hubris, condoned
the move and allowed the term to be incorporated in the constitution, which was adopted on
November 4th and came into effect on December 16, 1972.111 When Mujib launched his “Second
Revolution” in 1975 and moved the country’s politics towards a more authoritarian direction, he
did so in the name of Mujibism. The brutal coup that ended his rule in 1975 was at least partly a
reaction against Mujibism. After the coup, for more than two decades, subsequent governments
disparaged Mujibism and held it as an illustration of all that was wrong with Mujib’s rule. They
sought to negate the ideology of Mujibism and the foundational principles of the 1972
constitution through ordinances and constitutional amendments. However, with the return of the
Awami League to power, Mujibism has been rehabilitated to become once again the ideological
edifice of the regime and the country. The four principles of Mujibism – nationalism, democracy,
secularism, and socialism – have been restored as the foundational principles of the constitution
and been claimed to be the constitutive elements of the “Spirit of Liberation.”112
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Fierce debates over whether the ideology of Mujibism inspired the Liberation War or
whether the present Awami League government has a serious commitment to the four principles
of Mujibism have ensued. Those debates are beyond the scope of the present discussion, but the
question whether Mujib himself had been inspired by the principles of Mujibism remains
pertinent. How did Mujib understand these four broad principles? To what extent was he
committed to each of the principles, and when and how did he become committed to them? Did
he hold one of the principles to be more important than others? How did he reconcile, if at all,
the tensions between these principles? To answer these questions and produce an account of
Mujib’s political thought beyond the legends, propaganda, and ideological obfuscations one must
engage with his primary texts.
The difficulty in analyzing Mujib’s political thought through primary sources is that he
wrote little and by all accounts, including his own, he was more a man of action than abstract
philosophical thought. He knew his strength was his organizational abilities and gift for
producing rapport with people from all walks of life. He did not have a good estimation of
himself as a student and showed reluctance to get involved in theoretical discussion and
debates.113 In fact he showed disdain for philosophical reflections, noting that too much
contemplation can induce paralysis and inaction. Mujib wrote in in his memoir:
There are many men who waste their time and life contemplating and deciding without
accomplishing anything. Once I decide something after some thought, I act on it. If there
are any mistakes, I correct them. Only those who take action can make mistakes, those
who do not act do not make mistakes either.114

113

See Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Oshomapto Atmojiboni [Unfinished Memoirs] (Dhaka:
University Press Limited, 2012) pp. 41 and109 regarding his preference for concrete action over
abstract thought.
114
Rahman, Unfinished Memoirs, p. 80.
245

Such straightforward pragmatism and the manic urge to intervene, that at times approached
rashness, defined Mujib’s political career. Yet, it would be extremely imprudent to say that his
actions were devoid of thought or contemplation. In fact, he was forced to read and contemplate
for long periods of time by his numerous stints in Pakistani government prison cells. Altogether
Mujib had spent about one-third of his adult life as a political prisoner, much in solitary
confinement with only books and papers as companions.115 Though he was not a writer, he took
up the pen during his prison stints to combat boredom and maintain sanity and to give an account
of his life and politics, perhaps for posterity. His prison notebooks, written under the scrutiny and
surveillance of hostile governments, are his only writings besides personal letters. The notebooks
remain invaluable sources for accessing his thoughts.116
We may, however, better grasp Mujib’s political thinking from his speeches rather than
his written words. By all accounts, he was a spellbinding speaker, particularly when addressing
large crowds. Though he delivered numerous speeches in mass public meetings during his long
political career, only a few were recorded and have survived, but they are enough to give us a
sense of the man and his thoughts. His official speeches and particularly the speeches in the
parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh, which were often prepared with great care, are much
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better preserved and accessible.117 We may also get a sense of his political thinking from the
various manifestos and party programs that bear his signature. As a professional politician,
Mujib viewed manifestos and programs as important means for articulating and communicating
political ideas. In fact, he argued that easily understandable bullet point demands were far
superior in expressing political ideas than scholarly dissertations.118 Though these documents
were not perhaps authored solely by Mujib, they reflect his political ideas and aspirations. Thus,
despite Mujib’s few written texts, sufficient materials can be analyzed to construct an account of
his political thought.
II
Though an account of Mujib’s political thought must ultimately rely on the “texts”
produced by him, it must also analyze his biography because personal biography is important for
properly understanding any political thinker and for Mujib his politics and biography are
undistinguishable. Unlike many political personalities of Bangladesh and certainly unlike the
personalities discussed in this dissertation so far, politics for Mujib was a fulltime and only
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occupation. Whether Weber would find Mujib a man and leader worthy of the vocation of
politics is debatable, but unassailable is that Mujib took politics to be his vocation from the
beginning of his adult life and that he lived for politics.119 Mujib’s “political career” began at 18
when he was a 9th grade student. Because of a childhood illness he had to miss school for three
years and was thus considerably older than his cohort. He was also tall, handsome, athletic, and
from a prominent local family. All of these enabled him to become a “leader” of fellow students
and local youths. However, his leadership had not yet developed a political content, which was
supplied by a visit to his school in 1938 by then Premier of Bengal A. K. Fazlul Huq and his
Minister of Labor Relations, H. S. Suhrawardy. Mujib, on account of his leadership qualities,
was entrusted with coordinating a volunteer troupe for the welcoming ceremony and guard of
honor for the visiting dignitaries. While trying to carry out these duties Mujib first became
cognizant of deep communal division in Bengal politics as the Hindu students of the school and
local Hindu community in general exhibited reluctance to honor Muslim politicians, apparently
being instructed by the Congress party to do so. Mujib’s role in neutralizing the communal
hostility to ensure that the visiting dignitaries were given proper honor and welcome earned him
notice of the local leadership, and he was given a chance to mingle with the dignitaries. Though
both leaders were impressed by the courage, passion, and eloquence of teenage Mujib,
Suhrawardy took particular interest in him as a potential asset for the Muslim League and
cultivated a relationship with him via correspondence over the next few years.120 By the time he
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arrived in Calcutta in 1942 to attend the Islamia College, the 22 years old Mujib was already
fully committed to the Muslim League and to the demand for Pakistan that was sweeping
through Muslim India. Over the next five years Mujib worked tirelessly, often neglecting his
studies and familial obligations, as an organizer for the Muslim League, contributing
significantly towards the growth of the party and thus towards the success of the Pakistan
movement. Years later a friend from his student years asked him nostalgically what he
recollected from their years together in Calcutta. Mujib replied, “I don’t remember what I did
except politics.” As a young man Mujib might have gone to the movies or played sports, as his
friend attested that he did, but that he did not remember anything else signals that he lived for
politics and everything else was secondary.121
Having played a significant role in creating Pakistan, young Mujib returned to Pakistan
not with the unbridled joy and optimism that many others felt at that time but with a sense of
apprehension, disappointment, and responsibility. Though Mujib had fought hard for Pakistan,
he seemed taken aback by the reality of what independence entailed, i.e., the partition of Bengal.
On a personal level he was concerned about leaving Calcutta, his adopted home and workplace,
and leaving behind many of his Muslim League colleagues from West Bengal who faced the
difficult choice between their actual homes and the ideological/political homeland they had
fought for. As one of the core organizers of the Muslim League he was also coping with the
practical complexities and challenges associated with continuing the functions of the party across
the newly created international borders. On a larger political level, Mujib was deeply concerned
about the communal riots, the fate of Hindus and Muslims who would remain in Pakistan and
India, respectively, and the fair and balanced distribution of resources and assets of British India
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between the new states of India and Pakistan.122 To his dismay, Mujib found that the majority of
the Muslim League leaders were not concerned about tackling any of these momentous
challenges thrown up by the Partition. Rather, they saw in the creation of Pakistan the
opportunity for advancing their own material and political interests, and they engaged in “politics
of conspiracy” for doing so.123 The first victim of this politics of conspiracy was H.S.
Suhrawardy, Mujib’s “leader” and political mentor, who was removed from the leadership of
Bengal Muslim League and effectively barred from becoming a part of the government of the
new country. The sidelining of Suhrawardy, along with Hashim and Huq, and the assumption of
power by Khwaja Nazimuddin in the wake of Pakistan’s independence was not merely another
episode of party politics but a political victory of the Muslim aristocrats of Bengal, who, along
with their counterparts in West Pakistan, were determined to keep the upstart middle-class
politicians from coming to or sharing in the power of the new country.124
Mujib, like many Bengali-Muslim middle-class political actors at the time, felt betrayed.
And, he also felt a sense of responsibility to correct the betrayal and realize the promises of azadi
[independence]. Thus, though he had enrolled in the Dhaka University to pursue a law degree, he
once again took up political activism as his primary occupation, first in efforts to give shape to a
national student organization and then in the movement to have Bangla recognized as a state
language of Pakistan. This time his troubles got him both expelled from the university and
arrested by the government of the country that he had fought so hard to bring about.125 While
Mujib was in prison, disgruntled members of the Muslim League formed a breakaway party the
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Awami Muslim League on June 23, 1949 under the leadership of Maolana Bhashani. Mujib was
elected Joint Secretary of the new party in recognition of his contribution and leadership
qualities. He was released from prison within a week and threw himself wholeheartedly in the
organizational work of the new party.126 Thus, ended the student activism phase of Mujib’s life
and began in earnest his life as a professional politician.
Mujib would remain a professional politician, a party official, for the rest of his life. He
never held any other occupation except for between 1959 and 1963, when formal party politics
was banned in Pakistan by Ayub Khan’s martial law regime. During this period, he held an
executive post in an insurance company. It was, however, largely a ceremonial post, and he
continued to be active in whatever political opportunities existed under the martial law regime.127
In his career as a professional politician Mujib was mostly an opposition politician conducting
street agitation and popular mobilization against sitting governments, until he became the leader
of independent Bangladesh. In the Pakistan period he was a parliamentarian from 1955 to 1958
as a member of the Second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. During this period he had two
brief stints as a minister in provincial governments, first in 1954 at the age of 34 for 14 days in
Fazlul Huq’s cabinet and a second for about nine months from September 1956 to May 1957 as
the minister of Industries, Commerce, and Labor in Ataur Rahman’s cabinet.128 Mujib’s
promising career as a parliamentarian came to an end with the demise of constitutional politics in
Pakistan in 1958 as Ayub Khan rose to power through a military coup, abrogated the
constitution, and imposed martial law. Mujib was back to the streets, or more precisely to the
jails. In 24 years of the Pakistan period Mujib spent altogether about eleven years in prison,
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sometimes on various pretexts and trumped up charges, other times without any charge but
simply because he was deemed contrary to the interest of the ruling coterie of the country. Thus,
Mujib not only was unable to live off politics in economic terms but also was unable to pursue
any other career or economic activity.
Mujib’s political career and repeated imprisonment also meant that he was unable to
contribute or even be present much in daily family life.129 Mujib was unburdened from taking
care of familial obligations by two persons – his father and his wife, who both had great
confidence in him, believed that he was doing something worthwhile, and thus provided
unconditional moral support. Mujib wrote in his autobiography that during the student years of
his political career well-wishers had advised his father that he might need to control Mujib’s
political activities to ensure his economic and physical security. His father replied, “He is only
serving the country and not doing anything wrong. If that lands him in prison, so be it; that will
not pain me. His life may yet turn out in the end not to be a waste. I will not deter him.”130
Mujib’s father, Sheikh Lutfar Rahman, was a petty official in a civil court and owned a
significant amount of land through inheritance. Though neither extremely wealthy nor part of the
elite, Mujib’s father was prosperous enough to afford higher education for his children and
support Mujib financially throughout his life. Mujib was married to his second cousin
Fazilatunnesa in their childhood through family arrangement, a practice that was common even
in the mid-20th century. Fazilatunnesa was orphaned at a young age but inherited a considerable
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amount of land from her grandfather. By all accounts she was a courageous and prudent woman,
who looked after the family with great efficiency and the support of her father-in-law, leaving
Mujib to pursue politics unencumbered by the niceties of family life.131 Naturally, Mujib felt a
great deal of gratitude towards his family, particularly towards his wife, and perhaps even guilt
for being absent and causing them so much pain. His sense of gratitude and guilt perhaps
explains why he was so indulgent towards his family when he became the head of the country in
Bangladesh. Perhaps he wanted to reward his family for sticking with him despite all the years of
sufferings.132
If Mujib himself ever felt any doubt about his calling, it was during the early years of
Ayub Khan’s regime. Being imprisoned and fighting all the trumped-up charges that the Ayub
regime was charging him with caused him great distress. However, he was more disheartened by
apparent self-interested actions of the politicians and all the petty infighting and conflicts they
produced. A frustrated Mujib wrote to his father from prison:
I will not do politics any more because there is no politics left in the country… There is
no value of sacrifice and dedication in this country. If I ever manage to get out of prison,
I will make some sort of career and will live a proper family life with my children and
you all. I have suffered a lot and have made you all suffer as well.133
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Once freed from prison, Mujib tried to keep the promise and live the life of a householder, while
expressing pessimistic views about politics in Pakistan.134 However, his resolve did not last long,
and within three years Mujib again gave into the siren call of politics. This time not as a mere
party organizer but as the leader of the reconstituted Awami League, a leading voice in the
democratic struggle against the military regime, the fiercest champion of the East Bengal’s
autonomy movement, and ultimately as the Jatir Janak of Bangladesh.
Max Weber argued that within the structure of modern party organizations “Naturally
power actually rests in the hands of those who… handle the work continuously.”135 By all
accounts, even by those of his political adversaries, Mujib was a first rate party organizer and
worked tirelessly to take care of daily and mundane tasks associated with organizing a political
party.136 Naturally, to use Weber’s reasoning, Mujib became a powerful figure within the Awami
League, a party he had been involved in since its inception. What made Mujib a great leader was
that he had an impeccable work ethic, great organizational skills and that he lived for politics.
Politics, Weber noted, is essentially and necessarily striving for power, and “He who lives ‘for’
politics makes politics his life, in an internal sense. Either he enjoys the naked possession of the
power he exerts, or he nourishes his inner balance and self-feeling by the consciousness that his
life has meaning in the service of a ‘cause’.”137 Though some of the critical accounts of Mujib
have claimed that he was primarily motivated by possession of power for power’s sake, his
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biography makes such claims extremely untenable. Only politics motivated by a service to a
cause can inspire one to display the kind of courage and self-sacrifice that Mujib exhibited
throughout his life. And perhaps that is the only kind of politics that can inspire such personal
loyalty and devotion that his followers as well as his family members have shown towards him.
Mujib himself certainly viewed his life and politics to be of a service to a cause. He claimed in
his autobiography that throughout his life he had abided by advice that his father had given him
early in his political career, “If you have sincerity of purpose and honesty of purpose, you will
not be defeated in life.”138 Mujib remained sincere and true to his purpose, despite the blatantly
authoritarian measures he took during his so-called “second revolution” and the corruption he
apparently tolerated and even enabled.
III
If we grant the argument that for Mujib politics was a calling and that his politics were in
service of a cause rather than in service of mere quest for power, we must then identify what that
cause was. To what purpose did Mujib dedicate his life and politics? To what end did he endure
his sufferings? An answer to these questions can again be found in his first public speech in
independent Bangladesh, where he declared, “My Bangladesh is independent today. My life-long
dream is fulfilled today. My people in Bangladesh have been liberated.”139 Later in the speech he
revealed that when the ruling junta of Pakistan came close to executing him towards the end of
the liberation war he had told them, “even as I walk to the gallows I will declare that I am a
Bengali, Bangla is my country, Bangla is my language.” This speech has been cited as evidence
that the mainspring of Mujib’s politics has always been Bengali nationalism. However, I want to
argue that Mujib’s political career has been in service of a broader but also less easily definable
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concept of liberation than mere national independence. In the same speech Mujib warned the
people:
The freedom of ours will remain incomplete, if the people of Bangladesh do not get
sufficient food, our mothers and sisters do not get clothes to wear, and the young men
their work.
Towards the end of the speech Mujib urged his fellow countrymen that they would all have to
work harder to “build this Bengal anew,” where the people will “once again smile, live in a free
atmosphere, have their regular square meals.” Ushering in such a Bengal, a “Golden Bengal,”
had been and will always be “my life-long mission… my desire,” declared Mujib. The tension
between the declaration of mission accomplished and the admission that much remains still to be
achieved that characterizes Mujib’s first public speech as the leader of the newly independent
country is emblematic of the tension inherent in the moment of “independence”, which is as
much a moment of celebration as it is a call to actualize true freedom.
Twentieth century political actors and thinkers of the Indian sub-continent have
understood freedom or liberation through concepts like swaraj, azadi, or shadhinota, the last of
which is a Bengali word best translated as self-rule. In the context of anti-colonial struggles,
these conceptions of freedom were invariably tied up with ideas of national liberation. Yet to
designate and treat all the different thinkers as mere nationalist thinkers would miss the
particularities of each thinker and the particular ways they conceptualized freedom. Thinkers like
Gandhi and Tagore, to take the most prominent examples, constructed conceptions of swaraj as
modalities of freedom that were not necessarily tied to nationalism or the nation state.140 Without
claiming Mujib to belong in the same category of thinkers as Gandhi and Tagore, I want to argue
that his idea of freedom also had a meaning beyond and separate from national independence. In
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fact, for someone having the distinction of being a “father” of a nation, Mujib’s thinking was
remarkably non-nationalist, and “Bengali nationalism” was even less central to his political
ideas. Mujib’s concerns with liberation had more to do with the removal of structures of
oppression, both political and economic, than with specific concerns with national independence.
He often described his politics as dedicated to broad causes like desher kaj [serving the country]
and manusher kaj [serving the people/humanity], which were vague and unmoored to any
specific national identity. Mujib talked more often about jonogoner mukti [liberation of the
people] than jatir mukti [liberation of the nation] and even then he called for the latter only in
March of 1971 and only after being pushed to do so by more passionate advocates of Bengali
nationalism.
So why and how did Mujib become the face of Bengali nationalism and the father of the
Bengali nation? The answer has to do, at least in part, with the way he, through his democratic
struggles and his quest for jonogoner mukti, brought about the people that would provide the
body of the nation. The nation, as political theorist Bernard Yack has argued, is also intimately
related to another imagined community, “the people.” It is not so much that the idea of the nation
produces the idea of the people as, Yack argues, the “doctrine of popular sovereignty contributes
to the rise and spread of nationalism by introducing a new image of political community, an
image that tends to nationalize political loyalties and politicize national loyalties.” The function
of the nation is to “give the body-politic a body.” The historical idea of “the nation” fills in the
blanks of the abstract political idea of “the people” as composed of individuals bound by a social
contract. Though the doctrine of popular sovereignty does not necessarily produce democracy,
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struggles for democracy necessarily call for “the people” and thus “the nation.”141 Thus, to
understand his contribution to Bangladeshi nationalism and appreciate his place in Bangladeshi
politics we need to view Mujib as more than a nationalist leader and to engage with his other
political concerns, particularly democracy and social uplift.
Yet, as nationalism defines the political horizon within which all the other ideas and
concerns get elaborated in the postcolonial context, we will have to also give an account of
Mujib’s nationalism. In his adolescent years Mujib understood nationalism in terms of the panIndian struggle against British colonial rule, led by the Indian National Congress and personified
by figures like Subhash Chandra Bose, whom he, like many other young people at time,
idealized as a national hero.142 From there Mujib’s conversion to Muslim League politics was
simultaneously fortuitous and over-determined. As I have discussed above, the chance encounter
with Suhrawardy in 1938 and a continued relationship with him thereafter led Mujib to join the
Muslim League politics even before he finished high school. Even without this personal
encounter he most likely would have ended up in the Muslim League, as virtually all Muslim
middle-class youth and students did at the time. Muslim nationalism appealed to individuals like
Mujib because it provided a way for them to make sense of and fight against the secondary status
of Muslims in social, cultural, and political spheres of colonial India and Bengal. The account of
his family history that he provided in the beginning pages of his autobiography, for example,
mirrors the Muslim nationalist narrative of Muslim decline and the ascendency of Hindus under
British rule. In his autobiography Mujib also recounted, in a manner remarkably similar to the
way Abul Mansur Ahmad had, how everyday experiences of being discriminated against and
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humiliated by the Hindu bhadralok had pushed him to embrace a politics of Muslim
nationalism.143 Though Mujib felt a sense of brotherhood with other Indian Muslims on the
account of their shared experience of suffering and discrimination, he never developed a positive
formulation or understanding of Muslim identity or the Muslim nation. We do not witness Mujib
spending energy on constructing differences between Hindus and Muslims over theological,
philosophical, or cultural differences, as we have seen Abul Mansur Ahmad doing. In fact,
Mujib did not think that Hindus and Muslims were fundamentally different or naturally inclined
against each other. Rather, he found that communal animosities among the Hindus and Muslims
of Bengal were fermented by political ideologies and interests of Hindu leadership of the openly
communal Hindu Mahasabha, as well as the supposedly secular Congress.144 While Indian
Nationalists showed great courage in standing up to the British, Mujib argued, they did not with
the exceptions of figures like C.R. Das, Tagore, and Subhash Bose, take care or give thought
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about Hindu-Muslim unity.145 Hindu leadership treated “patriotism as their birth-right” and
undermined the nationalist sentiments and political agencies of Muslims.146 Ultimately, Mujib
held the Hindu leadership generally and the Congress particularly responsible for the rise of
Muslim nationalism and for the eventual partitions of India and Bengal.
Mujib’s support for Pakistan was more of a reaction against the political realities of late
colonial India than any commitment to Muslim nationalism. Mujib, inspired by Abul Hashim’s
theory of multi-national India and Hindu Muslim unity, was beginning to question the validity of
the “two-nation theory” even before the creation of Pakistan and he came to empathetically reject
it after independence. However, while Mujib united with Hashim in rejecting the idea of a
Muslim nation, he deviated from his mentor in rejecting the idea of constituting Pakistan as an
Islamic polity.147 During the mid-1950s Mujib, as a member of the Second Constituent Assembly
of Pakistan, would come to denounce the ideas of Muslim nationalism and Islamic republic
repeatedly and forcefully. Though he was expressing not his personal opinions but the positions
adopted by his party, the Awami League, he was one of the more passionate and eloquent critics
of Muslim nationalism and Islamic state in the Constituent Assembly.148 The language and
structure of the arguments that he made in constitutional debates can give us a sense of the
political thinking of the young Mujib. Among the dozens of speeches that he delivered in the
course of his short parliamentary career, the 21 February 1956 speech delivered in the Karachi
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session was particularly noteworthy as illustrative of Mujib’s political thought. Mujib argued that
“the ruling junta” was advancing the ideas of the Muslim nation and Islam “to get power by
manipulation” and “to give bluff to the people in the name of Islam,” which had been their
“habit” and “tactic always.” Later on Mujib argued, “history has so many times proved that you
cannot bluff the people for all the time.”149 This argument of bluffing in name of religion is
interesting not only because it calls out the hypocrisy of the ruling elite of Pakistan but also
because it reveals Mujib’s own anxieties, and perhaps that of large segments of BengaliMuslims, about being duped in the name of Islam into supporting the cause of Pakistan.
That religion can be used to manipulate public sentiment and decide political outcomes
profoundly disturbed Mujib. But he also learned how to use religion to advance his own cause
and political ideas. Mujib opposed the ideas of an Islamic republic and Muslim nation not by
appealing to liberal democratic ideals but by appealing to Islamic principles and Muslim
brotherhood. Consider his argument in the speech mentioned above:
Read the history of Islam and see how the rulers of Islam have treated the minorities and
how they have given them rights. Now, if you … declare that your country is an Islamic
Republic, at once the minorities become second-class citizens. At least I feel so and my
conscience says that it is against the fundamentals of Islam.150
He further argued:
Sir, when we wanted Pakistan, we had declared that the ten crores [a crore is 10 million]
of Muslims of India constituted one nation and, Sir, out of those ten crores of Muslims,
five crores are still left in India at the mercy of those fanatic Hindus. Have you ever
imagined what would be their fate if you declare ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’? ….
Fanatic Hindus such as the R.S.S. and [the Hindu Mahasabha] might agitate tomorrow for
declaring India a ‘Hindu Republic’ for taking vengeance on those unfortunate five crores
of the Muslims of India who have sacrificed everything for the achievement of Pakistan
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and for making a separate state for seven crores of the people of Pakistan who are
enjoying the fruit of their sacrifice today.151
Mujib also took pains to make clear that he or his party was not against Islam. Rather he
redefined Islam to equate it with justice, democracy, and egalitarian social policies. Consider the
following part of his speech:
No, the Awami League is not against an Islamic Constitution if it is based on the
fundamental principles of Islam, [which are] equality [of rights], fair play and equal
distribution of wealth according to the need of individual. Do it first. You are not making
a democratic and Islamic constitution. You are making a reactionary constitution, a
constitution not for the people but for the ruling junta to govern the country according to
their own fancy and desire…. [Such measures] have done injustice to the people. Now,
Sir, how injustice and Islam can go together?... If you really provide in the constitution
fundamental principles of Islam and accept them in the name of Islam, nobody would
object to it. Even the Hindus will not object to it. 152
Mujib’s efforts to redefine the fundamentals of Islam were remarkably similar, as we
have discussed above, to those of Bhashani, who at the time was of course the president of the
Awami League and thus Mujib’s political leader. There is no indication, however, that Mujib
subscribed to or was interested in Bhashani’s theological-political project. He was not
particularly an observant Muslim or interested in Islamic philosophy. On the contrary, there is
evidence to suggest that Mujib did not regard Bhashani as a serious thinker or even a principled
politician.153 Thus it is more than likely, that Mujib was echoing Bhashani’s language and
arguments not because he found Bhashani’s reinterpretation of Islam compelling but because
they were the most effective means for advancing democratic and liberal causes in a highly
religious society. Thus, we should not read the above speech as Mujib’s effort to redefine or
recover Muslim nationalism and Islamic state but as his efforts to reject them in favor of
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democratic and secular principles using a language that was permissible within the confines of
the political discourse of the time. Underscoring his secular politics Mujib declared:
As a Musalman [sic], I believe in my religion and it is my duty to obey it. Allah will
punish me for my faults… I think there is nowhere mentioned that the government will
punish me and put me in jail if I do not say my prayers. It is my own character and my
own personal matter.154
Bangladeshi nationalist historians have argued that Mujib’s secularism, which is clearly
apparent in the speech discussed above, was tied to an inherently secular Bengali identity, which
was the source of Bengali nationalism and the inspiration behind the language movement of the
1940s and 1950s, the autonomy movement of the 1960s, and finally the liberation movement of
1971. In the case of Mujib this narrative is at best partially true. Mujib certainly had a strong
sense of himself as a Bengali, and he was demonstrably secular in his disposition.155 However,
there is no indication that he conceptualized the Bengali identity in nationalist terms before 1947.
For example, we do not see any coherent nationalist explanation for his support for the United
Bengal movement that Suhrawardy and Hashim, along with Sarat Bose of Congress, undertook
in the early months of 1947. Mujib, who was member of the Suhrawardy-Hashim faction of the
Muslim League, supported this initiative, not out of any sense of Bengali nationalism but
because he reasoned that a United Bengal would significantly increase the Muslim share in the
arithmetic of the partition of India.156 Independent Pakistan produced a different field of political
calculations in which articulation of a Bengali nationalism became possible and perhaps also
necessary. Yet, Mujib stopped short of articulating a Bengali nationalist agenda and from the
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outset framed the struggles to secure political and economic rights and parity for the Bengalis, in
which he played leading roles, in terms of struggles for democratic rights and provincial
autonomy within the framework of a federal Pakistan. There have been some suggestions
recently that given the draconian character of the Pakistani regimes Mujib could not openly
espouse Bengali nationalist politics, which he had in fact come to adopt in private and had even
initiated an underground operation to “liberate Bangladesh.”157 On the other hand, many
historians and scholars argue that despite all his disillusionment with Pakistan and all the
suffering he had endured at the hands of various Pakistani regimes he remained committed to
Pakistan until his end, publicly and privately.158 I find the second position more plausible that the
lack of nationalist rhetoric in Mujib’s politics, which is discernible in his speeches and writings
during the Pakistan period, was not a consequence of his fear of persecution but an indication of
his genuine commitment to and concern with a politics that served “the people,” which did not
necessarily have a national character.
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Throughout his political career he invoked in his speeches and in his writings “the
people” as the subject-object of his politics and presented himself as their voice. In his first ever
speech delivered to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on September 22, 1955 the 35-year-old
first time parliamentarian from a modest middle-class background declared empathetically to a
hall full of grandees, nobles, and political veterans that independence had established the people,
instead of the Queen of England, as the new sovereign. He warned his colleagues there that in
independent Pakistan their power depends on their status as “representatives of the people” and
not on wealth and status granted them by the previous sovereign, and “Without the support of the
people you have got no power worth the name. You may usurp any power that you want. But
people will not tolerate it any longer.”159 The main argument of his speech was that “The people
should decide the future [and character] of Pakistan” and not the aristocratic elites. The speech
demonstrated not only Mujib’s courage but also his conviction that the source of political power
generally and his own power particularly was and will be the people. In this speech and in
subsequent speeches in the Constituent Assembly Mujib argued strongly that the constitution
should fulfill the demands contained in the 21-Point Program of the United Front because, as
evidenced by the electoral victory of the United Front, they were the demands of the people.
Similarly, in his famous Six-Point Formula: Our Right to Live, Mujib argued, “these demands
are not new points invented afresh by me or any individual but are in reality long-standing
demands of the people and pledges of their leaders awaiting fulfillment for decades.”160
Mujib presented himself as the voice of the people not only when he was addressing the
ruling elites but also when he was addressing the people. Mujib did not address the people from a
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position of superiority or as someone endowed with higher understanding and knowledge than
them. He was a leader of the people but he was also their brother and one of their own, who
merely gave voice to their own understanding of the world and to their political demands. For
example, Mujib opens his most famous and celebrated speech of 7 March 1971 by saying, “My
brothers I come to you with a heavy heart. You know everything and understand as well,” before
going on to explain why they must participate fully in the Non-cooperation movement and resist
the Pakistani ruling junta with “whatever you have.”161 Mujib was in fact calling the people into
being by articulating “the people’s demand.” This was not a cynical tactic to pander to the
people. Rather, he sincerely believed that understanding and articulating the people’s demand
was the duty of the politician and the source of his power.162
“The people” is a famously open and unspecific category. So, who were “the people”?
Though the nationalist narratives have often claimed that by “people” Mujib meant the Bengali
nation, little textual evidence suggests that interpretation. The concept of nation or jati did not
occupy Mujib much. And, when he engaged the idea of a nation, he often reacted negatively,
commenting either on the deleterious effects of nationalism for humanity or disparaging Bengali
national traits.163 Instead of using the concept of Bengali jat he commonly used the phrase desher
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manush [the people of the country] or sometimes more specifically “the ordinary, poor,
exploited, and oppressed people” as the subject-object of his politics.164 Even in his famous
March 7th speech, which has been hailed as one of the most powerful inspirations behind the
Liberation War, Mujib did not use the word jati but argued instead that the struggle this time was
for the freedom, rights, and survival of Banglar manush [the people of Bengal]. Later in the
speech he declared, “The seventy-five million people – Hindus, Muslim or Bengali, non
Bengalee [sic] – all are our brothers” and vowed to free “the people of this country.”165 Desher
manush simply referred to all those who resided in the country. At times, he even used the term
“Bengalee” to refer not to a national identity but more generally to the people of Bengal.166
Mujib’s preference for using “people of Bengal” instead of the “Bengali nation” was not a mere
semantic choice but a reflection of Mujib’s commitment to his cosmopolitan sensibilities and a
multiculturalist vision of the people.
Mujib was a great admirer of Rabindranath Tagore, a fact often cited as evidence of his
Bengali nationalism.167 The fact that Mujib mobilized Tagore’s idea of “Shonar Bangla” or
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“Golden Bengal” to imagine not only a glorious past but also a prosperous future of the nation
has been noted adequately. However, much less has been said about the influence of Tagore’s
cosmopolitanism on Mujib. Though Mujib does not make any direct reference to Tagore while
advancing his argument for federalism, which was the basis not only of the autonomy movement
that he would lead in the 1960s but also of his support for Pakistan in 1940s, he echoed Tagore’s
cosmopolitan sensibility. In his first ever speech to the Constituent Assembly Mujib criticized
the proposal to form “one-unit” of West Pakistan, pointing out that such a move would ignore
and suppress its diverse languages and cultures.168 Tagore had argued, “Now the problem
worldwide is not that of unity by dissolving differences – but how to meet while preserving
differences.”169 Echoing this cosmopolitan sensibility, Mujib reasoned:
If I speak in Bengali they cannot follow; if they speak in Urdu, I cannot follow. But we
can develop. I will speak in Urdu and they will speak in Bengali and this will lead to
greater friendship and co-operation and Pakistan will become stronger.170
Mujib was calling for a multicultural Pakistan against the policy favored by the new rulers of
Pakistan of producing national unity and integration by imposing one state language and
constructing one national culture.171 Mujib’s concern was not only for the protection of the
Bengalis but also for the Baloch, Pashto, Sindhi, and other “national groups” [jati-gosthi] of
Pakistan. In the context of demanding a state language status for Bangla he argued that since
Pakistan was created to accommodate differences and protect the interest of the minority the
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constitution of independent Pakistan should be based on a principle of federalism and follow the
Soviet model to accommodate differences and protect the interest of various “national cultures”
and languages of Pakistan.172
IV
Mujib’s multiculturalist views and his concern with the people, as opposed to the nation,
had profound effects on how he understood political freedom. Mujib was oriented more towards
ideas of emancipation or liberation than towards independence, ironic given how closely he is
associated with Bangladesh independence. Throughout his political career Mujib preferred to use
the phrase mukti rather than shadhinota when articulating political goals and programs. While
mukti has a broader meaning variously connoting freedom, emancipation, or liberation,
shadhinota is often narrowly understood as independence. Mujib’s preference for a conception
of freedom associated with mukti manifested, for example, in his construction of the famous Six
Point Formula as a muktir shonod or a manifesto of liberation. More famously, in his 7th March
speech he declared, “The struggle this time is the struggle for our liberation [muktir shongram].”
He then added, almost as an afterthought and perhaps as a concession to the radical elements
among his followers chanting for independence, “The struggle this time is the struggle for
independence [shadhinotar shongram].” Growing up in a colonized society, Mujib knew that
emancipation or liberation depended on independence. He also thought that independence was
achieved with the establishment of Pakistan, and he strove for a higher level of freedom within
the framework of Pakistan. He also knew from the 23 years of experience of Pakistan that
independence was no guarantee of emancipation. This perhaps explains why he celebrated the
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independence of Bangladesh with the warning that the job has not yet been completed and that
political independence of Bangladesh will be meaningless without true freedom for the people.173
But what was this true freedom or mukti for Mujib, and how had he hoped to achieve it?
In his March 7, 1971 speech Mujib stated that after his and the Awami League’s landslide
victory in the 1970 election he had hoped that they would be allowed to “draw up [a democratic]
constitution” and “build up the country accordingly” to ensure that “the people of this country
will gain economic, political, and cultural freedoms.”174 He did not elaborate in the speech what
these three freedoms meant, perhaps because he simply did not have the time or opportunity
during that frenetic moment to go into theoretical details or more likely because he took the
meaning of these freedoms to be already apparent and understood by the people. The struggles
that he had been engaged in and the political programs that he had articulated over the 23 years
of Pakistani rule had provided his audience with a clear enough sense of what these freedoms
meant for them to join him in the struggle to secure these freedoms. I have already discussed
above Mujib’s struggles for cultural freedom as they related to producing a multicultural
Pakistan generally and to promoting development of Bengali culture and language particularly. I
would like to focus on his ideas regarding the other two freedoms – political and economic.
Mujib’s conception of political freedom was undoubtedly connected to principles of
federalism and the struggles to secure maximum political autonomy for East Bengal/East
Pakistan. The demand for federalism and provincial autonomy had been a major theme in the
politics of the Indian sub-continent since at least the 1920s and was a foundational principle of
the Muslim League’s historic Lahore Resolution, the Manifesto of the Awami Muslim League,

173

See my discussion above regarding his first speech to the people of independent Bangladesh
on January 10, 1972.
174
Rahman, The Voice of Freedom (2011), 188 – 191.
270

and the 21-Point Program of the United Front. It is not surprising that Mujib had adopted
federalism as one of his main political principles, though his unwavering commitment to it and
the way he was able to use it to mobilize a massive political movement from 1966 onwards is
remarkable. Though provincial autonomy was certainly a major element in Mujib’s conception
of political freedom, his struggles establishing a system of modern democratic governance in
Pakistan and guaranteeing political and civil rights were arguably more fundamental to his
conception of political freedom.
Mujib had already established himself as an advocate for democracy in the early years of
Pakistan through his participation in various political struggles and through the speeches he
delivered in the Second Constitutional Assembly in 1955-56. Beyond the general call for
democracy and recognizing “the people” to be the ultimate source of political authority, Mujib
often spoke in the Assembly to propose and argue on behalf of specific and concrete democratic
institutions. For example, he presented strong arguments for the establishment of a “joint
electorate” system, based on the principle of equality of all citizens before the law, instead of the
“separate electorate” system that had been instituted by the British. He also delivered speeches
enumerating fundamental political rights that should be guaranteed by the constitution. He
advocated for establishing separation of powers and limits on executive powers.175 During the
early years of Pakistan, Mujib like many of his colleagues subscribed to the liberal-democratic
principles embodied in the constitutions of Western countries like the United States and in the
emerging regime of international human rights. Though Mujib and his democratic colleagues
were successful in incorporating many of these democratic principles in the first constitution of
Pakistan, these became void and meaningless when the constitution itself was abrogated by Ayub
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Khan’s martial law regime. Mujib, however, continued the fight to establish liberal democratic
principles and institutions in Pakistan and articulated the demand for liberal parliamentary
democracy as the first of his famous Six-Point demands.176
Mujib’s aspirations for liberal parliamentary democracy were not ultimately realized in
Pakistan, pushing him towards a program of independence. The constitution of Bangladesh,
adopted swiftly after its independence, provided for a liberal parliamentary democracy with
extensive rights guaranteed to its citizens.177 Claiming that a nation without a constitution is like
a boat without a boatman Mujib proclaimed November 4, 1972, the day the constitution was
adopted, as “one of the red lettered days of my life as I have been able to present a constitution to
the nation. If the future generation can build up an exploitation free society based on democracy,
socialism, secularism, and nationalism – the four pillars of the Constitution, my life-long dream
will be realized.”178 Yet within less than three years Mujib dramatically reneged on his
commitment to parliamentary democracy and established a single-party rule under a presidential
system through his “second revolution.” To make sense of this total and fateful reversal we will
have to discuss the third of Mujib’s freedoms, the one relating to economic freedom.
Mujib was a representative member of the Bengali-Muslim urban middle class that
emerged from the upper peasantry in the early 20th century. Mujib and his class had two strong
economic motives for supporting the Pakistan movement. First was the abolition of the
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oppressive and exploitative zamindari system dominated by Hindu zamindars. Second was
increasing opportunities of education and jobs for the expanding middle class. Political programs
of the middle class in the early years of Pakistan were much focused on achieving these two
objectives.179 For example, two thirds of the 21-Point Program of the United Front addressed
issues of economic development and reform. Mujib’s own thinking at this point, as demonstrated
by some of his speeches at the Constituent Assembly, was moderate and aligned with the 21Point Program. He supported moderate egalitarian policies such as limiting the salaries of high
government officials and investing in primary and vocational schools but dismissed those
espousing more radical economic programs like socialism as being out of touch with reality and
living in a fantasyland.180 As the desired economic developments failed to materialize in Pakistan
and the benefits of whatever meager development did occur went mostly to West Pakistan,
Mujib’s economic thinking became more radical. In public he proposed the Six-Point Formula,
which though it demanded complete economic independence for East Pakistan, did not include
any socialist measures.181 In private he became more sympathetic and open to socialism. In his
autobiography, which he wrote in prison stints between 1966 and 1969, Mujib claimed:
“I am not communist myself. However, I believe in socialism and I do not subscribe to
capitalist economics. I consider it as an instrument of exploitation. As long as this
economic system that seeks to create capitalist magnets exists, exploitation cannot be
eradicated from the Earth. The Capitalists are determined to produce world-war for their
interest.”182
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Mujib’s conversion to socialism might have been influenced by the number of young
economists and intellectuals with social-democratic views who became close associates of his in
the 1960s and helped him formulate the Six-Point Formula and other party programs.183 Perhaps
he was also pushed to adopt a socialist politics by the increasing radicalism of the university
students and socialist postures of rival political parties like Bhashani’s NAP.184 Or perhaps he
came to socialist conclusions from his insights into the conditions of oppression and world
politics.185 Mujib seemed to suggest that he was at least partly inspired by the way China, which
he had visited in 1952 to attend the World Peace Conference, had been able to summon a
collective spirit to achieve economic and social development within a short period of its
revolution.186 Though Mujib might have originally been a representative of the “aspiring Bengali
bourgeoisie,” to produce a “broader national constituency” he had to appeal to the “subaltern
classes” of Bengal, according to Rehman Sobhan, one of the economists who helped Mujib craft
the Six-Point Formula and the economic arguments of the Awami League.187 Mujib’s unrivaled
popularity in East Pakistan from 1969 on, the overwhelming victory of the Awami League in the
1970 election, and the spontaneous and sustained participation of the masses in the struggle for
independence are testaments of his success in producing a vision of economic freedom that had
appealed to and inspired the subaltern classes. This vision was most eloquently expressed in his
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campaign speech broadcasted over national television and radio networks on October 29, 1970,
where he laid out in great detail but simple language “the radical economic programmes” that
“must be implemented” within “a federal democratic framework” to “bring about a social
revolution” to end “[t]he exploitation of man by man and of region by region.”188
Having articulated his visions for economic, political, and cultural freedoms through his
speeches, programs, manifestos, and struggles, Mujib did not feel the need to define them again
in that 18 minute speech on March 7th, 1971, when the people of Bengal were quite literally
facing the guns of the military junta.189 He simply acknowledged that the people “knew
everything and understood everything.” Then he asked, “Brothers are you with me?” The
hundreds of thousands of voices assembled there roared in unison “we are with you.” Yes, the
people were ready to fight for their freedom with whatever they had, including their lives.
Was that the moment the nation was born? Perhaps. Mujib, however, seemed not to have
recognized its birth or that he was its father. He was still trapped in the discourse of
representative democracy. Yes, “power has to be won by the people… to bring about a social
revolution,” Mujib had argued in his campaign speech on October 29, 1970. But he had hoped at
that time that the “elected representative of the people” can “give to this country a Constitution”
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that would allow for the implementation of revolutionary programs of political and economic
freedom.190 After becoming the representative, nay the tribune, of the people, Mujib could not
have given up on that hope of a revolution through constitutional means. Perhaps this hope of a
democratic solution explains why he continued to negotiate with Yahiya Khan and Zulifikar Ali
Bhutto about a constitutional solution for the future Pakistan, while Pakistani generals were quite
visibly gearing up to pounce on the unarmed population of Bengal. The hope for a negotiated
solution perhaps also explains why Mujib decided not to avoid arrest on March 25, 1971 and
take the chance to lead the war of independence that was clearly imminent.191 Though the war of
independence was fought in his absence and without his leadership, there was no question about
his assumption of leadership after independence. Perhaps because Mujib lacked the direct
experience of the war, independence for him became, as we have discussed above, not so much a
matter of national independence but a democratic victory of the people. He took independence as
a referendum of the Awami League’s 1970 election manifesto and as the mandate to implement
the “radical social programs” outlined there. Thus, assuming the power of an independent
Bangladesh Mujib proceeded to initiate a social revolution through a democratic constitution for
the purpose of making the Shonar Bangla [Golden Bengal] of his dream a reality.
Mujib’s ideal of Shonar Bangla was a fundamentally modernizing concept containing
visions of economic, social, and political developments. He invoked the idea to imagine and
aspire for a prosperous Bengal that would be free of the abject poverty, famine, and violence that
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had characterized 20th century Bengal. The program of economic development for Mujib was
intimately connected to the overall social-cultural modernization that would overcome the
illiteracy, backwardness, superstition, small-mindedness, and despair that plagued the BengaliMuslim psyche.192 He argued that the independence of Bangladesh had produced the possibility
not only of constructing the Shonar Bangla or the utopian homeland but also for producing
shonar manush or golden human beings, who would in fact act as the agents ushering in the
utopian future. As the leader of the newly independent country, Mujib could not just theorize
abstractly about these possibilities but had to propose concrete policies and tangible programs to
realize them.
Mujib viewed the establishment of a democratic constitution, which he had fought for
throughout his career, as the necessary first-step for producing political, economic, and cultural
freedoms for the people. Given that in the immediate aftermath of independence Mujib’s
charismatic authority was at its height and the Awami League enjoyed near total support among
the people, constitution making was swift and did not face significant opposition either in the
Constituent Assembly or on the streets or in the papers. Only a few grumbling voices on the far
left objected to the new constitution. 193 It was a modern, progressive, secular, democratic, and
socialist constitution, which not only provided for democracy and constitutional rights but also
enumerated programs of social uplift and guarantees of economic security as a matter of state
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responsibility.194 By 1973 Mujib’s government introduced the first Five-Year Economic Plan
containing bold visions for industrialization, land reform, and village-cooperatives, all intended
to “increase production” and make Bangladesh “self-sufficient.” However, realizing the ideals
and aspirations contained within the Constitution and the Five-Year Plan proved infinitely
difficult because Bangladesh was a poor country and in absolute ruin after a genocidal campaign
and systematic destruction of resources by the Pakistani military. And Mujib’s visions for
socialist economic development failed to materialize because of middle-class resistance and foot
dragging by the bureaucracy, which was a holdover from the Pakistani and colonial periods.
Rampant corruption by members of the Awami League, which Mujib failed to deal with
decisively, exacerbated the situation. For the first three years of Mujib’s rule there were no
significant improvements in the dire economic conditions of the country. The situation worsened
by 1974 and brought about a famine that caused tens of thousands of deaths. Mujib, along with
most of the country, grew increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress, and in 1975 he
announced his “second revolution” as the remedy.
Mujib’s “second revolution” officially began on January 25, 1975 when the Parliament,
which was almost entirely composed of members from the Awami League, enacted the 4th
Amendment discarding the multiparty parliamentary system in favor of a single party
presidential system. The Amendment recognized Mujib as the “Father of the Nation” and the
president for a 5-year term, ignoring the more extreme suggestions to make him the president for
life. The Amendment nevertheless provided for near unrestricted power for the president and
suspended many of the fundamental rights that the Constitution had originally provided,
including freedom of press. Using his new powers, Mujib declared the formation of the new
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official party, the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL), within a month and
required, in effect if not by law, all political and civil society leaders and civilian government
employees to join. By adopting the corporatist ideology and the single party system that was in
vogue in much of the developing world during that period Mujib reversed many of his previously
held political principles and adopted exactly the authoritarian posture that he had fought
throughout his life.
Many Bangladeshi commentators, including some of Mujib’s close associates, have
argued that it was perhaps the biggest blunder of his political life, one that perhaps precipitated
the brutal end of his regime and life.195 Mujib himself had argued as a member of the
Constitutional Assembly in 1956, “if constitutional means of politics were not open to the
people, they would surely find other means.”196 It seemed that his words had come to haunt him.
But what explains Mujib’s reversal on democracy? Perhaps it was simply hubris and one more
tragic example of the corrupting effects of power, as some commentators have suggested. But
Mujib empathetically rejected this claim in a speech delivered to Parliament on 26 March 1975
where he defended himself against charges of authoritarianism. Often referring to himself in the
third person, Mujib argued:
I believe that power lies with the people of Bengal. The day people will say,
‘Bangabondhu leave’, Bangabondhu will not remain a president or prime minister even
for a day. Bangabondhu did not do politics for power; Bangabondhu did politics out of
love for suffering people. Bangabondhu did politics for the establishment of exploitationfree society… One thing is clear: we want democracy of the exploited and not the
democracy of the exploiter… Political freedoms become futile, if there is no economic
freedom… The rotten system of rule of the British and Pakistani [colonial] era cannot
continue. [Our system of rule] must be created on a new basis.197
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Was the call for a “democracy for the exploited” a merely populist rhetoric designed to disguise
and justify his authoritarian ambitions or a sincere political program advanced in response to the
demands of the time?
I think Mujib deserves the benefit of the doubt based on his long record as an advocate of
democracy and the immeasurable sacrifices he had made and sufferings he had endured for the
people of Bengal throughout his political career. We should not evaluate the last years of Mujib’s
political career as an autocrat’s efforts to hold on to power but as a democrat’s efforts to deliver
the social, economic, and political transformation that independence demanded. Though Mujib
was an avowedly centrist politician weary of revolutionary extremism and a committed
democrat, the lack of progress in the first years after independence led him to recognize the
ineffectiveness of liberal democracy against entrenched social and political hierarchies.198 He
was extremely suspicious and critical of the economic and political elites of post-colonial
Pakistan because their status and privileges stemmed from their positions in and relations to
structures of colonial rule and they had little material interest in opposing colonialism. He was
particularly suspicious of the bureaucratic class, which stood to lose most because of
decolonization. As his speeches in the parliament and reflections in his memoir suggest Mujib
saw the intrusion of the bureaucracy to be a greater threat to democratic aspirations in Pakistan
than a power grab by the social elites or the ashraf politicians.199 The independence of
Bangladesh represented a victory of the middle class and reduced the dominance of the ashraf
elites but did not produce an alternative to the bureaucratic structure inherited from the colonial
states. By 1974 Mujib came to conclude that fundamental changes to the governance of the
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country were necessary to overcome the bureaucracy and other vestiges of colonial hierarchy and
to lift Bangladesh out of misery and poverty and to transform it from “a beggar nation” to a
modern and prosperous one.200 Mujib’s “second revolution” sought to produce a “democracy of
the exploited” by restructuring the bureaucracy and, thus, the character of the post-colonial state.
But revolutions require a show of force against the guardians of the old order. Mujib was
compelled to deviate from the principles of liberal democracy that he so cherished and adopt an
authoritarian approach.201 He did not renounce liberal democracy altogether, nor did he reject it
out of theoretical conviction, as Bhashani and many of the left intellectuals had done. He merely
felt obliged to deviate from it temporarily as a practical necessity. In June of 1975, mere months
before his assassination, Mujib expressed his apprehensions about the authoritarian measures he
felt obliged to take in the following manner:
What an irony of fate that it is I, who for my entire life have struggled for democracy and
spent many years in prison for it, should now have to create a one-party [state]… I didn’t
want this. I have been obliged to do this… This one-party platform is purely temporary.
Once I have saved the country from the counterrevolution, I will restore multi-party
democracy. 202
V
In summarizing Mujib’s political life and thought it is useful to remember Machiavelli’s
warning that:
Nothing is more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to
manage, than to put oneself at the head of introducing new orders. For the introducer has
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all those who benefit from the old order as enemies, and he has lukewarm defenders in all
those who might benefit from the new orders.203
Mujib is considered a founder of a new order for having inspired the independence of
Bangladesh.

But what I have argued in the discussion above is that the independence of

Bangladesh, though it certainly produced a new state, did not produce a new order. Independence
or even the progressive democratic constitution adopted in 1972 did not fundamentally alter the
socio-economic or power structures of the country. Political and economic powers remained
concentrated within the elite, particularly in the hands of bureaucrats who since the British
colonial period had been trained to serve the state and their own class interest rather than the
interest of the people. In contrast to the moment of independence, the rhetoric and the programs
of the “second revolution” expressed intentions to produce a total social revolution, overturning
not only the power of the bureaucracy but also the class structure of the country.
Mujib’s “second revolution” sought to nullify or even demolish the power of the elite in
the name of the people. Though his “second revolution” was a departure from parliamentary
liberal democracy, he argued it to be more democratic in essence. I think Mujib’s claim can be
justified if we conceptualize democracy not as democratic procedures and political rights but as
Machiavelli did in terms exercising power to serve the interests of the people [il popolo] against
the elites or the grandees. In what has been called a Machiavellian democracy, democratic means
matter less than democratic outcomes, i.e., economic freedom and improvement of living
conditions for the masses.204 The landslide victory of the Awami League in the 1973 general
election, despite partially arising from election rigging, and his undiminished ability to rouse the
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masses, had convinced Mujib that the people were with him, and that he was their voice. Like
populist leaders elsewhere, Mujib suspended the niceties of constitutional rule and presented
himself as the tribune of the people, ready to batter down hierarchies of society. Yet in the end
his revolution was top down, without spontaneous participation of the people, who turned out to
be less than “lukewarm defenders” of it.
Unlike other revolutionaries, Mujib did not have at his disposal a well-organized and
ideologically motivated vanguard party to carry out the revolution. On the other hand, the
enemies of the revolution, some from within the ranks of his own party, were much more fierce
and determined to destroy the new order and preserve the old status quo. Mujib was also a
reluctant revolutionary, adopting a program of revolution as the last resort and when his
charismatic authority was on the wane.205 Perhaps, he would have been more successful, if he
had adopted the revolutionary program right from the beginning of independent Bangladesh, as
many of his radical followers had wanted him to. But he had been swayed by the ideals of
freedom promised by liberal democracy. His was a choice between democracy and social
revolution. At first, he wanted to achieve social revolution through democracy, and then he chose
revolution at the expense of democracy. But in the end, neither democracy nor revolution
materialized, and the greatest hero of Bengal’s modern history suffered the most tragic ending to
his life and dreams.
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Conclusion: Bhashani, Mujib and the Bangladesh Moment
“The nationalist hour” arrives, Ranabir Samaddar declared, when the nation overcomes,
if only temporarily, diverse ideas and plural interests to become a unified collective body.206 The
nationalist hour or what I call the “Bangladesh Moment” certainly arrived in 1971 to produce
independence. The arrival of the Bangladesh moment, however, was neither inevitable nor
premeditated. Reflections on the political lives and thoughts of Bhashani and Mujib, who were
both instrumental in producing the “Bangladesh Moment,” enable us to appreciate how political
actors of different persuasions arrived at the nationalist hour and the different trajectories they
followed afterwards. The lives and political careers of these two leaders were intimately
intertwined and the alliances, friendships, and enmities that characterized their relationship from
1948 to 1975 were at once personal and political. Their relationship was not merely that of two
contemporaneous politicians vying for political dominance but expressive of the tension between
the different political ideals, energies, and constituencies they represented.
Bhashani was a representative of the sharbahara or the destitute peasants and workers of
Bengal. His politics were motivated at their core by anger and rebellion against the injustices of
class society, and he gravitated towards socialist ideals. He was deeply suspicious of electoral
democracy and argued that without a radical democracy that awakens and empowers the poor
masses, social justice could be achieved. Bhashani also advocated for class struggle and
endorsed the use of revolutionary violence. Mujib, on the other hand, was a representative of the
middle class and was deeply committed to constitutional politics and electoral democracy,
arguably even after his “second revolution.” In the 1950s and 1960s, Mujib was relentless in his
struggle to realize democratic ideals and establish fundamental rights in Pakistan. Though
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economic development and social uplift were his political goals, he saw the establishment of
democracy as the necessary prerequisite and the most urgent political goal. By the late 1960s
Mujib began to embrace socialism over capitalism as the preferred mode of organizing the
economy and a more effective solution to the problem of underdevelopment, but Mujib’s
socialism was not predicated upon any commitment to class struggle or any disavowal of liberal
democratic principles.
Neither Bhashani nor Mujib were primarily nationalist thinkers or politicians. Rather,
they were motivated by different political ideals and by their desire to serve their respective
constituencies. The political struggles of Bhashani and Mujib in the 1950s and 1960s appealed to
and produced different collective bodies or publics, which began to come together after 1969 to
produce the nationalist public and the nationalist hour. The nationalist public was created in part
by Mujib’s ability to subsume different publics, such as Bhashani’s sharbahara or the
dispossessed, under the category of jonogon, the people. The moment of national unity was also
produced, at least partially, because of Bhashani’s decision to concede the mantle of the political
leadership of East Pakistan to Mujib and the Awami League during the crucial years of 1970 and
1971. Bhashani’s concession was not, however, personal but expressive of the submission of the
peasantry to the petty bourgeoisie. The ascendency of the urban middle class among BengaliMuslims, which began in the 1920s and manifested itself politically in the demand for Pakistan
in the 1940s, was finally complete with the independence of Bangladesh in 1971.
It would be reasonable to expect that without the need for strategic alliances against
external common enemies, whether against the Hindu zamindars and the bhadralok in the
colonial era or against West Pakistani domination in the Pakistani era, class contradictions within
the Bengali nation would play out to their full extent in independent Bangladesh. Bhashani
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advocated this line of reasoning: “let independence come, then we will do the rest.” Accordingly,
he assumed a radical posture and adopted a critical approach to the government of Bangladesh in
the years following its independence. In doing so he maintained continuity in his politics,
fighting to secure economic freedom for the sharbahara and holding those in power accountable
to the people. But Bhashani’s class politics did not find much wind in its sail against the strong
current of nationalism. The peasant movements dissipated, perhaps characteristically so, soon
after independence, depriving Bhashani of a crucial source of his political power. And he was
unwilling to embrace the vanguardism that the Jatiya Shomajtantrik Dal, Sharbahara Party, and
other radical left formations were advocating. Extremist actions by small groups of
revolutionaries could not be substitutes for a mass awakening and participation, argued
Bhashani.
Towards the end of his political career Bhashani emphasized the more moral and
spiritual dimensions of the awakening, which he sought to produce through education programs
rather than through political agitations. Perhaps the shift in his politics was a result of weakened
peasant movements. Or perhaps, his advanced age led him to emphasize his role as a pir or a
pastoral caretaker of the masses. Or perhaps Bhashani began to adopt a less confrontational role
after independence of Bangladesh because he wanted the new regime and particularly Mujib to
succeed in the task of building up the war-devastated and poverty-stricken country. By 1975
Mujib and Bhashani had overcome some of the acrimony that had characterized their
relationship and Mujib reportedly maintained close contact with Bhashani during his move for
the “Second Revolution,” which Bhashani supported publicly as a good first step. When Mujib
was assassinated a few months later, Bhashani wept and lamented, “All is finished.”207
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The independence of Bangladesh changed the political calculus dramatically for Mujib.
He was no longer an oppositional politician or anti-state agitator. He was now the head of a state
and charged with the task of establishing a new order. His political career hitherto had been
defined by struggles for democracy and regional autonomy. In independence, both goals had
been achieved, and Mujib was now faced with the difficult task of using political power to
produce economic development and social uplift, the task that had hitherto remained distant and
abstract. In trying to achieve these goals Mujib came to face tremendous criticism, opposition,
and resistance. The left-wing critics were arguing that his measures were not drastic and
revolutionary enough. Yet, whatever modest measures he tried to introduce were severely
resisted and subverted by the urban middle class and the bureaucratic apparatus. To be true to his
status as the Father of the Nation, Mujib had to overcome the resistance of the class that he had
represented for most of his life. Mujib became increasingly disillusioned about democratic
means for producing social transformation and became increasingly convinced of a need for a
revolution. Yet, he did not have at his disposal a revolutionary class or a revolutionary party. His
revolution had to be top-down and was never really given a chance before it was brutally
crushed, in part by his erstwhile comrades and supporters. Perhaps desires for democracy in postcolonial countries like Bangladesh are bound to bow before the imperatives of economic
development and social uplift. And perhaps, revolutionary movements for social transformations
are fated to fail against the resistance of local and global guardians of the status quo. Mujib could
not realize his dream of Shonar Bangla. And that dream remains unfulfilled till today, despite
claims by successive regimes otherwise.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion
I
In a recent monograph, political theorist Michael Walzer reflects upon the “paradox of
national liberation.” The projects of national liberation, Walzer contends, seek not only to
liberate the nation from foreign rulers but also to emancipate the nation from its own
backwardness. “Liberationist militants,” as Walzer calls them, subscribe to a “secular,
modernizing and developmental creed” that hopes to totally repudiate and overcome the old
ways of the nation that is to be liberated. “But the old ways are cherished by many of the men
and women whose ways they are. That is the paradox of liberation.”1 The paradox plays out as
conflicts between the new and the old, the modern and the traditional, and more significantly, as
the subtitle of his book suggests, between secular and religious outlooks and ideologies. The
militant secular and anti-religious politics of national liberation produce, after a generation or
two, religious counter revolutions whose “protagonists claim to embody the ancient traditions,
the faith of the ancestors, even to represent a pure, authentic version of it; oldness is their mantra.
And although the claim is false, the sense of oldness must account, at least in part, for the appeal
of their program. They connect the liberated people to their own past; they provide a sense of
belonging and stability in a rapidly changing world.”2 Though Walzer is careful to point out that
this schematic description does not represent any historical “law,” it nevertheless represents a
general pattern that at least fits with the experiences of the three cases that he observes – Algeria,
Israel, and India.
1

Michael Walzer, The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions and Religious
Counterrevolutions, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016) pp. 19.
2
Ibid, p. 28
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Many commentators of Bangladeshi politics would argue that the experiences there also
fit the pattern. In the second chapter of this dissertation I read the narratives of Bangladeshi
political and intellectual history, as Walzer does for his cases, primarily in terms of a conflict
between the forces of progress and reaction, between modernizing secular nationalists on one
hand and religious conservatives, or more specifically Islamic fundamentalists, on the other. A
crucial difference is that while Walzer is trying to understand the “revival” of religions and the
apparent short lives of secular victories, commentators on Bangladesh are concerned with the
failure of secularism to be fully victorious and the stubborn persistence of religion in
Bangladeshi politics. They would nevertheless agree that the conflict between secular
nationalists and religious conservatism fundamentally shapes Bangladeshi political and
intellectual discourses. They would also argue, as some indeed do, that the Shahbag moment,
which I discussed at the beginning of the dissertation to frame the questions that the dissertation
pursues, is just but a dramatic example and expression of that ongoing conflict. Yet, the reality is
much more nuanced, complex, and messy than suggested, for example, by the dichotomy
between old and new. National liberation or the desire for colonized people to be free produces
not so much a paradox but a tension that produces the need for negotiation.
Walzer also recognizes the need for negotiation. He argues that the ideological rigidity
and absolutism of the liberationist militants must at least partially account for the failure of their
secularizing and modernizing projects. Had the militants, he argues following philosopher Akeel
Bilgrami, advanced “negotiated” visions of secularism and modernity instead of a total
repudiation of the past, the victories of national liberations might have been more durable and
hegemonic.3 Liberation militants were modernizers and Westernizers because they “learned a

3

Ibid, p.110
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great deal from their imperial rulers and used what they learned in the interests of liberation.”4
Liberation militants accepted modernity’s identification with the West and found their own
cultural traditions lacking the “resources” necessary for supporting the modern projects of
secularism, freedom, democracy, and egalitarianism. The discovery of this lack resulted not from
an objective lack but from their lack of adequate critical engagement with the inherited cultures
of the people, Walzer argues, agreeing somewhat reluctantly with many postcolonial critics. In
conclusion Walzer argues, “Particular engagements with particular cultures and histories…
produce particular versions of secularism and modernity…. [I]f modern, secular liberation is
‘negotiated’ in each nation, in each religious community, a highly differentiated universe is the
necessary outcome. The orchestra might well be cacophonous, requiring negotiation not only
within each nation but between and among them, too.”5
Walzer’s vision of multiple modernities and a differentiated universe is what many
postcolonial critics have argued for and what I have argued in this dissertation. Yet there are
several differences in the ways Walzer and I frame and pursue our arguments, which produce
fundamentally different understandings of the dynamics of postcolonial history. Chief among
our differences is that while Walzer bemoans the lack of “negotiation” with the past or with
national cultures in the modernizing projects of national liberation, I locate and analyze that very
“negotiation.” The figure of “liberation militant” that Walzer evokes, though not fictitious, does
not capture the diversity and complexity of nationalist political ideas. Many anticolonial and
nationalist activists sought to engage critically with inherited cultures and traditions to excavate
resources in support of emancipatory modernist projects. These figures were not exceptional,
marginal, or defeated – neither in postcolonial countries generally nor in Bangladesh. His
4
5

Ibid, p. 108
Ibid, p. 121
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framing of postcolonial history in terms of the victory of secular national liberation followed by
the backlash of religious revivalism is not persuasive.
My reading of Bangladeshi political and intellectual history suggests that national
liberations have involved from the beginning, and continue to do so, a negotiation, not so much
between modernity and tradition but between modernity and identity. And this is the second
important difference between us. While Walzer emphasizes tradition or the “old ways,” I focus
on identity. This distinction is significant because the central driving force of colonial and postcolonial history is not so much the conflict between the old and the new as the desire to be
modern while forging and asserting one’s identity. When Walzer argues that “old ways are
cherished by many” because those are their ways, he reifies and essentializes both the “old ways”
and the identities of the colonized people. However, neither identities nor the “old ways'' are
fixed, given, or apparent but are imagined and constructed to serve the political exigencies of the
present. In this dissertation I have analyzed how Bangladeshi political thinkers have
conceptualized the national identity, while accommodating and appropriating modernity
differently.
Contrary to what Walzer seems to suggest, and as many nationalist discourses assert,
leaders of national liberation did not always take the existence of the nation as given. Many were
acutely aware that they were not simply liberating an existing nation but were calling it into
being. National liberation required mobilization of a national identity, which, however, had to be
forged and reproduced through and after liberation. To paraphrase Abul Mansur Ahmad, in the
project of national liberation we become “we” [amra amra hobo]. Liberation leaders also
understood that forging a national identity cannot be successfully accomplished by simply
invoking an imagined past or a reified tradition to answer who we are, it must also gesture to the
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future to imagine what we might become. As I have discussed throughout this dissertation, in
the case of Bangladesh there have been many competing conceptions of national identity and its
future. While some conceptions embodied emancipatory and egalitarian ideals associated with
modernity, others were antithetical to modernist political ideals. However, it is not clear why the
anti-modern invocations would be considered more autochthonous than the modernist ones, as
Walzer suggests.
He is correct that most advocates of national liberations were motivated by a deep desire
to improve the conditions of their people by changing the existing socio-economic conditions
and transforming their consciousness. Such desires, however, did not necessarily equal a
repudiation of the “old ways” or the identity of the people. The examples I have discussed
demonstrate that at least some, and arguably most, significant protagonists of Bangladesh’
national liberation constructed the old ways, whether it be political ideals of Islam or a syncretic
culture of Bengal, in terms of the modern political ideals of secularism, democracy, and
egalitarianism. And, the consciousness they wanted to change was not the consciousness passed
down by people’s old ways but the consciousness corrupted by colonial rule. Thus, for instance,
they were much more critical of the attitude and politics of the educated middle class and the
intelligentsia than of the illiterate peasants. When they criticized religious conservatisms of their
society, they did not repudiate religion as such but objected to interpretations of religious
doctrines that circulated among a defeated and colonized people. They all understood, and some
like Abul Mansur Ahmad argued explicitly, that religious fundamentalism was a modernist
reaction to colonial rule rather than an expression of people’s ancient religious practices. So,
their desires to liberate the people from backwardness indicated not critiques of any essential
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identity of the people but critiques of colonial rule and how it produced material deprivation and
stunted consciousness.
Lastly, Walzer argues that “religious counter movements” appear when national
liberations seek social revolutions against existing hierarchies generally and against subjugation
of women particularly. He notes, following Hannah Arendt, that the revolutions that seek to
produce only political change, such as the one in the United States, do not produce the religious
backlash he is trying to explain. This, however, undercuts his argument about “religious counter
movements” being expressions of people’s anxieties about modernity and change and their
desires to find stability and a “sense of belonging in a changing world.” The “religious counter
movements” or backlashes against modernizing national liberation projects are produced not
because modernity is new or foreign but because modernization threatens the interests of
powerful sections of society. Religious counter movements represent the interest of some people
but not “the people” as such. In fact, the majority of “the people” – women, persons from lower
castes, the subaltern – may have material interest in resisting and often do resist religious
movements. The “old ways” may be cherished by some but not all. By failing to make this
distinction Walzer, despite his call for negotiated modernity, is unable to overcome the
Eurocentrism that has afflicted even the best of the post-enlightenment Western thinkers. By
equating the “old ways” to the peoples’ ways, Walzer locates modernity outside of the cultures
of colonized peoples. He then counsels the Westernized elites of colonial societies to make the
modernization process more palatable by somehow connecting it to native cultural discourses, to
give it a local guise and disassociate it from the stench of Westernization. I am not sure that
would help much in the end. Calls for democracy, equality, redistribution of wealth, or abolition
of existing classes would always generate violent and determined reactions, no matter how
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indigenous they sound. The counter-revolution against Mujib’s “second revolution”, for
example, was not a religious countermovement but a reaction of the most secularized elites –
civil and military bureaucracy – against their vested interests.
I engage with Walzer’s argument not only to illustrate the persistence of Eurocentrism in
contemporary academic discourses but also to use him as a counterpoint to clarify arguments I
advance about “negotiation” between modernity and identity. Though we both talk about
negotiation, we mean something quite different by it. By calling for negotiation Walzer is
calling for domesticating a modernity that is in fact foreign. In contrast, I seek to analyze how
colonial and postcolonial subjects negotiate the tension between modernity and identity that is
produced by the dynamics of colonial rule and peculiarities of modernist discourses. I detail this
tension in the earlier chapters of this dissertation through various postcolonial theorists. Here I
will summarize the key arguments without the lengthy explanations, caveats, and references that
I provide in my earlier discussions.
Eurocentric discourses of modernity on the one hand identify it with the West and on the
other hand view secularism, democracy, egalitarianism, and nationhood as particularly modern
constructs and markers of modernity. Furthermore, colonial discourses identify modernity with
the colonizing power and designate the colonized to be non-modern or pre-modern by describing
them as uncivilized, backward, or underdeveloped. The modernity of the colonizer and the
backwardness of the colonized then get used as justification for colonization. Colonial rule
transforms economy, social structures, politics, epistemology, and consciousness in profound
ways that leave subjects little choice but to operate within and through its structures and
discourses.

294

When colonized subjects seek to free themselves from colonial domination, they find that
they must articulate their demands for freedom through the modern political language
engendered in colonial rule by demanding rights, equality, democratic participation, and
ultimately national self-determination. The demand for national self-determination requires that
the self of the nation must be determined, that a nation must be named, and that the national
identity be differentiated from other national identities, especially that of the colonizer.
Producing national identity, however, involves not simply marking a nation as a mere variant of
the universal prototype through language, ethnicity, religion, and other indicators. Producing
national identity involves imagining the nation’s essence, its character, defined ethically,
morally, and politically.

To put it as Abul Mansur Ahmad did, different nations produce

different conceptions of life and provide their members with different platforms and foundations
to live their lives and pursue their goals.
And, here is the tension and the need for negotiation – how to accommodate modernity in
that identity of the nation or that conception of life? Since modernity is identified with the
colonizing power and since modernist colonial discourses impose the identity of backwardness
upon the colonized, critiquing modernity becomes necessary. But does it mean giving up or
rejecting it altogether, discarding associated discourses about rights, freedom, equality,
democracy, and progress? If the nationalist thinkers are not to give up on modern projects of
freedom, how do they produce differentiation from the colonizer who claims an identity with and
ownership of these projects?
Responses to these questions by anticolonial and postcolonial thinkers and nationalist
leaders over the last two centuries have been philosophically and politically diverse. My aim has
been to capture some of that diversity by focusing on the Bangladeshi case. Responses by
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Bangladeshi thinkers and political actors have also been diverse, making it difficult to
characterize a “Bangladeshi” response.

However, the thinkers I engage with in this

demonstration have challenged modernity’s identification with the West or the arguments about
modernity’s location outside their “own” cultures. They reasoned, albeit with various degrees of
explicitness and theoretical sophistication, that desires for freedom, equality, dignity, or even
democracy are not exclusive properties of modernity or the West. To strive for these political
ideals was not contrary to naming and liberating their nation. In fact, these political ideals were
often the very objective of their projects of national liberation.
II
In this dissertation I analyze the negotiation of modernity and identity in Bangladeshi
political thought through its political and intellectual histories and the ideas and lives of four
select thinkers. One of the biggest challenges I have faced in this project is that the political
thinkers with whom I engage were each multi-dimensional thinker concerned with various
political questions and projects. None were primarily or explicitly concerned with the question of
modernity and identity. My challenge was to find a balance between having them speak to the
tension between modernity and identity on one hand and faithfully representing their intellectual
and political multi-dimensionality, complexity, nuance, and eccentricity on the other. If I
overstressed the former, I would risk a highly selective reading and reduce them to caricatures. If
I stressed the latter, I would risk losing sight of the motivating question of this dissertation. I
constantly struggled to find the balance but perhaps erred on the side of describing the political
lives and thought of the four thinkers. Here I want to highlight the ways they spoke to the
question of negotiation between modernity and identity.
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Among the four thinkers I engage with, Abul Mansur Ahmad was the most explicit and
systematic in thinking about the relationship between identity and modernity. Ahmad was a
secular politician who subscribed to the idea of non-communal (nonreligious) pan-Indian
nationalism but was nevertheless connected to both Bengali-Muslim middle-class and peasant
politics. He was also a prominent literary figure situated in the Bengali-Muslim modernism of
the 1920s and 1930s. By the mid-1940s, however, he lent his support to the Pakistan movement
in apparent contradiction to his earlier progressive modernist politics. He justified the shift by
advancing arguments about the distinctiveness of Bengali-Muslim cultural identity and the
legitimacy of the politics of cultural autonomy. He claimed that different cultural identities serve
to differentiate one nation from another by giving each their unique personalities. Though
Ahmad’s primary political concern was to establish the cultural autonomy of Bengali-Muslims in
relation to Bengali-Hindus and to overcome the secondary status assigned to Bengali-Muslims
within Bengali culture, he also sought to secure autonomy from the “cultural fascism” of
Western universalism.

Yet such a project of autonomy did not amount to a rejection of

modernity or modern civilization, by which he understood “the total progress of humanity in
terms of education, knowledge, science, literature, commerce, industry, technology, etc.” Using
the image of light, Ahmad analogized that just as a torch lights the path of the torchbearer, it also
reveals the path for others. Modern civilization, though originating in the West, cannot remain its
exclusive property. Non-Western cultures can adopt the civilizational gifts of the West because
cultures are not ossified traditions but dynamic fields of actions that allow for and demand
constant refinement and improvement. By distinguishing between cultural essence and ossified
tradition, Ahmad called for a renaissance of Bengali-Muslim culture, which would make it
modern without denying its essential identity. This is the challenge that Ahmad posed to all
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nationalist intelligentsia. Failure to live up to this challenge would turn non-Western nations into,
he warned, a “herd of cows under the Western cowherd.” Though Ahmad offered specific
examples of how such a task could be carried out for the Bengali-Muslim culture, he failed to
develop a general theory about how non-Western nations could bask in the light of Western
civilization without burning up. Nevertheless, Ahmad and his colleagues at the East Pakistan
Renaissance Society initiated a discussion about the negotiation of modernity and identity that
has informed intellectual and political discourses of successive generations in Pakistan and
Bangladesh.
Abul Hashim, in contrast, was uninterested in negotiating modernity and identity but
ruthlessly criticized modernity, which I would argue is also a form of negotiation. Hashim was
especially critical towards the philosophical secularism of modern political philosophy, which
denied God’s sovereignty and banished Him from not only politics and public life but also from
philosophical outlooks and moral considerations. This secularism, he claimed, produced a
“materialistic nihilism” that prevented men from knowing and realizing their true nature.
Modern political philosophy also advanced an instrumental conception of politics where men
treat each other as mere means for furthering their self or group interests. Starting from this
fundamental critique Hashim criticized various ideas and institutions of modern politics,
including nationalism, democracy, and class struggle. After questioning modern ideologies of
liberal democracy and communism, which were vying to shape the world according to their own
images during the mid-20th century, Hashim advocated for a newly independent Pakistan to be
founded upon an Islamic political ideology.
Despite his call for Islamist politics, it would be a mistake to dismiss Hashim as a mere
religious revivalist anxious about progress and determined to preserve the status quo. He took
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pains to clarify that his critique of modernity was not motivated by concerns about preserving his
identity or tradition. In fact, he argued that anxieties about identity were a particularly modern
phenomenon and viewed nationalism based on ascriptive cultural or biological identity to be one
of the greatest ills produced by Western modernity, one which produced the biggest obstacle in
the path of attaining the “universal brotherhood of man.” Rather, his critique of modernity and
modern politics emanated from his observations of the horrors of the mid-20th century, notably
the Second World War, the Bengal Famine of 1943, and the violence unleashed by nationalist
conflicts throughout the world. These horrors of course also caused Western criticisms of
modernity, of which the Frankfurt School is a notable example.
Hashim argued that his carefully worked out political philosophy was the essence of all
religions, most notably Islam, and Platonic philosophy. His philosophy did not seek preservation
or revival but constructed an ideal that Hashim used not only to criticize modernity and rival
political ideologies but also to attack the existing social order and religious orthodoxy of
Pakistan. In his reinterpretation Islam became a revolutionary creed, which he argued was more
conducive to political ideals of freedom, equality, peace, and even progress than modern
ideologies of liberal democracy or communism. The validity of these arguments, which I discuss
at length in chapter 3, remains open to debate. What is important to stress, however, is that
Hashim saw decolonization and national liberation not merely in terms of independence of a
nation but as possibilities for establishing alternatives to modern politics. He conceived and
argued for Pakistani nationalism to be based not on Muslim identity but on the essence of Islam.
Though he rejected modernity, he conceived of its political aims, for example, concerns about
the equality and dignity of human beings, as the essence of Islam rather than intrinsic to
modernity. In doing so, Hashim outlined an Islamic ideology that was valid not only for

299

Pakistan or Muslims but also for humanity. The establishment and spread of the ideology was to
be Pakistan’s contribution to humanity.
Maolana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani shared many of Hashim’s philosophical criticisms
of modernity, though the inspirations behind Bhashani’s critiques were more diverse, as were
their political manifestations. He and Hashim were deeply influenced by the philosophy of
Rububiyah, a particular interpretation of Islam that had significant following among Muslim
leaders and thinkers in the early 20th century. Bhashani was, however, also a Sufi pir with a
large number of disciples among the Muslim peasants of Bengal and Assam. And his political
thought and action were primarily oriented not by philosophical considerations but by his
impulse to serve the interests and improve the condition of the poor peasants, the sharbahara of
Bengal, of whom he was an organic representative. Throughout his political life Bhashani
fought to overturn the class society, which exploited the toiling masses and deprived them of
their humanity. His philosophy was always connected to the interests of his constituency and
concrete political programs.
He argued, similar to Hashim, that the banishment of God, spirituality, and concern for
the soul constituted the fundamental flaw of modern politics and that “The Islamic ideals of
equality, fraternity, and peace that had been announced fourteen hundred years ago that should
serve humanity better than communism, not only today but until the end of days.” However,
Islam was superior not merely in an abstract philosophical comparison among political
ideologies but concretely because it served the “helpless and oppressed peasants, workers, and
other destitute of the world” better.

While Hashim spent much of his energy criticizing

modernity and articulating a theory of an ideal Islamic polity, his theories about how to achieve
that ideal were not well developed. Bhashani similarly critiqued modernity to advance his theory
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of ideal government, palonbad or the doctrine of nurture. Unlike Hashim, however, Bhashani
also advanced theories and concrete political programs for realizing the ideal. He contended that
to achieve true freedom and the ideals of Islam required the simultaneous pursuit of a twopronged struggle, which on one hand should seek to produce social revolution and on the other
hand should seek to achieve purification and reform of the self. By social revolution Bhashani
meant overturning the existing socio-economic hierarchy through class struggle and radical
democratic actions of the dispossessed. The purification and reform of the self were to be
produced by a program of philosophical and practical education, which Bhashani theorized and
then tried to institute through his Islamic University. While Hashim’s philosophical elaborations
of the ideal Islamic polity appeared esoteric and failed to attract much of a following, Bhashani’s
concrete political programs animated political movements with hundreds of thousands of
participants and produced sustained curiosity and excitement about his political philosophy
among successive generations of the Bangladeshi intelligentsia.
The question of identity occupies a curious space in both Hashim and Bhashani’s
thought. Though both of them played leading roles in various movements of the Pakistan era that
sought to advance Bengali culture and language, neither saw the need to treat the question of
identity seriously in their political theories. They treated cultural identity as a fact of life without
much, if any political significance. Perhaps they were anxious that attaching political
significance to their Bengali cultural identity might lead them down the slippery slope of
identitarian politics and nationalism, which they both agreed were contrary to the Islamic ideal of
the universal brotherhood of men. Thus, Hashim failed to offer any cogent rationale for his
participation in the state language movements of the 1950s or the pro-Tagore movement of the
1960s. To the extent Bhashani offered a rationale for his advocacy for the Bengali language, he
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articulated as making politics accessible to the subaltern masses by ensuring that government
business be conducted in their language.
By minimizing political significance of cultural identity, Hashim and Bhashani decoupled
the question of political ideology from identity, which in turn allowed them to advance Islamist
political ideology without facing the charge of communalism. Both argued that just as one could
be a Bengali and a liberal or a communist simultaneously, one could also be a Bengali and an
Islamist concurrently. And what was politically significant was not Bengali identity but
adherence to liberal, communist, or Islamist ideologies. I find this argument to be entirely
legitimate in the context of defining the political character of the postcolonial state, which
according to the logic of national liberation should be subject to choices made by postcolonial
politics. Yet I cannot help but wonder, as have critics of Hashim and Bhashani, how seriously
can we take their claim that their adherence to Islamic political ideologies resulted from their
philosophical reflections and not from their Muslim identity? Perhaps, their projects were
ultimately about rescuing modernity for Muslims by articulating an Islamic political ideology
that, despite all the objections to modernity, would be able to appeal to modern subjects.
In striking contrast to Hashim and Bhashani, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was
unapologetically modernist. He was a modern professional politician committed to liberal
political ideals of constitutionalism, democracy, federalism, secularism, egalitarianism, and
individual rights. And though Mujib agreed with Ahmad about the importance of cultural
identity and autonomy, he did not hold cultural autonomy to be the essence of national liberation,
as Ahmad did. Liberation signified not merely independence of the nation but the emancipation
of the people from economic misery and political oppression. This conception of liberation
informed Mujib’s political activism in the Pakistan period, as well as his political and economic
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programs in independent Bangladesh. He invoked the idea of Shonar Bangla to imagine and
offer an inspiration for a prosperous Bengal that would be free of the abject poverty, famine, and
violence that had characterized 20th century Bengal. Mujib’s ideal of Sonar Bangla was a
fundamentally modernizing concept containing visions of economic, social, and political
developments. Mujib grew up during a period when the Bengali-Muslim middle class was
coming into being and constructing its self-identity by embracing social-cultural modernization.
Like many of his generation Mujib was deeply influenced by and subscribed to the modernizing
project and saw moral and cultural improvement of Bengali Muslims as requisites for the socialeconomic development of the country.
In many ways Mujib resembles the figure of “liberation militant” described by Walzer.
Certainly, Mujib made no attempt to differentiate his political project from Western modernity.
Among the thinkers in this dissertation, Mujib was the least concerned with the negotiation
between modernity and identity. One explanation for this may be that unlike the political
projects of Ahmad, Hashim, or Bhashani, Mujib’s was not primarily shaped by anti-colonial
struggles against a Western colonizer but by struggles against an authoritarian postcolonial state.
Another explanation is that he saw no tension between modernity and identity and thus no need
for negotiation. He was liberal in his political ideology, Bengali in this cultural orientation, and
Muslim in his faith.

Mujib never explicitly discussed the relationship among these three

categories, but I read this silence, while he continued to simultaneously be Bengali, Muslim, and
liberal in his political life, as an indication that he saw no contradiction among the categories.
His liberalism was not intrinsic to his Bengali identity, despite contrary claims by many presentday Bengali nationalists. Neither was liberalism antithetical to his Bengali identity or his
Muslimness. Perhaps Mujib implicitly agreed with Hashim and Bhashani’s explicit projects of

303

decoupling identity from ideology. Like Hashim and Bhashani, Mujib did not claim the validity
of his political ideology based on any inherent connection to the cultural identity of the people.
And like these two thinkers, Mujib did not argue that acceptance of or adherence to any political
ideology required the people to overcome their identity. If one can be Bengali and Islamist
simultaneously, one can also be Bengali and liberal and thus modern at the same time.
III
In analyzing the negotiation between modernity and identity in Bangladesh, I inevitably
engaged with the history of nationalism and with the nationalist discourses of the country. My
engagement has been framed by the argument that national identity is both real and imagined.
National identity is both a sociological category and a discursive construct. Definite and
identifiable historical processes produce the ties and “sentiments” that bind the nation and
produce the possibilities for and shape nationalist discourses. In my analysis of nationalism I
focus on how Bengali and Muslim identities have been constructed and negotiated against each
other to produce a composite Bengali-Muslim identity, which serves as the foundation of
contemporary Bangladeshi national identity. I also analyze how these two identities have been
mobilized in particular ways in service of the two moments in the double birth of the nation –
first as Pakistan, then as Bangladesh. My decision to organize the dissertation around the two
moments of birth rests on the argument that to understand 1971 one must understand 1947 – the
moment of decolonization, the original moment of national liberation, and one that makes
possible and continues to live through 1971. To understand the political dynamics and discourses
in contemporary Bangladesh one must engage with the Pakistan period of Bangladesh’s history
and examine how Bengali-Muslims thought of Pakistan and why they participated in the
Pakistan project.
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However, as the passions around the Shahbag movement demonstrate, these questions
and issues are not merely academic but are politically potent and highly contentious. 1971 looms
large in Bangladeshi history, and the memory of the genocidal violence unleashed on the
Bangladeshi people by the Pakistani Army remains alive as an open wound. The Shahbag
movement of 2013, you will recall, was first and foremost a movement to ensure accountability
for 1971’s war crimes and atrocities, committed to defeat the Bangladeshi liberation struggle.
The memory of trauma and sacrifice are not mere abstract nationalist constructions in
Bangladesh but all too concrete and deeply personal. Thus, the questions about the relationship
between 1947 and 1971, between Pakistan and Bangladesh and between Muslim and Bengali
identities, understandably stirs up trauma and outrage among many in Bangladesh. Yet these
questions must be raised and answered if there is to be clarity. Perhaps academic works that seek
such understanding, as I do, can play positive of roles in healing remaining open wounds.
One of the ways my dissertation contributes to the process of healing is by challenging
the oppositional dichotomy between Bengali and Muslim identities and political ideals that is all
too common in Bangladeshi political and intellectual discourses. Though I have argued that
Walzer overemphasizes the impact and political power of the “liberation militant,” the figure is
by no means fictitious or inconsequential. One may find plenty of examples of this figure in the
political conversations carried out in academic circles, traditional media, and especially in the
emerging social media of contemporary Bangladesh. Bangladeshi incarnations of the liberation
militant claim to represent the mukti-juddher chetona, the spirit of liberation, which they
construct in terms of secular Bengali nationalism and in opposition to the Muslim nationalism of
Pakistan. In these constructions Muslimness appears not only as the bearer of a discredited
nationalism but also as a marker of backwardness and reactionary politics. In constructing
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Muslimness in such a way, the militants demonstrate their failures to recognize the religious
commitments of the people and to appreciate the possibilities of the emancipatory politics
contained within religious politics generally and Bangladeshi Islamist politics particularly. This
failure allows a particular kind of political Islam to claim to be the true representative of the
people and to rejects Bengali nationalism and progressive and egalitarian political programs on
account of their supposed anti-Islamic character. The dichotomy between Bengali and Muslim
identities is not only politically counterproductive but also something that is almost entirely
absent in the thought and politics of some of the most important figures in Bangladeshi history.
None of the four thinkers in this dissertation, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman –
Bangladesh’s Father of the Nation, saw support for Pakistani nationalism as problematic,
regressive, or antithetical to Bengali ethno-linguistic identity. Nor did they see their Bengali
identity or nationalism as antithetical to their Muslimness. Engaging the thought and politics of
these thinkers, along with critical analyses of social and political histories of Bangladesh, allow
one to navigate the tensions between Bengali and Muslim, between secular and religious,
between modern and traditional, between progressive and reactionary politics with more clarity.
Such engagements produce political discourses and practices that are much less contentious and
a lot more accommodating and empathetic towards different points of views, which has been one
of my objectives here.
IV
In this dissertation I have provided an account of Bangladeshi political thought. A
comprehensive and exhaustive account of any such tradition is nearly impossible. It is much
more difficult in a context like Bangladesh, which lacks a recognized body of political thought.
Thus, an account of Bangladeshi political thought will inevitably be limited and incomplete. That
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much is given. I have discussed many of these limitations in the introduction and provided an
argument regarding why engaging with the lives and ideas of the four thinkers that I select,
leaving aside dozens of others who could have legitimately claimed to be included in a project
like this, may still be valuable in providing an account of Bangladeshi political thought.
However, in the process of completing this dissertation I recognize many other limitations of the
project. Two of those limitations are significant.
First, though I seek to analyze “Bangladeshi” political thought, I do not actually engage
with much of it. By choosing to focus on the two moments of the double birth of the nation and
by selecting the figures that I found to be especially relevant for understanding these two
moments, I end up discussing mostly the political thought of the late colonial and Pakistani
period. Though they are constitutive of and relevant for understanding Bangladeshi politics, they
represent mostly its prehistory. I have little to say about the diverse questions and concerns that
have been discussed and debated by Bangladeshi intellectuals and political actors over the last 50
years. I was aware of this limitation from the beginning and even considered engaging with more
contemporary political thinkers, for example, those who are reflecting upon the difference
between the promise and the reality of national liberation or with those who are re-imagining the
discourses of development and progress. I found, however, it too difficult to contemplate these
contemporary discourses while continuing to engage with the discourses that I do here. I had to
make some choices, and I chose, after carrying out substantial research and accumulating some
notes, to save my engagement with contemporary Bangladeshi political thought for a possible
future project. I chose to focus instead on this mostly prehistory of Bangladeshi political thought
because without understanding this prehistory attempts to understand contemporary discourses
would be severely handicapped.
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The second and perhaps more glaring limitation of this dissertation is that it is silent
about gender equality. Part of this silence is because each of my interlocutors themselves was
silent about the gender question, despite their concerns about liberation, equality, autonomy, and
democracy. This kind of silence, however, was not uncommon in traditions of political thought.
Nineteenth century Indian liberals were for example silent about the question of caste, just as
18th century American revolutionaries were silent about the question of slavery. I do not point to
these historical examples as a way of excusing the silence of Bengali-Muslim nationalists on
gender questions, especially because feminist discourses were already in circulation – not only in
distant Europe or America or among Indian nationalists but also within the cultural tradition of
Bengali Muslims, the most famous example of which was Begum Rokeya.6 However, I argue
that though their silence on the gender question is potentially revealing of their patriarchal
attitude, it does not necessarily invalidate their other democratic and egalitarian projects.
Of course, another reason for the dissertation’s silence on the gender question is my own
failure to engage with it. Perhaps there were other thinkers and actors whom I could have chosen
who would have allowed me to engage with the questions of women’s rights and equality. Or I
could have more explicitly addressed the silence of my interlocutors and of Bengali-Muslim
nationalist discourses regarding the gender question. On both accounts I must admit my failure,
due in part by the practical necessity to focus on some questions while ignoring others. But my
failure was also due to my lack of appreciation about how productive an engagement with the
gender question would have been for a discussion of the negotiation between modernity and
identity. Again, this I will have to save for a future project.
6

Rokeya Sakhawat Hussain (1880-1932) is by far the most famous Muslim feminist writer of
colonial India. She penned among others the celebrated 1905 satire and feminist utopian story
“Sultana’s Dream.” See Kalyani Dutta, Freedom Fables: Satire and Politics in Rokeya Sakhawat
Hussain’s Writings (New Delhi: Zubaan Books, 2019).
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V
Despite the many limitations of this dissertation, some of which I am aware of and have
tried to account for and others that will be evident only to a more perceptive reader, I believe that
I have succeeded in accomplishing the tasks that I had proposed. The most explicit of the tasks
was to provide an analysis of the negotiation of modernity and identity in Bangladeshi political
thought. In the process, I have offered a reading of the political and intellectual histories of the
country that I hope will produce a better understanding of the dynamics of nationalist politics.
Perhaps the analysis provided here will persuade us to reevaluate our conceptions about the
political significance of Islam in Bangladesh, not only as the source of social conservatism or
political violence, which it certainly is sometime, but also as inspiration for a politics oriented
towards social justice, egalitarianism, radical democracy, and universal peace. Perhaps we
should view Islamist politics as something that needs to be politically and philosophically
contended with rather than as something that needs to be suppressed by the secular state.
By analyzing Bangladeshi political thought, I advance a fundamental argument that
Bangladeshi political thought exists. Though in some sense it is an unnecessary point to make.
Why wouldn’t there be Bangladeshi political thought? Yet it is also a radical argument to make
given the persistent Eurocentrism of Western academia and its inability to treat non-Western
peoples as thinking subjects capable of producing philosophical reflections and theories. In
recent years there has been increasing recognition, perhaps due to the influence of postcolonial
critiques, of the possibilities of philosophy in India, China, or the Arab world, places that have
civilizational identities and ancient aura. However, there is less recognition regarding little places
like Bangladesh or Burkina Faso. And even when that recognition is granted theoretically, it does
not generate many efforts within Western academia to read and engage with the ideas from these
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far off places. Eurocentrism is also internalized and reproduced in non-western countries. There
may be many Bangladeshi scholars who are trying to make sense of Deleuze but not many bother
to read Hashim. There are some occasional efforts to read the political philosophy of this or that
Bangladeshi thinker or political leader, but there is no concept of a Bangladeshi tradition of
political thought. I seek to overcome that glaring absence by trying to build a “shelf” or body of
Bangladeshi political thought, which I imagine to be situated in the great library of political
thinkers and philosophers. The four thinkers that I engage with are the first ones on that shelf. I
hope more will be added to the shelf. The question, however, is who should be on that shelf and
how should we decide? Is my decision to put these four thinkers on that shelf justified? Do they
even qualify as philosophers? Are they worthy to be in the same section of a library with Plato or
Locke or Foucault? To answer these questions we must first read them and be open to the
possibility that they might be worth reading.
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